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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Ronald Ryan Berrett, Lanie Berrett
vs.
Clark County School District No. 161

Supreme Court Case No. 46354-2018

CLERK’S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District,
in and for the County of Jefferson

HONORABLE BRUCE L. PICKETT

Jacob Scott Wessel

Blake G Hall

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

Boise, Idaho

Boise, Idaho
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JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMAR Y
CASE No. CV-2017-328
Ronald Ryan Berrett, Lanie Berrett

§
§
§
§

vs.
Clark County School District No. 161

Jefferson County District
Court
Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.
Filed on: 05/10/2017
Case Number History:
Location:

CASE INFORMATION

Statistical Closures
08/02/2018
Closed

Case Type:

AA- All Initial District Court
Filings (Not E, F, and Hl)

Case
Status: 08/02/2018 Closed

DATE

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-2017-328
Jefferson County District Court
06/28/2017
Pickett, Bruce L.

PARTY INFORMATION

Plaintiff

Lead Attorneys
Wessel, Jacob Scott
Retained
208-522-1230(W)

Berrett, Lanie

Berrett, Ronald Ryan

Defendant

DATE

Wessel, Jacob Scott
Retained
208-522- l 230(W)

Clark County School District No. 161

Hall, Blake G.
Retained
208-522-3003(W)

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE C0l!RT

05/09/2017

Complaint Filed (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. )
Complaint Filed

05/10/2017

New Case Filed Other Claims (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. )
New Case Filed - Other Claims

05/10/2017

Attorney Retained (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.)
Plaintiff: Berrett, Ronald Attorney Retained Jacob S Wessel

05/10/2017

Notice of Appearance (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. )
Notice OfAppearance

05/10/2017

Attorney Retained (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. )
Plaintiff: Berrett, Lanie Attorney Retained Jacob S Wessel

05/10/2017

Notice of Appearance (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.)
Notice OfAppearance

05/10/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. )
Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Court of any type not listed in categories E,
F and H(l) Paid by: Wessel, Jacob S (attorney for Berrett, Ronald Ryan) Receipt number:
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JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMAR Y
CASE No. CV-2017-328
0002362 Dated: 5/10/2017 Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: Berrett, Ronald Ryan (plaintiff)
05/10/2017

Summons Issued (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.)
Summons Issued

05/24/2017

Affidavit of Service (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. )
Affidavit ofService-D. Lantis served

05/25/2017

Notice (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.)
Notice ofNon Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Diqualify

06/02/2017

Motion (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.)
Motion for Disqualification

06/02/2017

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.)
Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofMotion for Disqualificaiton

06/12/2017

Attorney Retained (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.)
Defendant: Clark County School District No. 161 Attorney Retained Blake G. Hall

06/12/2017

Notice of Appearance (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.)
Notice OfAppearance

06/12/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. )
Filing: I 1 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Hall,
Blake G. (attorney for Clark County School District No. 161) Receipt number: 0002937
Dated: 6/12/2017 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: Clark County School District No. 161
(defendant)

06/12/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C. )
Order ofDisqualification

06/12/2017

Order (Judicial Officer: Stephens, Alan C.)
Order ofAssignment

06/12/2017

Change Assigned Judge (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory)
Change Assigned Judge

06/16/2017

Notice (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory)
Plaintiff's Notice ofIntent to Take Default

06/19/2017

Motion (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory )
Motion for Disqualification

06/19/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory)
Defendant's Answer to Complaint

06/20/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory)
Order ofDisqualification

06/22/2017

Order (Judicial Officer: Moeller, Gregory)
Order ofAssignment

06/22/2017

Change Assigned Judge (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Change Assigned Judge

06/28/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 07/12/2017 02:00 PM)

06/28/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Notice Of Hearing- Status Conference
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JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-328
07/10/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 08/09/2017 02:00 PM) Motion for partial summary judgment

07/12/2017

Motion (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Motion for Change of Venue

07/12/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Change of Venue

07/12/2017

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Affidavit ofBlake G. Hall in Support ofMotion for Change of Venue

07/12/2017

Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 7112/2017
Time: 2:33 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Kylee Wetherell
Tape Number:

07/12/2017

Hearing Held (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 07/12/2017 02:00 PM: Hearing Held

07/12/2017

Status Conference (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled on 07/12/2017 02:00 PM· Hearing Held

07/13/2017

Motion (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Motion for Change of Venue

07/13/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Change of Venue

07/13/2017

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Affidavit ofBlake G Hall in support ofMotion for Change of Venue

07/13/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 08/09/2017 02:00 PM) Motion for change of Venue

07/14/2017

Hearing Vacated (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 08/09/2017 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion for
change of Venue

07/14/2017

Hearing Vacated (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 08/09/2017 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion for
partial summary judgment

07/14/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 09/29/2017 01:30 PM) Motion for Summary Judgment

07/14/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Notice Of Hearing- Motion for Summary Judgment

07/14/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 01/29/2018 01:30 PM)

07/14/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/26/2018 09:00 AM)
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JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMAR Y
CASE No. CV-2017-328
08/09/2017

CANCELED Motion Hearing (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Vacated
Motion for partial summary judgment Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 08/09/2017
02:00 PM· Hearing Vacated

08/09/2017

CANCELED Motion Hearing (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Vacated
Motion for change of Venue Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 08/09/2017 02:00 PM:
Hearing Vacated

08/31/2017

Notice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Defendant's Notice of Hearing

08/31/2017

Motion (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

08/31/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Defendant's memorandum in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment

08/31/2017

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Affidavit ofBlake G. Hall

08/31/2017

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Affidavit ofDavid Kress

08/31/2017

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Affidavit ofErin Haight-Mortensen

08/31/2017

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Affidavit of Gayle Woods

09/01/2017

Notice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Plaintiff's Notice ofHearing

09/01/2017

Motion (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Plaintiff's Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment

09/01/2017

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Affidavit ofRonald Ryan Berrett in Support ofMotion/or Partial Summary Judgment

09/01/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support ofMotion/or Partial Summary Judgment Striking
Defendant's Fourteenth Affirmative Defense (Rules 12(j) and 56)

09/01/2017

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Affidavit ofJacob S. Wessel in Support ofPlaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

09/14/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

09/14/2017

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Affidavit in Support ofMemorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion/or Partial Summary
Judgment

09/15/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Plaintiff's Response to: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

09/15/2017

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Affidavit ofJacob S. Wessel in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

09/19/2017

Hearing Vacated (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
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JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-328
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 09/29/2017 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion for
Summary Judgment

09/19/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 10/06/2017 09:00 AM) Motions for Summary Judgment

09/19/2017

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Notice Of Hearing - Motions for Summary Judgment

09/22/2017

Reply (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

09/25/2017

Reply (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Reply in Support ofDefendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

09/29/2017

CANCELED Motion Hearing (I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Vacated
Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 09/29/2017 01:30
PM: Hearing Vacated

10/06/2017

Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 10/6/2017
Time: 8:56 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Kylee Wetherell
Tape Number:
Jacob S. Wessell
Blake G. Hall
Mary Fox

10/06/2017

Hearing Held (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 10/06/2017 09:00 AM: Hearing Held Motions for
Summary Judgment

10/06/2017

Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Motions for Summary Judgment Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 10/06/2017 09:00
AM· Hearing Held

11/22/2017

Order (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Opinion and Order on Parties Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

11/22/2017

Judgment (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Judgment of Dismissal

11/22/2017

Status Changed (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Case Status changed: Closed pending clerk action

11/22/2017

Civil Disposition Entered (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Civil Disposition Entered entered for: Clark County School District No. 161, Defendant;
Berrett, Lanie, Plaintiff; Berrett, Ronald Ryan, Plaintiff. Filing date: 11/22/2017

11/22/2017

Dismissed With Prejudice
Party (Berrett, Ronald Ryan)
Party (Berrett, Lanie)
Party (Clark County School District No. 161)

12/04/2017

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 01/12/2018 10:00AM) Motion to Reconsider

PAGE50F9
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JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMAR Y
CASE No. CV-2017-328
01/04/2018

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Response Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider

01/04/2018

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Affidavit ofBlake G Hall

01/09/2018

Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Plaintiff's Reply RE:Motion to Reconsider

01/12/2018

Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motions
Hearingdate: 1/12/2018
Time: 10:00am
Courtroom: Large Courtroom #3
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Denise Criddle
Tape Number:
Party: Clark County School District No. 161, Attorney: Blake Hall
Party: Lanie Berrett, Attorney: Jacob Wessel
Party: Ronald Berrett, Attorney: Jacob Wessel

01/12/2018

Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Minute Entry RE: Motion to Reconsider

01/12/2018

Hearing Held (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing result/or Motions scheduled on 01/12/201810:00 AM: Hearing Held Motion to
Reconsider

01/12/2018

Motion Hearing (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Motion to Reconsider Hearing result for Motions scheduled on OJ /1212018 I 0:00 AM:
Hearing Held

01/29/2018

Hearing Vacated (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Hearing result/or Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 01/29/2018 01:30 PM: Hearing
Vacated

01/29/2018

Hearing Vacated (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 02/26/2018 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

01/29/2018

CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Vacated
Hearing result/or Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on 01/29/2018 01:30 PM: Hearing
Vacated

02/14/2018

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Memorandum Decision on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider

02/26/2018

Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
02/27/2018-03/02/2018

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 02/26/2018 09:00 AM· Hearing Vacated
03/07/2018

Motion (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Motion for Summary Judgment RE: Federal Claims

03/07/2018

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Memorandum in Support ofMotion/or Summary Judgment RE: Federal Claims

03/07/2018

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Affidavit ofBlake G Hall in Support ofMotion/or Summary Judgment RE: Federal Claims

03/12/2018

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
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JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-328
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 05103/2018 01: 30 PM) Motion for Summary Judgment
03/16/2018

Notice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Notice of Hearing: 05/03/2018@01:30 PM

04/23/2018

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment

04/23/2018

Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Affidavit ofCounsel in Opposition to Defendant's 2nd Motion/or Summary Judgment

04/24/2018

Reply to Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion/or Summary Judgment RE: Federal Claims

05/03/2018

Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 5/312018
Time: 10:48 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Denise Criddle
Tape Number:
Party: Clark County School District No. 161, Attorney: Blake Hall
Party: Lanie Berrett, Attorney: Jacob Wessel
Party: Ronald Berrett, Attorney: Jacob Wessel

05/03/2018

Hearing Held (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Hearing result/or Motions scheduled on 05/03/2018 01:30 PM: Hearing Held Motion/or
Summary Judgment

05/03/2018

Motion Hearing (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 05/03/2018 01: 30
PM: Hearing Held

06/04/2018

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion/or Summary Judgment

06/18/2018

Motion (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Motion/or Reconsideration RE: Attorney Fees

06/18/2018

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Memorandum in Support of Motion/or Reconsideration RE: Attorney Fees

06/21/2018

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 08/01/2018 02:00 PM)

06/22/2018

Notice of Hearing (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Notice ofHearing: 08/01/2018@ 02:00 PM

07/25/2018

Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider

07/27/2018

Reply (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Reply Memorandum in Support ofMotion/or Reconsideration RE: Attorney Fees

08/01/2018

Minute Entry (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motions
Hearing date: 8/1/2018
Time: 1:46pm
Courtroom: Large Courtroom #3

PAGE70F9
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JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-328
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Denise Criddle
Tape Number:
Party: Clark County School District No. 161, Attorney: Blake Hall
Party: Lanie Berrett, Attorney: Jacob Wessel
Party: Ronald Berrett, Attorney: Jacob Wessel
08/01/2018

Hearing Held (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Hearing result/or Motions scheduled on 08/01/2018 02:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion/or
Reconsideration Re: Attorney Fees

08/01/2018

Motion Hearing (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Motion/or Reconsideration Re: Attorney Fees Hearing result/or Motions scheduled on
08/01/2018 02:00 PM· Hearing Held

08/02/2018

Order (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider

08/02/2018

Judgment (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Final Judgment

08/02/2018

Status Changed (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Case Status changed: Closed

09/10/2018

Notice (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Notice ofAppeal

09/12/2018

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid by: Wessel, Jacob S
(attorney for Berrett, Lanie) Receipt number: 0004520 Dated: 9/1212018 Amount: $129. 00
(Check) For: Berrett, Lanie (plaintiff) and Berrett, Ronald Ryan (plaintiff)

09/12/2018

ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L. )
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy OfAny File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page
Paid by: Jacob Wessel Receipt number: 0004536 Dated: 9/12/2018 Amount: $100.00 (Check)

09/12/2018

Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Clerk's Certificate ofAppeal

09/19/2018

•

10/29/2018

•

Reporter's Notice ofTranscript(s) Lodged

10/29/2018

•

Transcript Filed

Miscellaneous (Judicial Officer: Pickett, Bruce L.)
Clerk's Resord and Reporter's Transcript Due Dates Set

DATE

FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Defendant Clark County School District No. 16 l
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 11/2/2018

136.00
136.00
0.00

Plaintiff Berrett, Lanie
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 11/2/2018

129.00
129.00
0.00

Plaintiff Berrett, Ronald Ryan
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 11/2/2018

321.00
321.00
0.00
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JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-328
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
RONALD RYAN BERRETT AND LANIE )
)
BERRETT, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)
v.
)
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT )
)
NO. 161,
)
Defendant.

CaseNo.CV-17-QQ2-g

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL
Fee Category: A
Fee: $221.00

COME NOW plaintiffs Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett, and for cause of action
against defendant, allege as follows:

INTRODUCTION
1.

This matter was origirutlly filed in tbe United States District Court for

tbe District ofldabo in Case 4: 12-cv-00626-EJL-CWD Berrett v. Clark County School District No.
161 asserting claims under federal law and claims under state law, over which tbat court had
jurisdiction based upon tbat court's supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC § 1367.
2.

On September 30, 2014, tbe United States District Court for tbe District of Idaho

granted summary judgment to Defendant Clark County School District No. 161 on all claims.

1-

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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3.

Plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; the Ninth

Circuit reversed and remanded as to Plaintiffs' state law claims, but upheld the granting of summary
judgment as to Plaintiffs' federal claims. A courtesy copy of this decision is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.
4.

On April 18, 2017, in its Memorandum Decision and Order ofDismissal, the United

States District Court declined federal jurisdiction and dismissed plaintiffs' federal complaint without
prejudice pursuant to 28 USC § 1367 (c) for filing in state court. A courtesy copy of this decision
is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5.

Plaintiffs timely bring this Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial pursuant to 28 USC

§ 1367 (d); Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the period of limitations is tolled for a period of thirty
(30) days after the federal claims are dismissed in order to provide adequate time to refile in state
court.
6.

Plaintiffs are residents and citizens of the State of Idaho and are residents of the

County of Jefferson.
7.

Defendant Clark County School District # 161 is a school district operating in the

State ofldaho, County of Clark.
8.

Venue is proper in Jefferson County, State of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-

2105(3) and the District Court properly has jurisdiction as the amount in controversy is in excess of
$10,000.00.
ALLEGATIONS
9.
2-

Plaintiffs' allegations are contained in the federal Complaint and Demand for Jury

COMPLAJNT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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/\

Trial attached hereto as Exhibit C, and incorporated as if fully set forth herein.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs request this Court:
1.

To assume jurisdiction over each of the causes set forth herein.

2.

To declare Clark's conduct as alleged herein to be in violation ofthe relevant statutes
and public policy.

3.

For plaintiffs' lost wages, benefits, and remuneration from the date of termination
until reinstatement in amounts to be proven at trial;

4.

For reinstatement with full fringe benefits and seniority rights, but if reinstatement
is not an option as an equitable remedy in lieu ofreinstatement, plaintiffs are entitled
to an award of lost wages, benefits, and remuneration in amounts to be proven at

trial;
5.

For assessment of a civil fine;

6.

For pre-judgment interest at the highest applicable rate on all amounts found due and
owing;

7.

For an award ofplaintiffs' attorney fees, expert witness fees, and court costs incurred
in bringing this action; and

8.

3-

For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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DATED May 4, 2017.
TIIOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

~1

5~ ~

acob S. Wessel, Esq.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury.

DATED May 4, 2017.
TIIOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

~ 5., ~
Jacob S. Wessel, Esq.

4-
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FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS

MAR 172017
MOLLY C. DWYEB, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONALD RYAN BERRETT; LANIE
BERRETT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

No.

14-35894

D.C. No.
4: 12-cv-00626-EJL-CWD

v.
MEMORANDUM*

CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
NO. 161,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 9, 2017
Seattle, Washington
Before: GRABER, IKUTA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Ronald Ryan and Lanie Berrett appeal the district court's order
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Clark County School District
(Clark County). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

•
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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The district court erred in granting Clark County's motion for f!nmmary
judgment on Mr. Berrett's claim for retaliatory discharge under the Idaho
Protection of Public Employees Act (Idaho Whistleblower Act). Mr. Berrett
established a prim.a facie case of retaliatory conduct by presenting evidence that:
he engaged in protected activity by reporting "a violation or suspected violation of
a law," Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1)(a); he suffered an "adverse action" when he was
terminated, id. § 6-2103(1); and the "close relation in time" between them, among
other factors, suggests he may have been fired for reporting the propane issue.
Curlee v. Kootenai Cty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,397 (2008). This is
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary judgment
Id. at 396 (holding that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework does
not apply to claims under the Idaho Whistleblower Act at the summary judgment
stage).
The district court correctly held that Ms. Berrett did not engage in any
protected activity and therefore cannot bring a claim under the Idaho
Whistleblower Act However, the court failed to address Ms. Berrett's common
law claim for termination in violation of public policy-that is, firing her in
retaliation for her husband's statutorily protected whistleblower activity--and
should consider on remand whether this claim also survives summary judgment.
2
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The district court did not err in granting Clark County's motion for summary
judgment on the Berretts' claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA), because the Berretts failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether they were terminated ''because of [Mr. Berrett's] disability." Allen v.

Pacific Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). The Berretts also
argue that they were terminated for Mr. Berrett's reasonable accommodation
requests but failed to produce evidence supporting this theory.
Nor did the district court err in granting Clark County's motion for
immmary judgment on the Berretts' claims under the Fair Housing Act. Clark
County provided evidence that the Berretts were evicted because they were no
longer employees, and the Berretts do not offer any direct or circumstantial
evidence that they were evicted because of Mr. Berrett's disability. Nor is there a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Clark County raised the Berretts' rent
or altered the Berretts' payment policy because of Mr. Berrett's disability.
Although Clark County asserted that it changed the Berretts' payment policy to
avoid raising Mr. Berrett's income to the point where he would lose his disability
benefits, such economic considerations do not constitute discrimination based on
disability.

3
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Finally, the district court did not err by declining to rule on evidentiary
objections that were not ''material to its ruling." Norse v. City ofSanta Cruz, 629
F.3d 966,973 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane).
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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UNITED STAIBS DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

RONALD RYAN BERRETT and
LANIE BERRETT, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 4:12-CV-0626-EJL

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

v.
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
NO: 161,
Defendant.

Currently pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Court to Decline
Jurisdiction. (Dkt. 46). The parties have filed their responsive briefing and the matter is
now ripe for the Court's consideration.
Having fully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments
are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding
further delay, and because the Court conclusively fmds that the decisional process would
not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Motions shall be decided on the record
before this Court without oral argument.

BACKGROUND
On September 30, 2014, this Court issued a decision dismissing all of Plaintiffs'
claims. (Dkt. 38.) These included claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), ("ADA"); the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f), 3613;
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and Idaho law, including termination in violation of public policy, specifically the Idaho
Whistleblower Act, I.e. §§ 6-2101-2109. (Dkt. 1.) Plaintiffs alleged that the employment
practices described in the Complaint occurred in Clark County, Idaho. (Id., 'If 6).
Plaintiffs appealed the Court's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Dkt.
41.) On March 17, 2017, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision affirming in part and reversing
in part the Court's decision. (Dkt. 45.) The Ninth Circuit affmned the Court's decision
dismissing the federal claims, reversed the Court's decision dismissing the state law claims,
and remanded the case back to the Court for further proceedings.
Three days after the case was remanded, Defendant moved to effectively dismiss
the remaining state law claims. (Dkt. 46.) Defendant argues that the Court should decline
jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(c).

DISCUSSION
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs' Complaint initially
raised claims based on federal laws over which the Court has original jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.") The Complaint also raised
state law claims over which the Court exercised supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a) ("[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the

district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related
to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy under Article ill of the United states constitution.")

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 2
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In its original decision dismissing Plaintiffs' state law claims, the Court opted to
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims after dismissing the federal
law claims. (Dkt 38.) However, at this point and after the Ninth Circuit's decision, all of
Plaintiffs' federal claims have been dismissed and the Court is left to decide whether to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' only remaining claim: wrongful
discharge in violation of the Idaho Whistleblower Act.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3), the Court has discretion to decide whether to
decline, or exercise, supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. "To
decline jurisdiction under §1367(c)(3), the district court must first identify the dismissal
that triggers the exercise of discretion and then explain how declining jurisdiction serves
the objectives of economy, convenience and fairness to the parties, and comity." Trustees

of Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Desert Valley Landscape &
Maintenance, Inc., 333 F.3d 923,925 (9th Cir. 2003).
In this case, after the appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Court is left to decide the state
claim exclusively. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remand essentially triggered the Court to
conduct a 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3) analysis to determine whether it should exercise
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state claims exclusively for the purpose of trial.
The Court finds that the interests of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity
weigh heavily in favor of dismis.~ing the case without prejudice in order that the case may
be tried in the Idaho state courts. First and foremost, the state courts are in the best position

to determine claims, such as those remaining here, that hinge on state policy considerations.
Second, the state courts are likely in a better position to have this case set for trial before
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 3
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this Court can set the case for trial. Third, nearly two and a half years have passed since

the Court issued a decision dismissing Plaintiffs' claims. Thus, the parties and the Court
will have to reacquaint themselves with the facts ofthis case and prepare for trial essentially
anew whether this case is tried in state or federal court.
Plaintiffs raise three basic arguments in favor of the Court retaining jurisdiction over
these state law claims. First, Plaintiffs are concerned about further delays, especially in
light of the fact the harm alleged in the complaint occurred almost five years ago. (Dkt. 47,
p. 3.) Plaintiffs argue that, because of the timing of vacating the jury trial, they are ready
to try the case as soon as schedules allow and believe they will be able to go to trial sooner
if the Court retains jurisdiction over the state law claims. Id., p. 4. Second, Plaintiffs argue

that this Court has already considered Plaintiff state claims and is, therefore familiar with
them. Id., p. 4. Third, Plaintiffs argue that there are expenses associated with starting over
in state court, including the costs of filing fees as well as the costs necessary to prepare
pretrial filings under state law. Id.
Toe Court has considered Plaintiffs' concerns but is, nevertheless, convinced that
the state court is in a better position to try these claims for the reasons outlined above.
Moreover, while the Court is mindful of the Plaintiffs' expressed cost concerns, the
Defendant expressed a countervailing argument that costs will be reduced if the case is
tried in Clark County, where the alleged conduct occurred and witnesses are located. Thus,
the economic factors, on balance, like the convenience and fairness factors, do not sway
the Court in favor of exercising its jurisdiction over the remaioioe state court claims.
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Page 22

Case 4:12-cv-006C)EJL-CWD Document 50 Filed 04,Q17 Page 5 of 5

ORDER
In light of the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Court
to Decline Jurisdiction. (Dkt. 46.) Plaintiffs' state law claims are dismissed without
prejudice.

~
UmteaSta~
war . . Lodg .. ··
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Jacob S. Wessel, ISB #7529
TIIOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 0Jannine; Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
jwessel@ts-lawoffice.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Ronald Ryan and Lanie Berrett
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

RONALD RYAN BERRETT and LANIE
BERRETT, husband and wife
P)ainti:ffa.

)
)
)

~

)
)
)

CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
NO. 161,

)
)

Docket No. CV-12-

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL

)
Defendant.

)

)

Plaintiffs Ronald Ryan and Lanie Berrett, for cause of action against Clark County School
District No. 161 (hereinafter "Clark"), state and allege as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION
1.

This is a claim under Title I ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to correct

unlawful employment practices on the basis of disability and/or age, to vindicate plaintiff's rights
and the rights of other qualified people with disabilities to fair treatment and equal opportunity, and

1-
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to make plaintiffs whole. Plaintiff Ronald R. Berrett is a qualified individual with a physical
impairment, which substantially limits him in one or more major life activities. Clark discriminated
against Plaintiffs Ronald R. Berrett and Lanie Berrett in the terms and conditions of their

employment by firing them for Mr. Berrett's disability.
2.

Plaintiffs also allege an action under and Titles I and Vil (Fair Housing Act) of the

Civil Rights Act of 1968 and 1991 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 because Clark
evicted them from their home following the termination.
3.

Plaintiffs also allege an action under Idaho Code § 6-2101, et seq. and Idaho

common law because Clark terminated them both for reporting a violation of law to Clark.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4.

This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1331. This actionisauthorizedandinstitutedpursuantto Section 107(a)oftheAmericans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 as amended ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a),pursuantto Section 102
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 198l(a), and pursuant to Title Vil of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 as amended in 1988 also known as the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f), 3613.
5.

The court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims set forth in this complaint

pursuant to its supplemental jurisdiction to hear related state law claims under 28 U .S.C. § 1367(a).
Both the federal and state law claims alleged herein arose from a common nucleus of operative fact,
the state action is so related to the federal claim that they form part of the same case or controversy,
and the actions would ordinarily be expected to be tried in one judicial proceeding.
6.

The employment practices alleged herein were committed in the District of Idaho,

County of Clark.
2-
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PARTIES
7.

Plaintiffs are residents and citizens of the State ofldaho and at all times relevant

hereto were residents of the County of Clark.
8.

Defendant Clark County School District # 161 (hereinafter "Clark") is a school

district operating in the State ofldaho, County of Clark.
9

Clark employs and has employedduringtherelevantperiods more than 15 employees

and was engaged in an industry affecting commerce. At all material times, Clark was and is an
employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1211 l(S)(A).
10.

Plaintiff Ronald R. Berrett is a qualified individual with a disability for purposes of

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), in that be has a physical impairment which substantially affects one or more
major life activities, including, but not limited to, his ability to walk and to use his hands.
11.

Clark leased a dwelling in Clark County, Idaho to Plaintiffs and then evicted

them for the disability; thus Plaintiffs are aggrieved persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §
3613.
12.

Clark regarded and treated plaintiffRonald R. Berrett as a person with an impairment

that substantially limited one or more major life activities. Plaintiff's ability to perform the essential
functions of his position with Clark was limited as a result of the attitude of Clark toward his
impairments.
13.

Despite his disability, at all relevant times plaintiff was able to work and qualified

for the positions he held with Clark. He was experienced in maintenance work, and with or without
reasonable accommodation was fully able to perform the essential functions ofthe positions he held
with Clark.
3-
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14.

PlaintiffLanieBerrettwasemployedbyClark,agovernmentagency,asalunchroom

supervisor until Clark terminated her employment on June 30, 2012.

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
15.

Plaintiff Ronald R. Berrett has filed charges of unlawful employment practices with

the Idaho Human Rights Commission, and with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") raising the issues complained of herein.
16.

Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission ("EEOC'') authorizing him to commence a civil action. Plaintiff has filed this
complaint within 90 days from the date he received his notice authorizing him to bring actions.

CLAIMS OF RELIEF
(DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION)
(fITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT)
17.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 16 as if

fully set forth herein.
18.

Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett began working for Clark in July of 2010 and was

employed by Clark part time as the maintenance supervisor, working in Dubois, Clark County Idaho
until he was terminated in violation of the ADA on June 30, 2012.
19.

At the time of his hiring, Clark was aware that Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett was

disabled, thus Clark promised that his duties would include calling contractors and light duties, but
not strenuous physical duties; Clark promised to accommodate his disability by hiring someone to
help with the physical duties.
20.

Despite the request by Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett for an accommodation,

Clark failed to accommodate Plaintiff's disability.
4-
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21.

PlaintifIRonaldRyanBerrettwasqualifiedforhispositionasmaintenancesupervisor

and was able to perform the essential functions of such positions.
22.

Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett was at all times relevant hereto and is a disabled

individual within the meaning of the Americans in that he has a disability that affects one or more
major life activities including, but not limited to his ability to walk and to use his hands and do other
manual labor.
23.

Plaintiff Lanie Berrett worked for Clark full time as a lunchroom Supervisor

in Dubois, Clark County Idaho until she was terminated in violation of the ADA on June 30, 2012.
24.

Dated June 27, 2012, Clark's Superintendent at the time, Dave Kerns, sent both

Plaintiffs Lanie Berrett and Ronald Ryan Berrett letters terminating their employment effective June
30, 2012.
25.

The reasons Clark stated in the termination letters for the terminations are

pretext. The true reason and a motivating factor that both Plaintiffs were terminated was because
of Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett's disability and Clark's unwillingness to accommodate his
disability.
26.

Clark engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination against plaintiffs on the

basis of disability in the terms and conditions of plaintiffs' employment and in their termination.
27.

As a result of Clark's intentional acts alleged herein, plaintiffs suffered severe

emotional distress, mental pain and anguish, embarrassment, loss of dignity and self-esteem,
humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and eviction from their home resulting in damages in such
amount as may be available under applicable law.

5-
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28.

Clark's acts were done intentionally with an improper, abusive, discriminatory

motive, and with reckless indifference to plaintiffs' federally protected rights. Such conduct should
not be tolerated by this society, and punitive damages in the amount of$300,000.00,or as otherwise
fixed by a jury and available under applicable law, should be awarded to punish Clark and deter such
conduct in the future.
29.

Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees, expert witness fees, and costs incurred herein,

pursuant to one or more of the following: 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 12205,IdahoCode § 12120, and any other applicable federal and/or state statute.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(HOUSING DISCRIMINATION)
(TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968)
30.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 29 as if

fully set forth herein.
31.

When Clark terminated Plaintiffs for Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett's disability,

Plaintiffs were living in housing owned by Clark.
32.

In the termination letters dated June 27, 2012, Clark's superintendent at the

time, Dave Kerns, also informed Plaintiffs that since they were using District Housing, that they
must vacate that dwelling by Monday, July 9'", 2012.
33.

Clark evicted Plaintiffs from their home because of Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett's

disability, making their dwelling unavailable to them on the basis of Mr. Berrett's disability in
violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f).
34.

6-

Plaintiffs are entitled to all remedies available under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
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§ 3613.

35.

Plaintiffs are entitled to actual damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) in an

amount fixed by a jury.
36.

Clark's acts were done intentionally with an improper, abusive, discriminatory

motive, and with reckless indifference to plaintiff's federally protected rights. Such conduct should
not be tolerated by this society, and punitive damages in an amount fixed by a jury and available
under applicable law, should be awarded to punish Clark and deter such conduct in the future.
37.

Plaintiff's are entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 3613(c).
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(RETALIATION/WHISTLE-BLOWER)
(IDAHO CODE§ 6-2101 et seq.)
38.

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 37 as if

fully set forth herein.
39.

ThisisaclaimunderldahoCode, Title6Chapter21,protectionofPublicEmployees

(hereinafter "Whistle-blower Act'').
40.

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to its supplemental jurisdiction to hear related

state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
41.

Clark is subject to the Whistle-blower Act and meets the definition of an

employer under the Act pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-2103(4).
42.

Plaintiffs are within the protected class ofthe Whistle-blower Act because they were

employees of an Idaho government entity.

7-
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43.

In Janwuy, 2012, as mamtenance supervisor, Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett began

receiving calls about the strong odor of propane emanating from a propane tank located in an old
gymnasium owned by Clark.
44.

Plaintiffhad Mike Holden at Sermon Service and Electric come to check on the tank.

45.

Mr.Holden determined that the since July 1, 2011, thetankhadnotbeen safe or legal

and was not up to the code of the State of Idaho; Mr. Holden gave the Clark a quote to fix the
problem.
46.

Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett reported the problem and showed the quote to then

Superintendent Dave Kerns.
47.

Mr. Kerns told Mr. Berrett to keep quiet about the problem because of the cost

48.

Mr. Berrett responded that he could not keep quiet because the situation was unsafe

and was affected the school children.
49.

Mr. Berrett then reported the problem and gave the quote to the Chairman of the

District's Board of Trustees, Erin Mortensen; he also wrote a letter to the Board entitled ''Propane
Issue and Best Way to Remedy Situation."
50.

Nothing was done, and in April, 2012 Mr. Kern wanted to continue to use the

gymnasium and the propane tank, but Mr. Berrett advised him against it because of the safety risk.
51.

The disagreement between Mr. Kerns and Mr. Berrett regarding the safety of the

propane tank and the need to fix it continued with no results until May, 2012 when the Board
terminated Mr. Kerns' employment as superintendent.
52.

Mr. Kerns terminated both Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett and his wife PlaintiffLanie

Berrett before his termination was effective.
8-
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53.

On June 30, 2012, Clark terminated Plaintiffs' employment The reason which

Clark gave for plaintiffs' termination was a pretext The true reason and a motivating reason for
plaintiffs' terminations was thatPlaintiffRonaldRyanBerrettcommunicated to the District, in good
faith, a violation of a law, rule or regulation which had been adopted under the law of the state of
Idaho.
54.

Plaintiffs' terminations from employment were a violation of the Whistle-blower

Act, entitling plaintiff to all remedies under the Act, Idaho Code§ 6-2106.

55.

Plaintiffs' terminations from employment were also a common law action that is

contrary to the public policy of the State of Idaho.
56.

Plaintiffs are entitled to lost wages, benefits, and remuneration from the date of

termination until reinstatement in amounts to be proven at trial.
57.

Plaintiffs are entitled to reinstatement with full fringe benefits and seniority rights,

but if reinstatement is not an option as an equitable remedy in lieu of reinstatement, plaintiffs are
entitled to an award of lost wages, benefits, and remuneration in amounts to be proven at trial.
58.

Clark should be assessed a civil fine pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-2106(6).

59.

Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest on all amounts found due and owing.

60.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing this

action.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs request this Court:
1.

9-

To assume jurisdiction over each of the causes set forth herein.
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2.

To declare Clark's conduct as alleged herein to be in violation ofthe relevant statutes
and public policy.
COUNT I (DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION)

3.

For back pay and benefits from the date of termination to date of trial, in an amount

to be proven at trial;
4.

For front pay and benefits from date of trial in an amount to be proven at trial as an
equitable remedy in lieu of reinstatement;

5.

For a permanent injunction enjoining Clark, its owners, officers, management
personnel, employees and all persons in active concert or participation with Clark
from engaging in any employment practice which discriminates on the basis of
disability;

6.

For general damages for plaintiffs' emotional distress in an amount to be proven at
trial;

7.

For punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial;

8.

For pre-judgment interest at the highest applicable rate upon all amounts found due
and owing;

9.

For plaintiffs' attorney fees, expert witness fees and court costs incurred in bringing
this action; and

I 0.

For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable.
COUNT II (FAIR HOUSING ACT)

10-

11.

For Plaintiffs' actual damages in an amount to be proven at trial;

12.

For an award of punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial;
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13.

For pre-judgment interest at the highest applicable rate on all amounts found due and
owing;

14.

For plaintiffs' attorney fees, expert witness fees and court costs incurred in bringing
this action; and

15.

For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable.
COUNT ill (WIDSTLE BLOWER/RETAIJATION)

16.

For plaintiffs' lost wages, benefits, and remuneration from the date of termination
until reinstatement in amounts to be proven at trial;

17.

For reinstatement with full fringe benefits and seniority rights, but if reinstatement
is not an option as an equitable remedy in lieu ofreinstatement, plaintiffs are entitled
to an award of lost wages, benefits, and remuneration in amounts to be proven at
trial;

18.

For assessment of a civil fine;

19.

For pre-judgment interest at the highest applicable rate on all amounts found due and
owing;

20.

For plaintiffs' attorney fees and court costs incurred in bringing this action; and

21.

For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable.

DATED December 20, 2012.

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

11 -

/s/
Jacob S. Wessel, Esq.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Page 34

n

n

Case 4:12-cv-006:e.v-EJL-CWD Document 1 Filed 12/2L,, ...2 Page 12 of 12
•

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury.
DATED December 20, 2012.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

/s/
Jacob S. Wessel, Esq.

J:\data\JSW\9500\001 Complaint
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Suite 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 522-3003
Fax (208) 621-3008
/SB Nos. 2434 and 7012
bgh@hasattomeys.com
sla@hasattomeys.com
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Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
RONALD RY AN BERRETT and LANIE
BERRETT, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-17-328
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

V.

CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
NO. 161,
Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, Clark County School District No. 161, and by and through
counsel of record, Hall Angell & Associates, LLP, submits the following as an Answer to
Plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, dated May 4, 2017, (hereinafter "Complaint").
In answering this Complaint, Defendant expressly reserves, in addition to the defenses set
forth below, all defenses provided for or authorized by Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12
and all other defenses provided by law. Moreover, Defendant states that its investigation of this
matter is continuing and as such, certain averments, statements and defenses may change in the
future in light of additional or newly discovered information.
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ANSWER

Defendant denies any and all allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint not expressly admitted
herein.
INTRODUCTION

I.

With regard to paragraph 1, Defendant admits the same.

2.

With regard to paragraph 2, Defendant admits the same.

3.

With regard to paragraph 3, Defendant admits the same.

4.

With regard to paragraph 4, Defendant admits the same.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5.

With regard to paragraph 5, Defendant admits the same.

6.

With regard to paragraph 6, Defendant is without sufficient information to either
admit or deny the allegations ofthis paragraph, and therefore, denies the same.

7.

With regard to paragraph 7, Defendant admits the same.

8.

With regard to paragraph 8, Defendant is without sufficient information to either
admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and therefore, denies the same.
ALLEGATIONS

9.

With regard to paragraph 9, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs' allegations are
contained in their federal Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, but Defendant
denies Plaintiffs' allegations and further states as follows:
a.

Plaintiffs' first claim for relief contained in their federal Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial, ,r,[ 17-29, due to alleged disability discrimination
was dismissed in federal court, case no. 4:12-cv-00626-EJL and is not a
claim in this present action.
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b.

Plaintiffs' second claim for relief contained in their federal Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial, ,nr 30-37, due to alleged housing discrimination was
dismissed in federal court, case no. 4:12-cv-00626-EJL and is not a claim in
this present action.

c.

Plaintiffs' third claim for relief contained in their federal Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial, fl 38----60, due to alleged violation ofldaho's
Whistleblower Act is Plaintiffs' only claim in this present action.

d.

Defendant responds to the allegations contained in Plaintiffs' federal
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, which are applicable to this present
action, as set forth in its Answer to Complaint, filed January 30, 2013 in
federal court, case no. 4:12-cv-00626-EJL, attached hereto as Exhibit A,
and incorporated as if fully set forth herein.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1.

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each and every allegation contained therein, fails to state

a claim against Defendant upon which relief can be granted.
2.

Plaintiffs have failed to comply with requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act.

3.

Defendant is entitled to immunity as set forth in the Idaho Tort Claims Act.

4.

Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendant under the

doctrine of absolute immunity or qualified immunity.
5.

All relevant decisions regarding or affecting Plaintiffs made by Defendant were

based on legitimate business reasons.
6.

Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to some or all

of the claims asserted for which exhaustion is required under applicable law.
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7.

Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are solely attributable to the conduct of Plaintiffs and/or

were proximately caused in whole or in part by unforeseeable, independent, intervening,
and/or superseding events and by the unforeseeable, acts and/or omissions of persons or
entities other than Defendant.
8.

Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the doctrines of Waiver, Estoppel and/or

Laches.
9.

Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the applicable Statutes of Limitation.

10.

Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate damages, if any.

11.

The acts or omissions of Plaintiffs and/or others constitute comparative negligence

which, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-801 et seq, or other applicable laws, bars or reduces
Plaintiffs' recovery, if any, against Defendant.
12.

The actions of Defendant were at all times carried out in good faith. Defendant

had objectively reasonable belief that all conduct was lawful at all times stated in
Plaintiffs' Complaint.
13.

Equitable remedies are not appropriate.

14.

Defendant has not engaged in any conduct that would violate or be contrary to

public policy.
15.

Defendant alleges Plaintiffs did not engage in any activity protected by the Idaho

Whistleblower Act.
16.

Plaintiffs' Complaint and the averments contained therein fail sufficiently to allege

the times and places at which certain material events described in the complaint allegedly
occurred, and such claims therefore are barred and/or subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule
9 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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17.

Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are limited to the extent provided for by Idaho Code§§

6-1603, 6-1604 and 6-1606, and/or applicable Idaho law.
18.

The foregoing defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and all of

Plaintiffs' claims for relief. In asserting these defenses, Defendant does not admit the
burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses, but, to the contrary,
assert that by reasons of the denials and/or by reason of relevant statutory and judicial
authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses and/or the
burden of proving the inverse to the allegations contained in many of the defenses is upon
the Plaintiffs. Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility or
liability, but, to the contrary, specifically den any and all allegations of responsibility and
liability in Plaintiffs' Complaint.
19.

Defendant may have additional defenses to Plaintiffs' Complaint, but cannot at this

time, state with specificity those defenses. Accordingly, Defendant reserves the right to
supplement this Answer and add additional defenses as discovery in the case progresses.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Defendant has been required to retain counsel to defend this action, and is entitled to
recover reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in the defense of this action from Plaintiff,
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 6-918A, 12-117, 12-120, 12-121, Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure and all other applicable laws allowing for the recovery of costs or attorney fees in this
action.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows:

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5

Page 40

I.

That Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, with Plaintiffs taking

nothing thereunder;
2.

Defendant be awarded costs and attorney fees necessarily incurred in defending

this action;
3.

For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated this __Lk___ day of June, 2017.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this_&_ day of June, 2017, by the method indicated below:

Jacob S. Wessel
THOMSEN HOLMAN WHEILER, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax:522-1277
email: wessel@thwlaw.com

[,X ]
[ ]

[Xl
[ ]

Mailing
Hand Delivery
Fax
Overnight Mail
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BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ.
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ.
NATHAN R. STARNES, ESQ.
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P. 0. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630
Telephone (208) 522-3001
Fax (208) 523-7254
/SB Nos. 2434, 7012 & 7484
bghall@nhptlaw.net
slangell@nhptlaw.net
mstarnes@nhptlaw.net
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
RONALD RYAN BERRETT and LANIE
BERRETT, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 4:12-cv-00626-EJL

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

V.

CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
NO. 161,
Defendant.
By and through counsel of record, Defendant submits the following as an Answer to
Plaintiff's Complaint, filed December 21, 2012, (hereinafter "Complaint").
In answering this Complaint, Defendant expressly reserves, in addition to the defenses set
forth below, all defenses provided for or authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 and all other defenses
provided by law. Moreover, Defendant states that its investigation of this matter is continuing
and as such, certain averments, statements and defenses may change in the future in light of
additional or newly discovered information.
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ANSWER

Defendant denies any and all allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint not expressly admitted
herein.
NATURE OF THE ACTION

I.

With regard to paragraph I, Defendant denies the same.

2.

With regard to paragraph 2, Defendant denies the same.

3.

With regard to paragraph 3, Defendant denies the same.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4.

With regard to paragraph 4, Defendant denies the same.

5.

With regard to paragraph 5, Defendant denies the same.

6.

With regard to paragraph 6, Defendant admits the same.
PARTIES

7.

With regard to paragraph 7, Defendant is without sufficient information to either
admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and therefore, denies the same.

8.

With regard to paragraph 8, Defendant admits the same.

9.

With regard to paragraph 9, Defendant admits that it employs more than 15
employees, but denies the remainder ofthis paragraph.

I 0.

With regard to paragraph I 0, Defendant denies the same.

11.

With regard to paragraph 11, Defendant admits that it leased a dwelling in Clark
County to Plaintiffs, but denies the remainder of this paragraph.

12.

With regard to paragraph 12, Defendant denies the same.

13.

With regard to paragraph 13, Defendant admits that Plaintiff was employed by
Defendant, but denies the remainder of this paragraph.
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14.

With regard to paragraph 14, Defendant admits the same.
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

15.

With regard to paragraph 15, Defendant is without sufficient information to either
admit or deny the allegations ofthis paragraph, and therefore, denies the same.

I 6.

With regard to paragraph 16, Defendant is without sufficient information to either
admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and therefore, denies the same.
CLAIMS OF RELIEF
(DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION)
(TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT)

17.

With regard to paragraph 17, there are no factual allegations in this paragraph, and
therefore, Defendant denies the same.

18.

With regard to paragraph 18, Defendant admits that Ronald Berrett was employed
by Clark County and his employment ended on June 30, 2012, but denies the
remainder of this paragraph.

19.

With regard to paragraph 19, Defendant denies the same.

20.

With regard to paragraph 20, Defendant denies the same.

21.

With regard to paragraph 21, Defendant denies the same.

22.

With regard to paragraph 22, Defendant denies the same.

23.

With regard to paragraph 23, Defendant admits that Lanie Berrett was employed by
Clark County and terminated on June 30, 2012, but denies the remainder of this
paragraph.

24.

With regard to paragraph 24, Defendant objects to this paragraph. The letter is the
best evidence and speaks for itself.

25.

With regard to paragraph 25, Defendant denies the same.
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26.

With regard to paragraph 26, Defendant denies the same.

27.

With regard to paragraph 27, Defendant denies the same.

28.

With regard to paragraph 28, Defendant denies the same.

29.

With regard to paragraph 29, Defendant denies the same.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(HOUSING DISCRIMINATION)
(TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968)

30.

With regard to paragraph 30, there are no factual allegations in this paragraph, and
therefore, Defendant denies the same.

31.

With regard to paragraph 31, Defendant denies the same.

32.

With regard to paragraph 32, Defendant objects to this paragraph. The letter is the
best evidence and speaks for itself.

33.

With regard to paragraph 33, Defendant denies the same.

34.

With regard to paragraph 34, Defendant denies the same.

35.

With regard to paragraph 35, Defendant denies the same.

36.

With regard to paragraph 36, Defendant denies the same.

37.

With regard to paragraph 37, Defendant denies the same.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(RETALIATION/WHISTLE-BLOWER)
(IDAHO CODE§ 6-2101 et seq.)

38.

With regard to paragraph 38, there are no factual allegations in this paragraph, and
therefore, Defendant denies the same.
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39.

With regard to paragraph 39, there are no factual allegations in this paragraph, and
therefore, Defendant denies the same.

40.

With regard to paragraph 40, Defendant denies the same.

41.

With regard to paragraph 41, Defendant admits the same.

42.

With regard to paragraph 42, Defendant admits the same.

43.

With regard to paragraph 43, Defendant is without sufficient information to either
admit or deny the allegations ofthis paragraph, and therefore, denies the same.

44.

With regard to paragraph 44, Defendant is without sufficient information to either
admit or deny the allegations of this paragraph, and therefore, denies the same.

45.

With regard to paragraph 45, Defendant denies the same.

46.

With regard to paragraph 46, Defendant admits only that Mr. Berrett suggested a
need to address a propane problem and presented a quote to the District's Board of
Trustees, Defendant denies remainder of paragraph.

47.

With regard to paragraph 47, Defendant denies the same.

48.

With regard to paragraph 48, Defendant denies the same.

49.

With regard to paragraph 49, Defendant admits only that Mr. Berrett suggested a
need to address a propane problem and presented a quote to the District's Board of
Trustees, Defendant denies remainder of paragraph.

50.

With regard to paragraph 50, Defendant denies the same.

51.

With regard to paragraph 51, Defendant denies the same.

52.

With regard to paragraph 52, Defendant admits only that Plaintiffs were terminated
from their employment with Defendant, and denies the remainder of the paragraph.

53.

With regard to paragraph 53, Defendant denies the same.
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54.

With regard to paragraph 54, Defendant denies the same.

55.

With regard to paragraph 55, Defendant denies the same.

56.

With regard to paragraph 56, Defendant denies the same.

57.

With regard to paragraph 57, Defendant denies the same.

58.

With regard to paragraph 58, Defendant denies the same.

59.

With regard to paragraph 59, Defendant denies the same.

60.

With regard to paragraph 60, Defendant denies the same.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1.

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each and every allegation contained therein, fails to state

a claim against Defendant upon which relief can be granted.
2.

Plaintiffs have failed to comply with requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act.

3.

Defendant is entitled to immunity as set forth in the Idaho Tort Claims Act.

4.

Plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this action against Defendant under the

doctrine of absolute immunity or qualified immunity.
5.

All relevant decisions regarding or affecting Plaintiffs made by Defendant were

based on legitimate business reasons.
6.

Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to some or all

of the claims asserted for which exhaustion is required under applicable law.
7.

Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are solely attributable to the conduct of Plaintiffs and/or

were proximately caused in whole or in part by unforeseeable, independent, intervening,
and/or superseding events and by the unforeseeable, acts and/or omissions of persons or
entities other than Defendant.
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8.

Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the doctrines of Waiver, Estoppel and/or

Laches.
9.

Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the applicable Statutes of Limitation.

10.

Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate damages, if any.

11.

The acts or omissions of Plaintiffs and/or others constitute comparative negligence

which, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-801 et seq, or other applicable laws, bars or reduces
Plaintiffs' recovery, if any, against Defendant.
12.

The actions of Defendant were at all times carried out in good faith. Defendant

had objectively reasonable belief that all conduct was lawful at all times stated in
Plaintiffs' Complaint.
13.

Equitable remedies are not appropriate.

14.

Defendant has not engaged in any conduct that would violate or be contrary to

public policy.
15.

Defendant allege that some or all of the injuries claimed by Plaintiffs pre-existed

the incident alleged in the Complaint, or were the progression thereof, and were the result
of medical factors and conditions not proximately caused by any action of Defendant.
16.

Plaintiffs' Complaint and the averments contained therein fail sufficiently to allege

the times and places at which certain material events described in the complaint allegedly
occurred, and such claims therefore are barred and/or subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule
9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
17.

Plaintiffs' damages, if any, are limited to the extent provided for by Idaho Code§§

6-1603, 6-1604 and 6-1606, and/or applicable Idaho law.
18.

The foregoing defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and all of
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Plaintiffs' claims for relief. In asserting these defenses, Defendant does not admit the
burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses, but, to the contrary,
assert that by reasons of the denials and/or by reason of relevant statutory and judicial
authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses and/or the
burden of proving the inverse to the allegations contained in many of the defenses is upon
the Plaintiffs. Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility or
liability, but, to the contrary, specifically den any and all allegations of responsibility and
liability in Plaintiffs' Complaint.
19.

Defendant may have additional defenses to Plaintiffs' Complaint, but cannot at this

time, state with specificity those defenses. Accordingly, Defendant reserves the right to
supplement this Answer and add additional defenses as discovery in the case progresses.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Defendant has been required to retain counsel to defend this action, and is entitled to
recover reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in the defense of this action from Plaintiff,
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 6-918A, 12-117, 12-120, 12-121, Rules 54 and 58 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and all other applicable laws allowing for the recovery of costs or
attorney fees in this action.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows:
1.

That Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, with Plaintiffs taking

nothing thereunder;
2.

Defendant be awarded costs and attorney fees necessarily incurred in defending

this action;
ANSWER-8

Page 49

3.

For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated this 30th day of January, 2013.

_IS/____________
BLAKE G. HALL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following
this 30th day of January, 2013, by the method indicated below:
James S. Wessel
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Fax: 522-1277
email: jweseel@ts-lawoffice.com

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Mailing
Hand Delivery
Fax
Overnight Mail
ECF

_ _IS.I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

BLAKE G. HALL
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RLED IN CHAMBERS
llt Idaho Fall,

JJonnnHJ.eoun,,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

RONALD RYAN BERRETT AND
LANIE BERRETT, husband and wife,
Case No. CV-2017-328
Plaintiffs,
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

V.

CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
NO. 161,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: The Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant
are hereby dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
t;;,,"'
/

Dated this~ day of November 2017.

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J!t:

I hereby certify that on this
day of November 2017 the JUDGMENl- OF DISMISSAL
was entered and a true and correct copy was served upon the parties listed below by mailing,
with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse
boxes.

Counsel for Plaintiffs:
Jacob S. Wessel
THOMSEN HOLMAN WHEILER, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Fax: 208-522-1277
Email: wessel@thwlaw.com
Counsel for Defendant/Respondent:
Blake G. Hall
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: 208-522-3003
Fax: 208-621-3008
Email: bgh@hasattomeys.com

Colleen Poole
Clerk of the District Court
Jefferson County, Idaho

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
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:
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

RONALD RYAN BERRETT AND
LANIE BERRETT, husband and wife,
Case No. CV-2017-328
.,.--.•,

Plaintiffs,

--0

:: .··

OPINION AND ORDER ON PARTIES~ \ -;.
';.
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ~
"· JUDGMENT

V.

CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
NO. 161,
Defendant.

This Opinion and Order is in response to the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment.

I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of summary judgment, the Court finds the following facts:
The plaintiffs, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett ("Ryan" or "Mr. Berrett", and
"Lanie" or "Ms. Berrett", and collectively as ''the Berretts"), were both employed by the Clark
County School District (the "School District"). Ryan was employed as the district's maintenance
supervisor, Lanie as the lunchroom supervisor. During the relevant time period, Erin HaightMortensen ("Ms. Haight-Mortensen") was chairwoman of the Clark County School Board,
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V

David Kerns ("Mr. Kerns") was the district superintendent, and Gayle Woods ("Ms. Woods")
was the district business manager.

1. Ryan
As the School District's maintenance supervisor, Ryan's responsibilities included the
School District's heating and furnace systems. Including the propane tank and corresponding
system that supplied propane gas to heat the School District's various buildings. In January 2012,
Ms. Woods began receiving reports that the old gymnasium smelled of propane. She then
informed Mr. Kerns, and Mr. Kerns informed Ms. Haight-Mortensen there was a leak in the
propane system. Ms. Woods, Mr. Kerns, and Ms. Haight-Mortensen were all aware that the
propane system leak was a building code violation. 1
The task of finding and fixing the leak fell to Ryan. As a result, Ryan began reporting on
the problem in his monthly letters to the Clark County School Board (''the School Board") in
February 2012. He wrote, "We do have a propane pressure issue that has been ongoing for
several years. I have been working with a Sermon technician and think a lot of the problems are
at the bulk tank. I will bet [sic] the problem resolved. "

2

In March, Ryan provided another update to the School Board. In his letter, he described
the work he had done over the past month and his diagnosis of the problem. He then concluded,
"I am waiting for a bid from sermon [sic] to correct this problem, when I receive it I will give it
to MR. KERNS [sic] and we will go from there. " 3 There is a dispute about what happened after
Ryan received the quote from Sermon Electric, Ryan claims that he showed it to Mr. Kerns and
was told to "keep quiet." Mr. Kerns disputes that he never instructed Ryan to "keep quiet."

1

Woods Aff. 3; Kerns Aff. 2; Haight-Mortensen Aff. 3.
Woods Aff. Ex. A. February 2, 2012 letter.
3
Woods Aff. Ex. A. March 12, 2012 letter.
2
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Also in March, the School District received an inspection report. In the report, the School
District was cited for multiple maintenance violations. Some of the violations cited were repeat
offenses, for which the School District had been cited in prior inspections. As the maintenance
supervisor, Ryan was responsible for these violations.
During the months of February, March, and April, Ryan worked with technicians from
both Sermon Electric and High Planes Propane and their involvement is mentioned in his
monthly letters. Over the course of this three month period, both companies visited the school on
numerous occasions and attempted to identify and the leak in the propane system. The School
Board approved payment for these service calls. 4 After several months of investigation, it was
discovered that the propane system contained micro-leaks throughout and plans were made to
repair it after school let out for the summer.
In May 2012 the propane leak still remained unfixed. The School Board minutes indicate
Ryan appeared and told the School Board that ''the propane issues are still a problem."5 Later on,
near the end of May or first of June, Ryan posted a derogatory message on Facebook. The
message was critical of the Clark County School District and Administration and violated the
established policies outlined in the employee manual. The message also appears to have
contained a cryptic reference to the School District's propane leak. After it was posted, several
members of the community saw and commented on the message. Ms. Haight-Mortensen was
among those who saw the message. After viewing the message, Ms. Haight-Mortensen provided
a copy of it to Mr. Kerns and requested that he speak Ryan about it.
At Ms. Haight-Mortensen's request, Mr. Kerns approached Ryan about the Facebook
post and asked that it be removed. When confronted, Ryan became belligerent and called Mr.

4
5

Woods Aff. 3.
Woods Aff. Ex. A.
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Kerns a "fucking asshole."6 Mr. Kerns then explained why the post was inappropriate and
requested that Ryan remove it, a second time. Ryan agreed to remove it, and did so.
Mr. Kerns discussed then the Facebook post and his encounter with Ryan at the School
Board's next meeting. During the meeting it was decided that Mr. Berrett was an at-will
employee and discharge was the appropriate sanction for his conduct. A termination letter was
then drafted and delivered to Ryan. The letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states in relevant part:
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration
and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the internet. Your
performance in some duties has been declining as well with building maintenance
and keeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "atwill", or non-contractual employee, the District administration has decided to
terminate your employment effective June 30th , 2012. 7
As per the terms of the letter, Ryan's employment was terminated on June 30, 2012.

2. Lanie
As the lunchroom supervisor, Ms. Berrett was responsible for proper management of the
kitchen. Among other things, this required that she prepare (and adhere to) an annual budget and
submit state-required paperwork. However, for at least three consecutive years, Lanie exceeded
her approved budget. Despite being admonished and informed of hardship placed on the School
District when she exceeded her budget, she continued to exceed it. In addition to exceeding the
budget, it was also discovered that Lanie repeatedly failed to submit several forms required by
the State of Idaho. These were grounds for her termination, as stated in the letter.
On June 30, 2012, Lanie's employment was terminated. Her termination letter, which
was signed by Mr. Kerns, states, "You have consistently overspent the Food Service budget each
year, with the amount increasing each time. You also are not performing satisfactorily in your
supervisory duties and you have not followed the direction from your own supervisor when
6

7

Kerns Aff. 7.
Kerns Aff. Ex. B.
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V
called upon to make sure District policies and procedures are followed." 8 Lanie's employment
was terminated per the terms of the letter.
After they were discharged, the Berretts filed their in the Federal District Court ofldaho.
The Federal court granted summary judgment in favor of the School District on all claims and
the Berretts appealed to Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the Federal District Court's ruling as to the federal law claims, but remanded the
decision back on to the state law claims. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
Berretts had established a prime facie case under the Act and were entitled to a trial. Upon the
remand, the Federal District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case
without prejudice. The Berretts then filed their state law claims in state district court.
II.
PLEADINGS

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Ryan Berrett claims that his
employment was terminated because he reported on a leak in the Clark County School District's
propane system. He claims that this amounted to a retaliatory discharge because he engaged in
protected activity under the Idaho Whistleblower Act. He further claims his termination violated
the Idaho Whistleblower Act.
Lanie Berrett claims that she was terminated in retaliation for her husband's protected
activity. She claims that public policy entitles her to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower
Act, as the spouse of a whistleblower. Based on these assertions, she claims that she was
wrongfully terminated.

8

Kerns Aff. Ex. D.
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Both of the Berretts claim the "law of the case" applies to the Ninth Circuit Court
decision, binding this Court to act in accordance with that decision. They claim that by virtue of
that decision, they are entitled to survive summary judgment and proceed to trial.
In opposition to the Berretts' claims, the Defendant claims that summary judgment
should be granted in its favor. The School District claims that the Ryan is not entitled to
protection under the Act, his termination was not the result of any protected activity, Lanie's
termination was unrelated to her husband's activities, and public policy does not protect Ms.
Berrett from termination.

III.
APPLICABLE LAW
1. Standard of Review - Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if, based upon ''the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw."9 In evaluating a party's
Motion for Summary Judgment, "[The Court] liberally construes all disputed facts" and draws
"all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing
the motion." 10 Where there is no "issue of material fact, only a question of law remains." 11 When
only a question of law remains, the Court "exercises free review." 12
Additionally, the nonmoving party must provide more than a "mere scintilla of
evidence," creating a genuine issue of material fact. 13 In other words, "[T]he nonmoving party

9

Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225,227, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (2007); I.R.C.P. 56(c).

°Kiebert, 144 Idaho at 227, 159 P.3d at 864.

1

II
i2
13

Id.
Id
Van v. PortneufMed Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,556 212 P.3d 982,986 (2009).
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must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine
issue for trial." 14

2. Law of the Case
The law of the case is similar to stare decisis. Like stare dee isis, it seeks to eliminate
"relitigation of settled issues ...." 15 Specifically, the Idaho Court of Appeals has stated:
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision on
an issue of law made at one stage of a proceedin/ becomes precedent to be
followed in successive stages of that same litigation. 1
However, notwithstanding this precedent, established by the Idaho Court of Appeals, state
district courts are not required to treat Federal district or circuit court decisions or interpretations
ofldaho law as binding. 17 This applies "even on issues of federal law." 18 Certainly, they may
treat Federal district and circuit court decisions as persuasive, but they are not required to do
so.19

3. The Idaho Whistleblower Act-§ 6-2101 et seq.
The Idaho Whistleblower Act ("the Act") affords "a legal cause of action for public
employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and
violations of a law, rule or regulation."20 Protection under the Act is afforded to employees who
communicate, "in good faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower,

Id.
Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie Power Co-op., Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 129, 856 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Idaho Ct. App.
1993).
16
Id. (quoting Frazier v. Neilsen, 118 Idaho 104, 106, 794 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990)) (internal
citations omitted).
11
See State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413,413, 398 P.3d 146, 149 {Idaho 2017) (finding error where state district court
felt compelled to follow a directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit).
18
Id. (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235,240, 127 P.3d 138, 143
(2005)).
19
McNeely, 162 Idaho at 413,398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho 2017).
20
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2101 (1994).
14

15
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or a violation or suspected violation ofa law ... under the law of this state or the United
States."21 However, a good faith communication must also "be made at a time and in a manner
which gives the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the waste or violation."22

IV.
ANALYSIS

These are the issues before the Court on Summary Judgment. (1) Does the "law of the
case" apply to the Ninth Circuit Court's decision, binding this Court and entitling the Berretts to
a trial on their claims for relief? (2) Is Ryan Berrett entitled to protection under the Idaho
Whistleblower Act as outlined by Idaho Code section 6-2101 et seq.? (3) Is Lanie Berrett entitled
to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act, as a matter of public policy, because she is the
spouse of an asserted whistleblower? Each of these issues will be addressed in turn.
1. The "law of the case" doctrine does not apply and the Court may make an

independent evaluation of the facts before it.
The Court must first decide whether the "law of the case" applies to the Ninth Circuit
Court's decision, binding this Court and entitling the Berretts to trial on their claims for relief.
Based on the Court's reasoning and analysis, the "law of the case" does not apply to the Ninth
Circuit Court's decision and the Court is not bound to follow it.
As the Court has stated, the Berretts previously filed their claim in the Federal District
Court for the District of Idaho. In that case, the Berretts asserted both federal and state law
claims for relief. The School District moved for summary judgment and the Federal District
Court granted the motion. The Berretts appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.

21
22

IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2104(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2104(1) (1994).
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The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the district court's rulings on the Berretts' federal law
claims but remanded the remaining state law claims back to the Federal District Court. In doing
so, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Mr. Berrett established a prima facie case of retaliatory conduct by presenting
evidence that: he engaged in protected activity by reporting "a violation or
suspected violation of a law" . . . he suffered an "adverse action" when he was
terminated . . . and the "close relation in time" between them, among other
factors, suggests he may have been fired for reporting the propane issue. This is
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary
judgment. 23
Upon remand, the Federal District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case and
dismissed it without prejudice. The Berretts then filed their claims in state district court. They
argue the Ninth Circuit's decision is binding upon the Court and entitles them to a trial on the
merits of their claims. In this assertion, the Berretts specifically rely on the "law of the case"
doctrine.
The "law of the case" doctrine is similar to stare decisis. Like stare decisis, it seeks to
eliminate "relitigation of settled issues .... " 24 On the issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals has
stated:
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision on
an issue of law made at one stage of a proceedin/ becomes precedent to be
followed in successive stages of that same litigation.2
However, notwithstanding the precedent established by the Idaho Court of Appeal, state district
courts are not required to treat Federal district or circuit court decisions as controlling. 26 This rule

23

Wessel Aff. Ex. A, at 2.
Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 124 Idaho at 129, 856 P.2d at 1297.
25
Id (quoting Frazier v. Neilsen, 118 Idaho 104, 106, 794 P.2d 1160, 1162 {Idaho Ct. App. 1990)(intemal citations
omitted).
26
McNeely, 162 Idaho at 413,398 P.3d at 149 (finding error where state district court felt compelled to follow a
directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit).
24
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applies "even on issues of federal law." 27 The Court notes that the issues in this case arise under
state, not federal, law.
In short, the "law of the case" does not apply here. Certainly, the Court may still treat the
Federal district and circuit court decisions as persuasive, but it is not required to do so. 28 Because
the Court is not bound by the Ninth Circuit's decision and the issues of the case arise under state
law, it will look at the facts presently before it and make an independent evaluation and decision.

2. Ryan Berrett is not entitled to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act.
Next, the Court turns its attention to the second issue before it on summary judgment: Is
Ryan Berrett entitled to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act as outlined by Idaho Code
section 6-2101 et seq.? Based on the following analysis, the Court concludes he is not.
The Act affords "a legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse
action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or
regulation."29 Protection under the Act is afforded to any employee that "communicates in good
faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or
30
suspected violation of a law ... under the law of this state or the United States. " Therefore,

more narrowly stated, the issue is whether Ryan reported a violation or suspected violation of a
law, entitling him to protection under the Act.
Ryan claims that he reported a violation of the law because he reported on the School
District's problem(s) with the propane system. He claims he was discharged in retaliation for
making these reports. In response to Ryan's claims, the School District argues the discharge was
not retaliatory and has motioned for summary judgment. In order to survive summary judgment,
27

McNeely, 162 Idaho at 413,398 P.3d at 149 (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Services,
Inc., 142 Idaho 235, 240, 127 P.3d 138, 143 (2005)).
28
McNeely, 162 Idaho at 398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho 2017).
29
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2101 (1994).
30
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2104(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
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the Berretts carry ''the burden of presenting evidence from which a rational inference of
retaliatory discharge under the whistleblower act [can] be drawn. " 31 In other words, they must
present "a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge ...." 32
A prima facie case for retaliatory discharge consists of three elements. To survive
summary judgment the Berretts must establish: (1) Ryan was an employee of the District and
"engaged or intended to engage in protected activity;" (2) the School District ''took adverse
action against" him; and (3) there is "a causal connection between the protected activity" and the
adverse action taken by the District. 33 These three elements will be discussed in sequence below.

a. Ryan Berrett did not engage, or intend to engage, in protected activity.
It is not disputed that Ryan was an employee of the School District. Therefore, in order to
satisfy this first element, Ryan only needs to establish that he engaged in, or intended to engage
in, a protected activity. 34 Based on the Court's analysis, Ryan has not established that he engaged
in a protected activity.
There is very little precedent that may be used to define the scope of "protected
activities" contemplated under Idaho law. However, one case, Black v. Idaho State Police, has
provided some guidance in the form of examples. 35 The Black court stated:
Examples of protected activity include (1) reporting safety violations that
potentially violate federal regulations ... (2) documenting a waste of public funds
and manpower ... and (3) communicating a mayor's potential conflict of interest
with an employee health plan that could potentially waste public resources. 36
Of the three examples listed above, the first is most relevant here. Ryan claims the safety
violation he reported was the leak in the propane system, and that the reports he made became

31

Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,396,224 P.3d 458,463 (Idaho 2008).
Id
33 Id.
34 Id.
35
Black v. Idaho State Police, 155 Idaho 570,573,314 P.3d 625,628 (Idaho 2013).
36
Id fu.3.
32
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the catalyst for his discharge. However, as the following analysis illustrates, the reports Ryan
made do not fall within the range of "protected activities" contemplated by the Act.
Ample evidence indicates the propane odor in the old gymnasium was well known
throughout the School District in January 2012. It was reported to Ms. Woods, the School
District's business manager, by several staff members. 37 In turn, Ms. Woods reported the issue to

Mr. Kerns, the School District's superintendent. 38 Mr. Kerns then reported the issue to the
School Board's chairwoman, Ms. Haight-Mortensen. 39
As the School District's maintenance supervisor, responsibility fell to Ryan to identify
the problem and fix it. After becoming aware of the problem, Mr. Berrett made his first report on
the problem in in February, in his monthly letter to the School Board. Here, the Court again
points out that the issue had already been reported to the School Board by Mr. Kerns and was
well known throughout the School District and the Administration.
In his March letter, Ryan reported on the issue again. This time he described the work he
had done to identify the problem and fix it. He also informed the School District, "I am waiting
for a bid from sermon [sic] to correct this problem, when I receive it I will give it to MR.
KERNS [sic] and we will go from there.',4o Ryan claims he later received the bid from Sermon
Electric, showed it to Mr. Kerns, and was told to "keep quiet." Mr. Kerns disputes that he ever
told Ryan to "keep quiet."
Although this allegation is suspicious, it is of little consequence. Even if Ryan was told to
"keep quiet," the Court wonders: What was there to keep quiet about? The School Board was
already aware of the propane leak. Mr. Kerns, himself, informed the School Board's

37

Woods Aff. 3
Kerns Aff. 2.
39
Haight-Mortensen Aff. 2.
40
Woods Aff. Ex. A. March 12, 2012 letter.

38
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chairwoman, Erin Haight-Mortensen, and Ryan began reporting the problem a month later in his
letters to the School Board. The School Board was already aware of the problem and already
knew it was a building code violation, months before this particular conversation between Ryan
and Mr. Kerns occurred.
Additionally, there is other evidence that suggests the propane leak was already known to
the School Board, even before Ryan was allegedly told to "keep quiet" by Mr. Kerns. As early as
February, a technician from Sermon Electric began making service calls to the school and was
assisting Ryan in resolving the propane leak. Ryan reported this in his February letter to the
School Board. Eventually, Ryan also enlisted the aid of High Planes Propane. It is apparent the
School Board knew of this involvement because "it approved payment for each of the service
calls.',4 1 This is important because it evidences that the School Board had separate knowledge of
the propane problem; apart from Ryan's, Ms. Woods', or Mr. Kerns' reports of the issue.
It is beyond believable that an employee could be charged with solving a problem (even a
building code or safety violation), provide regular progress reports to his employer, discuss the
viability of proposed solutions with superiors, and then, after being fired, use those same
activities to substantiate claim of retaliatory discharge. This is especially true when the employee
was charged with fixing a problem already known to the employer. Certainly, the statute offers
protection to employees who report "a violation or suspected violation of a law." And it is
undisputed that the propane leak was a violation of law; however, there was nothing to report for
purposes of the Act because the School District already knew about the problem and was trying
to fix it. Therefore, Ryan has failed to establish that these discussed actions constituted protected
activity.

41

Woods Aff. 3.
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The Court now looks to Ryan's other actions to determine whether any of these
reasonably constituted protected activity. First, Ryan claims he appeared at the May 17 school
board meeting to testify against Mr. Kerns. 42 The meeting notes shed a different light on his
participation in that meeting; instead, these merely indicate Ryan reported ''the propane issues
are still a problem.',43 As with his other reports, this was nothing more than a progress report on
the problem Ryan had already been tasked with solving.
Just as before, the Court finds it difficult to conclude this participation in the School
Board meeting constitutes protected activity, even after drawing reasonable inferences in his
favor. The School Board already knew of the propane leak, Mr. Kerns had personally informed
the School Board of the issue approximately four months prior, Ryan had been providing the
School Board with monthly reports on the issue, and the School Board had approved payments
for service calls made by Sermon Electric and High Planes Propane long before this meeting
occurred. Again, the Court is left to ponder, what else was there to report that might have
constituted a protected activity?
Finally, the Court addresses the message Ryan posted to Facebook near the end of May
or beginning of June. The posted was message was critical of the Clark County School District
and Administration. Although the message may have contained a cryptic reference to the
propane problem, it more closely resembles an unfettered rant by a disgruntled employee. It
offers nothing that resembles a good faith report of "a violation or suspected violation of a
law .... " 44 Therefore, the Court cannot deem it protected activity.
Because Mr. Berrett has not established that he engaged in any protected activity,
summary judgment in favor of the School District is appropriate. Nevertheless, for the sake of
42
43
44

Berrett Aff. 5.
Woods Aff. Ex. A.
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2104(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
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inquiry, the Court continues its analysis of the two remaining elements: (1) adverse action
against the employee, and (2) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
action.
b. The District took an adverse action against Ryan Berrett by terminating his
employment.
The second element of a retaliatory discharge claim requires the employee to establish
the employer took an adverse action against them. Based on the following analysis, the Court
concludes that the Clark County School District took adverse action against Ryan. The evidence
before the Court is that Mr. Berrett's employment was terminated. This is undisputed.
After Ryan aired his discontent via social media, Ms. Haight-Mortensen notified Mr.
Kerns about the post and requested that he speak to Ryan about it. Mr. Kerns approached Ryan
about the Facebook post and asked that it be removed. Ryan became belligerent and called Mr.
Kerns a "fucking asshole.',45 Mr. Kerns then explained why the post was inappropriate and
requested that Ryan remove it, for the second time. Ryan agreed to remove it, and did so.
Mr. Kerns discussed then the Facebook post and his encounter with Ryan at the School
Board's next meeting. During the meeting it was decided that Mr. Berrett was an at-will
employee and discharge was the appropriate sanction for his conduct. A termination letter was
then drafted and delivered to Ryan. The letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states in relevant part:
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration
and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the internet. Your
performance in some duties has been declining as well with building maintenance
and keeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "atwill", or non-contractual employee, the District administration has decided to
46
th
terminate your employment effective June 30 , 2012.

45
46

Kerns Aff. 7.
Kerns Aff. Ex. B.

OPINION AND ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 15 of22
Page 67

V
The School District does not dispute that this letter was delivered, nor that Ryan's employment
was terminated. Because it is undisputed his employment terminated, Ryan has established that
the School District took adverse action against him. However summary judgment in favor of the
School District is still appropriate based on the Court's analysis of the other two elements.

c. There is no causal connection between Ryan Berretts alleged, protected
activity and the adverse action taken by the District.
To survive summary judgment on a retaliatory discharge claim, Ryan must also establish
a causal connection between his alleged, protected activity and the adverse action taken by the
School District. Because Ryan failed to establish that he engaged in a protected activity, there
can be no causal connection to the adverse action taken by the District. Nevertheless, the Court
continues its analysis of the final element for the sake of inquiry. Relevant to this inquiry is the
"Proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment action ... .',47
As stated, several the School District's other employees and administrators received
reports of a propane odor in the gymnasium as early as January 2012. Over a period of several
months, Ryan worked to resolve the issues and provided regular reports to Mr. Kerns and the
School Board. Multiple affidavits and their corresponding exhibits support these facts. It was not
until approximately five months later, after multiple written and verbal reports were provided
that Ryan's employment was terminated. This is a significant amount of time, and the Court
concludes that the adverse action taken against Ryan and the alleged protected activity are not
causally connected.
Instead, another cause for Ryan's discharge is more likely. As the Court discussed above,
Ryan posted a derogatory message on Facebook in late May or early June. The posted message

47

See Curlee, 148 Idaho at 397,224 P.3d at 464 (quoting Heng v. Rotech Med Corp., 688 N.W.2d 389,401, (N.D.
2004)).
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was critical of the School District and the Administration and violated the School District's
established policies. Ryan further compounded this behavior when he was confronted by Mr.
Kerns. When he was confronted Ryan was belligerent, calling Mr. Kerns a "fucking asshole." As
a result of this conduct, Ryan was deemed "insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District
administration and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the internet" and his
employment was terminated. 48
In addition to this belligerent conduct, the letter provided another reason for Ryan's
discharge: he had been doing a poor job in his maintenance duties. 49 The evidence before the
Court supports this. Only a few months before his discharge, the School District's facilities were
inspected and numerous maintenance violations were discovered. In fact, some of these
violations had been noted in the previous two or three inspections and still remained
unresolved. 50
Based upon the undisputed evidence and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, Ryan's "termination had nothing to do with the propane issue" or any other
protected activity. 51 Therefore, the Court concludes there is no causal connection between the
adverse action taken by the School District (i.e. Ryan's discharge) and any activity Ryan claims.
Because Ryan has failed to establish that he engaged in any protected activity or that the adverse
action taken against him was related to such activity was causally related, summary judgment in
favor of the School District is appropriate.

3. As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett does not qualify for protection under the
act as the spouse of a whistleblower.

48

Kerns Aff. Ex. A.
Kens Aff. Ex. A.
50
Woods Aff. Ex. A.
51
Haight-Mortensen Aff. 5.

49
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As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett claims that she qualifies for protection under
the Act as the spouse of a whistleblower. However, based on the Court's prior analysis, Ryan
Berrett failed to establish that he was a whistleblower under the Act or was the subject of a
retaliatory discharge. Because Ryan does not qualify for protected status under the Act, Lanie
cannot claim it as his spouse either.
However, even if Ryan had established a prima facie case retaliatory discharge, Lanie
would still not be entitled to protection for two reasons. First, under established law, spouses of
employees are unprotected by the Act. Second, her termination is not causally connected to any
protected activity.

a. Spouses of Employees are Unprotected
Spouses of employees who engage in protected activity are not protected under the Act or
any related Idaho law. The Idaho Whistleblower Act provides a "cause of action for public

employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and
violations of a law, rule or regulation."52 Lanie Berrett asserts that as a matter of public policy,
she is entitled to protection. However, the Court cannot adopt this conclusion.\
The language of the Act specifically allows relief for "employees." It makes no reference
to, or allowance, for spouses of employees. 53 The Court is unwilling to read words into the
statute that were not included by the legislature, nor is the Court willing to extend protection that
is not expressly provided by the Act. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that spouses of
employees engaging in protected activity are entitled to protection under the Act. Because Lanie
Berrett is not entitled to protection as the spouse of an employee claiming protection under the
Act, summary judgment in favor of the School District should be granted.

52
53

IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2101 (1994) (emphasis added).
See IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2101 (1994).

OPINION AND ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 18 of22

Page 70

V
b. Lanie's Termination is not Causally Connected
Even if Lanie were entitled to protection as the spouse of an employee engaging in
protected activity, summary judgment is still appropriate because she has not established that her
termination was causally connected to any (even the activity asserted by her husband ). As
discussed above, the Berretts must a establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge to
survive summary judgment. 54 Such a claim requires three elements: (1) the employee engaged in
a protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse action against the employee, and (3) the
adverse action was causally connected to the protected activity. 55
Lanie does not assert that she engaged in protected activity; rather, she relies on her
husband's claim that he engaged in protected activity. As the Court previously concluded, Ryan
did not engage in protected activity. Even ifhe had, the Act does not extend protection to
spouses of employees engaging in protected activity.
The second element requires an adverse action against the employee. If the Act made
allowance for spouses of employees, Lanie could establish this element. Her employement was
terminated and this is not disputed by the School District. Therefore, adverse action was taken
against her.
However, Lanie would not qualify for protection under the Act because her termination is
not causally connected to any protected activity. In the termination letter, signed by David Kerns,
and delivered to Lanie, the reasoning for her termination is stated. The letter states, "You have
consistently overspent the Food Service budget each year, with the amount increasing each time.
You also are not performing satisfactorily in your supervisory duties and you have not followed
the direction from your own supervisor when called upon to make sure District policies and

54
55

Curlee, 148 Idaho at 397,224 P.3d at 464.
Id
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procedures are followed. "

56

This reasoning for her termination is further supported by the

affidavits.
The multiple affidavits submitted to the Court indicate that Ms. Berrett consistently
overspent the food service budget. Notwithstanding, Lanie continued to exceed her budget. Then,
after all this, it was discovered that Lanie had failed, repeatedly, to submit paperwork required by
the State of Idaho.
These are the offenses cited in her termination letter. They are entirely separate and apart
from her husband's activities and the propane leak. The termination letter does not mention or
even allude that her termination is in any way related to her husband or his actions. As a result,
the Court cannot conclude that the termination of Lanie's employment was in retaliation for any
protected activity and summary judgment in favor of the School District is appropriate.

v.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Court concludes, based on its prior analysis, that it is not bound by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision on the Berretts' claims and may conduct an independent
evaluation of the facts before it. Additionally, having conducted an independent evaluation of the
facts before it, the Court cannot conclude that either of the Berretts' engaged in a protected
activity or that their terminations are causally connected to any protected activity. Because the
Berretts have failed to establish these two elements, even drawing reasonable inferences in their
favor, the Court cannot conclude there is a genuine issue of material fact left to be resolved at
trial. Lastly, based Court's prior analysis, the School District's Fourteenth Defense should be
denied. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the School District is appropriate.

56

Kerns Aff. Ex.D.
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Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1- Plaintiffs Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
2- Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

,,...J.:Dated this

/5

day of November 2017.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH RJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

RONALD RYAN BERRETT AND
LANIE BERRETT, husband and wife,
Case No. CVft2017-0328
Plaintiffs,
MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

v.

CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
N0.161,
Defendant.

This Memorandum Decision is in response to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider.

I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this Motion to Reconsider the Court adopts the following facts,
acknowledging there were inadvertent facts in the Court's prior opinion at summary judgment:
Toe plaintiffs, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett ("Ryan" or "Mr. Berrett", and
"Lanie" or "Ms. Berrett", and collectively as ''the Berretts"), were both employed by the Clark
County School District (the "District"). Ryan was employed as the District's maintenance
supervisor and Lanie as the lunchroom supervisor. During the relevant time period, Erin HaightMortensen (''Ms. Haight-Mortensen'') was chairwoman of the Clark County School Board,

MEMORDANDUMDECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Page I of 41

Page 75

RECEIVED

FEB/14/2018/WED 10:40 AM

02/14/2018 09:32AM

P. 002/041

FAX No.

David Kerns ("Mt. Kerns") was the district superintendent. and Gayle Woods ("Ms. Woods")
was the district business manager.
1. Ryan

As the District's maintenance supervisor, Ryan Berrett maintained and fixed the
District's furnace system. 1 As discussed below, this also included the propane tank and
corresponding system that supplied propane gas to the furnaces. In January 2012, Ms. Woods
began receiving reports that the old gymnasium smelled of propane. 2 Ms, Woods informed Ryan
of the reported odor. 3 Ms. Woods also informed Mr. Kerns, and Mr. Kerns informed Ms. HaightMortensen. 4 Ms. Woods, Mr, Kerns. and Ms. Haight-Mortensen were all aware that the propane
system leak was a building code violation. 5
Ryan began working to solve the problem and enlisted the help of Sermon Electric. 6
Ryan also began reporting on the problem in his monthly Ieners to the District's school board
("the Board"). 7 In February, he wrote. "We do have a propane pressure issue that has been
ongoing for several years. I have been working with a Sermon technician and think a lot of the
problems are at the bulk tank. I will bet [sicJ the problem resolved."8 Although Ryan does not
mention this letter (or any of the others he sent) in his affidavit, he has not disputed the
authenticity of the letters provided by the District.
1
Affidavit of Jacob S. Wessel in Response to Defendant's Morton for Summary Judgment, Ronald Ryan Berrett and
Lanie Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161, Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed September 15,
2017) (hereinafter "Wessel Affidavit), at attachment p.311.
2
Affidavit of Gayle Woods, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161,
Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31. 2017) (hereinafter ''Woods Affidavit), at p.3
l Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311.
4
Woods Affidavit, at p.3; Affidavit of David Kerns, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett v. Clark Coumy School
Distrlct No. 161, Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31, 2017) (hereinafter "Kerns Affidavit), at
p.2.
5
Woods Affidavit, at p.3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Affidavit of Erin Haight-Mortensen, Ronald Ryan Berrett and
Lanie Berrett v. Clark County School Disrrict No. 161, Jefferson County case no. CV-17--0328 (filed August 31,
2017) (hereinafter "Haight-Mortensen Affidavit), at p.3.
6
Wessel Affidavit, atattachmentp.311-12.
1 Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.27-29.
8
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A. p.27.
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In March, he provided another update to the Board.9 This time he described the work he

had done on the propane system over the past month and his diagnosis of the problem. 10 He
concluded by writing, "I am waiting for a bid from sermon [sic] to correct this problem, when I
receive it I will give it to MR. KERNS [sic] and we will go from there." 11 Later, Ryan received
the bid and showed it to Mr. Kerns and Ms. Haight-Mortensen. 12 There is a dispute about what
happened after Ryan received the quote from Sermon Electric and showed it to Mr. Kerns. Ryan
claims that Mr. Keros told him to "keep quiet:' 13 Mr. Kerns disputes that he instructed Ryan to
''keep quiet." 14
During the months of February, March, and April, Ryan worked with technicians from
both Sermon Electric and High Planes Propane. 15 Ryan mentioned the involvement of Sermon

Electric and High Planes Propane in his monthly letters to the school board. 16 Over the course of
this three month period, both companies visited the school on numerous occasions and attempted
to help Ryan isolate and repair the leak in the propane system. 17 During this time frame, the
Board was aware of these visits and approved payment for the service calls. 18 After several
months of work, it was discovered that the propane system contained micro-leaks throughout and
plans were made to repair it. 19

9

Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28.
Woods Affidavit, at Bx. A, p.28.
11
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28.
11
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.312-13.
13
Wessel Affidavit. atattachmentp.313.
14
Kerns Affidavit, at p.2.
15
Wessel Affidavit, at attachmentp.311-13.
16
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.27-29.
17
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311-13.
18
Woods Affidavit, at p.3.
19
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.312-13; Woods Affidavit, at p.4; Kerns Affidavit, at p.3-4; Haight-Mortensen
Affidavit, at p.3-4.
10
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In May 2012 the propane issue was still unresolved. 20 Ryan attended the Board meeting
to discuss the ongoing propane issue that month. 21 The Board minutes indicate Ryan appeared

and told the School Board that "the propane issues are still a problem."22 Ryan characterizes his
participation in this meeting, by stating that he "testified against Mr. Kerns .... "23
In June, Ryan posted a derogatory message on Facebook. 24 The following is an image of

the message Ryan posted, as included in his affidavit: 25

After it was posted, several members of the community saw and commented on the message. 26
Ms. Haight~Mortensen was among those who it message.27 After viewing the message, Ms.
Haight-Mortensen provided a copy of it to Mr. Kerns. 28
Mr. Kerns discussed Ryan's Pacebook post Ryan at the Board's next meeting. 29 Mr.
Kerns and Ms. Haight Mortensen were both present and involved in the meeting. 30 During the
20

Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p,34.
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.4.
22
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.34.
23
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314.
14
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.31S, 323-24.
25
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.324.
26
Haight•Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5, Ex.A.
27
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5.
28
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5.
21
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meeting, the District determined that because Mr. Berrett was an at-will employee, termination
was the appropriate sanction for his conduct, 31 A termination letter was then drafted and
delivered to Ryan. 32 The letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states in relevant part:
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration
and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the internet. Your
performance in some duties has been declining as well with building maintenance
and keeping lights replaced and in working order, Due to your status as an "atwill", or nonwcontractual employee, the District administration has decided to
tetminate your employment effective June 30111, 2012. 33
Accordingly, Ryan's employment was terminated on June 30, 2012. 34 Ryan disputes that the
Board was aware of, or approved, his termination but has not provided any evidence to support
this conclusion.
2. Lanie
Lanie Berrett was the District's lunchroom supervisor from spring 2009 through June
2012.35 As the lunchroom supervisor, Ms. Berrett was responsible for proper management of the
kitchen. 36 This required that she prepare (and adhere to) an annual budget and submit staterequired paperwork. 37 The District asserts that Lanie failed to remain within her allotted budget
for at least three consecutive years and submit the state-required paperwork.38 Furthermore, the
District asserts that Lanie's job performance was unsatisfactory. 39
Her termination letter, which was signed by Mr, Kerns, states, "You have consistently
overspent the Food Service budget each year, with the amount increasing each time. You also are
29

Kerns Affidavit, at p.5; Haight~Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5~6
Kerns Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5.
31
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5-6.
32
Kerns Affidavit. at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5-6.
Jl Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. B.
34
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.315.
35 Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.329; Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6.
36
Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6;
37
Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6;
38 Woods Affidavit, at p.5: Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6;
39
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6;
30
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not performing satisfactorily in your supervisory duties and you have not followed the direction
from your own supervisor when called upon to make sure District policies and procedures are
followed,".w Accordingly, Lanie's employment was terminated, 41 Lanie disputes the reasons for
her termination, 42 Therefore, for purposes of suromary judgment, the Court assumes Lanie
performed satisfactorily, did not exceed the budget, and submined the state-required paperwork.
After they were discharged, the Berretts filed an action in the Federal District Court of
Idaho. The Federal court granted summary judgment in favor of the District on all claims and the
Berretts appealed to Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the Federal District Court's ruling as to the federal law claims, but remanded the

decision back to the Federal District Court on the state law claims. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that the Berretts had established a prime facie case under the Idaho
Whistleblower Act and were entitled to a trial, Upon the remand, the Federal District Court
declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case without prejudice. The Berretts then filed
their claims in state district court,
II.
APPLICABLE LAW

1. Standard - Motion to Reconsider
"On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible evidence
or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order." 4l However, it is not required
that the motion "be supported by new evidence or authority." 44 "When deciding [a] motion for
reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of review that the court applied

40

Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. D.
Wessel Affidavit. at attachment p.330,
42
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.329-30.
41

43

Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).

44 Jd.
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when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered." 45 Therefore, when deciding a
motion to reconsider a grant of summary judgment, the Court must apply the summary judgment
standard.46

2. Standard - Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper if, based upon 11:he pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."47 In evaluating a
party's Motion for Summary Judgment, "[The Court] liberally construes all disputed facts" and
draws "all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party
opposing the motion. "48 Where there is no "issue of material fact, only a question of law
remains."49 When only a question of law remains, the Court "exercises free review."50
Additionally, the nonmoving party must provide more than a ''mere scintilla of
evidence," creating a genuine issue of material fact. 51 In other words, "[T]he nonmoving party
must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine
issue for trial. ,,s2 "Bare assertions that an issue of fact exists, in the face of particular facts
alleged by the movant, are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. "53

4S
46

47

48
49

Id.
ld.

Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225,227, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (2007); I.R.C.P. 56(c),
Kiebert, 144 Idaho at 227, 159 P.3d at 864.

Id.
so Id.
51 Van v. Portne.uf Med, Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,556 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009).
si Id,
:s3 Cates v. Albertson's Inc,, 126 Idaho 1030, 1033, 895 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1994).
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3. Law of the Case

The law of the case is similar to stare decisis. Like stare decisis, it seeks to eliminate
''relitigation of settled issues .... "s4 Specifically, the Idaho Court of Appeals has stated:
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision on
an issue of law made at one stage of a proceed~ becomes precedent to be
followed in successive stages of that same litigation.s
However, notwithstanding this precedent, established by the Idaho Court of Appeals, state
district courts are not required to treat Federal district or circuit court decisions or interpretations
of Idaho law as binding. 56 This applies "even on issues of federal law." 57 Certainly, they may
treat Federal district and circuit court decisions as persuasive, but they are not required to do
so,ss
4, Idaho Whistleblower Act § 6-2101 et seq.
M

The Idaho Whistleblower Act (''the Act'') affords ''a legal cause of action for public
employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and
violations of a law, rule or regulation." 59 Protection under the Act is afforded to employees who
communicate, "in good faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower,
or a violation or suspected violation of a law ... under the law of this state or the United

54

Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie Power Co-op.. Inc., 124 Idaho 125,129,856 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Idaho Ct. App.

1993).
55

Jd. (quoting Frazierv. Neilsen, 118 ldaho 104, 106, 794P.2d l 160, 1162 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990)) (internal

citations omitted).

56 See

State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413,413.398 P.3d 146, 149 (Idaho 2017) (finding error where state district court
felt compelled to follow a directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit).
51
Id. (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer-Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235,240, 127P.3d 138, 143
~00.S)}.
59

McNeety, 162 Idaho at 413,398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho 2017).
Idaho Code§ 6-2101 (1994).
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States."60 However, a good faith communication must also "be made at a time and in a manner
which gives the employer a reasonable opportunity to cocrect the waste or violation." 61

III.
ANALYSIS
These are the issues before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. (1) Does the
"law of the case" apply to the Ninth Circuit Court's decision, thereby binding this Court and
entitling the Berretts' to a trial their claims? (2) Did the Court properly construe the facts in favor
of the plaintiffs in its decision at summary judgment? (3) Did the Court properly grant summary
judgment in favor of the Defendant, thereby dismissing Ryan Berren' s whistleblower claim? (4)
Did the Court properly grant summary judgment in favor of the Defendant on Lanie's public
policy claim? (5) Was summary judgment properly granted on Plaintiffs remaining federal law
claims?
1. The Law of the Case

The law of the case does not apply and the Court may make an independent evaluation of
the facts and evidence before it (i.e. it is not bound by the prior decision of the Ninth Circuit
Court's decision). AB stated in the Court's earlier decision, the Berretts previously filed their
claims in f-ederal court. The District moved for summary judgment and the Federal District Court
granted summary judgment for the District. This decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on the Berretts' federal
law claims but remanded the case back on the remaining state law claims. In doing so, the Ninth
Circuit stated:

60 Idaho
61

Id.

Code§ 6-2104(1) (emphasis added).

MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Page 9 of41

Page 83

RECEIVED

FEB/14/2018/WED 10:43 AM

02/14/2018 09:32AM

P. 010/041

FAX No.

Mr. Berrett established a prim.a facie case of retaliatory conduct by presenting
evidence that: he engaged in protected activity by reporting "a violation or
suspected violation of a law" . . . he suffered an "adverse action" when he was
tenninated . . . and the "close relation in time" between them, among other
factors, suggests he may have been fired for reporting the propane issue. This is
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary
judgment.62
Upon remand the Federal District Court declined jurisdiction because there were no more federal
law claims and the case was dismissed without prejudice. Subsequently, the Berretts refiled their
claims in state district court. Toe Defendants then moved for summary judgment. At summary
judgment the Berretts argued that the Ninth Circuit's decision on appeal constitutes the law of
the case, entitling them to proceed to trial on the merits of their claims.
After careful analysis, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
The Berretts have filed a motion requesting the Court reconsider its prior decision. After the
following analysis, the Court remains convinced that its prior decision, granting summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants, was proper.
Like stare decisis, the "law of the case" seeks to eliminate ''relitigation of settled issues ..
. .,.6

3

The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated:

[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule
becomes the law of the case and -is controlling both in the lower court and on
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision
on an issue of law made at one stage of a proceeding becomes precedent to be
followed in successive stages of that same litigation. 64

In Swanson. v. Swanson, the Idaho Supreme Court described the law of the case as follows:
[U)pon appeal, the Supreme Court in deciding a case presented states in its
opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement

62

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Ronald Ryan and Lanie Berrett v. Clark Counry School District No. 161,
Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed May 9, 2017) (hereinafter "Complaint''), at Ex. A.
63 Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 124 Idaho at 129,856 P.2d at 1297.
64 Id. (quoting Frazierv. Netlsen, ll8 Idaho 104, 106, 794 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
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becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal ... .65
The Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out other language in Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire

Ass 'n. of Seattle, Wash. which describes the law of the case doctrine this way:
Where a judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court 11for a
new trial," the case comes on for the same, in all respects, as if it had never been
tried, subject to this condition, however, that it must be tried in light of and in
consonance with the rules of law as announced by the appellate court in that
particular case. 66
This case is substantially different from the one filed in federal court and does not meet
the standards relied upon by the Idaho Supreme Court in Swanson or Cteem. The original
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial was filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho in December 2012 and assigned case number 4:12-CV-0626ftEJL. The Federal
District Court then granted summary judgment for the Defendants on all claims. Plaintiffs
appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court in part
but remanded the case back on Ryan's "whistleblower claim" and on Lanie's "public policy
claim." Upon remand, the Federal District Court granted the Defendant's Motion for the Court to
Decline Jurisdiction and dismissed Plaintiffs' state law claims without prejudice. 67
Plaintiffs' then filed their claims anew, incorporating their same federal Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial when they filed their case in Jefferson County. This new case was filed in
a separate jurisdiction from Plaintiffs' earlier case, and was assigned a new case number
(Jefferson County case no. CV-2017-0328). Although Plaintiffs assert that the case filed in
Jefferson County is the same case, it is not. As quoted above, the Idaho Supreme Court has

65

134 ldaho 512,515, 5 P.3d 973,976 (2000) (quotingSuitts v. FtmSec. Bank of Idaho, 110 Idaho 15, 21,713 P.2d
1374, 1380 (1985)).
66 Creem v. Northwestern Mut.
Fire Ass'n of Seattle. Wash., 58 Idaho 349, _, 74 P.2d 702, 703 (1937).
G7 Complaint, at Ex. B.
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previously announced that the law of the case only applies ''in that particular case. 1168 Based on
the Court's reasoning and analysis the two cases are different and separate. Therefore, the law of
the case does not apply.
Despite Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, there are additional reasons why the
law of the case does not apply. First, state district courts are not required to treat federal district
.or federal circuit court decisions or interpretations of Idaho law as binding, 69 Second, the facts in
the case before the Court are not the same as those in the federal case.
As stated, state district courts are not required to treat federal district or federal circuit
court decisions or interpretations of Idaho law as binding. 70 This even applies to "issues of
federal law.;' 71 Certainly, Idaho courts may treat Federal district and circuit court decisions as
persuasive, but they are not required to do so. 72
In its Order and Opinion on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment the Court relied on
this holding as announced by State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, 398 P.3d 146 (2017). In
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiffs attacked the Court's reliance on McNeely by arguing
that the question before this Court, in this case, is entirely different from the question presented
in McNeely (i.e. "must this Court follow decisions by the Ninth Circuit in this exact case"}, 73
The fatal flaw in Plaintiffs argument is, as reasoned above, the case now pending is not the exact
case that was before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Even if this were the exacr same case,
the Court still believes the holding in McNeely is relevant and dispositive.

611

Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n of Seattle, Wash., 58 Idaho 349, _, 74 P.2d 702, 703 (1937).
See State v. McNeely. I 62 Idaho at_, 398 P.3d at 149 (finding error where state district court felt compelled to
follow a directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit).

69

70
11

Id.

Id. (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235. 240, 127 P.3d 138, 143
(2005)),
72
McNeely, 162 Idaho at_, 398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho 2017).
7
' Motion t.o ReconSider, Ronald Ryan Be,rett and Lanie Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161, Jefferson
County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed November 28, 2017) (Hereinafter ''Motion"), at p.4.
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Notwithstanding, the Court wishes to supplements it prior reasoning and analysis by
relying on the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in English v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 737,742,378
P.3d 1036, 1041 (2016). In English, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Bonneville County
district court.74 The case was then removed to federal court based diversity of citizenship. 75
Later, the Englishes "filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint ..." on
December 10, 2013, and sought to add two new defendants, Eastern Idaho Regional Medical
Center and Dr. James Taylor. 76 The Englishes did not serve copies of their motion or the second
amended complaint on either of the new defendants at that time. 77 The motion was granted and
the Second Amended Complaint was filed on January 16, 2014. 78 "[T]he filing of the Second
Amended Complaint destroyed diversity and deprived the federal district court of subject matter
jurisdiction," 79 After the Englishes filed their Second Amended Complaint in federal court, the
parties stipulated to remand the case back to state district court. 80
On January 24, 2014, after the case was remanded back to the state district court, the

plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint in the Bonneville County district court, and
served the two new defendants. 81
On March 4, 2014, the Englishes filed an ex parte Rule 60 Motion to Clarify
Docket entry order with the federal district court, seeking clarification that the
order granting their motion to file the second amended complaint related back to
the date on which the Englishes filed their motion for leave to file the Second
Amended Complaint. The motion stated that the purpose would be to clarify "that
82
the Complaint was filed on December 10, 2013, instead of some other date.''

74

English v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 737, 739, 378 P.3d 1036, 1038 (2016).

.

"M

16 ld.
71

Id.

7& Ia.

.

19 ld.
80

Id.

SI

Id.

82

Id.
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The federal district court entered a clarifying order on the Englishes motion to amend, stating,
uThe Court hereby clarifies that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint was effectively filed on

December 10, 2013 .... "83
Subsequently, the new defendants filed motions for "summary judgment on grounds that
the statute of limitations had expired" and the district court granted the motions, concluding "the
Englishes did not commence the actions against Respondents until after the statute of limitations
had expired." 84 The Englishes appealed. On appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court the
Englishes argued that the federal district court's clarifying order (i.e. the second amended
complaint was effectively filed December 10, 2013) was dispositive. The Idaho Supreme Court
noted that this argument had waived on appeal but addressed the claim anyways by stating,
''Even if the Englishes had not waived the argument, it is well established that 'the decisions of
lower federal courts are not binding on state courts, even on issues of federal law.' Therefore, the
federal district court's order of clarification is not binding on this Court."8s
As stated, the Court also recognizes that the facts in the federal case and the state case are
not substantially the same. Although Plaintiffs' filed the exact same affidavits that were filed in
federal court, along with copies of the Defendant's affidavits from federal court, the Defendant
has filed new affidavits. These affidavits offer facts not before the federal district court or the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Specifically, these affidavits state that the District was aware of
the propane leak in January and recognized it was a building code violation; even though it was

13

84
115

Id.
Id.
Id. (intemal citations omitted). Although it was a decision made by the federal district court and not the Ninth

Circuit that was at issue in English, this was not the case in McNeely. At issue in McNeely was a pronouncement by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals may be treated as persuasive but are not binding on Idaho's stat.e courts. McNeely, 162 Idaho at_, 398
P.3d at 148-49.

MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 14 of 41

Page 88

RECEIVED

FEB/14/2018/WED 10:46 AM

02/14/2018 09:32AM

FAX No.

P. 015/041

unable to isolate the cause or source of the leak.136 Therefore, based on the prior reasoning and
analysis, the Ninth Circuit's decision in the Berrett's former case is not binding on this court, in
this new case.

2. Disputed and Undisputed Facts
Plaintiffs have asserted multiple errors in the Court's findings of fact in its Opinion and
Order on the Parties' Cross Motion for Summacy Ju~gment. Specifically, Plaintiffs' assert the
Court failed to recognize facts that support their position and that the Court did not liberally

construe the facts in the light most favorable to them. Examples of the asserted errors are
provided below:
First, Ryan's [sic] was hired as a person on disability. When he was hired, he told
Kerns that he could not do the physical work required, but that he would call
professionals to do the work. He was not responsible for the propane, heating and
furnace system. Due to the smell, he called propane companies to check the
system. Second, all of the affidavits state that until March, [sic] 2012, no one
could find a leak in the propane system. No one knew there was a leak in the
propane system. They only knew of a smell. Third, at the May, [sic] 2012 meeting
Ryan testified against Kerns along with two propane professionals, and Kerns was
a [sic] fired as a result. Fourth, Ryan never swore at Kerns and never called him a
"fucking asshole", [sic] but Kerns used foul language towards Ryan and Lanie on
multiple occasions. Fifth, Kerns fired the Berretts without the school boal'<Ps
knowledge. Only after they were fired, did the Berretts and Kerns go before the
school board to discuss the termination. Sixth, Ryan Berrett always received
positive performance reviews. The first time anyone complained about his
performance was the statement in his termination letter that he was a doing a poor
job in his maintenance duties. 87
Further, Ryan asserts that he engaged in a protected activity under the Idaho
Whistleblower Act and the evidence shows the propane issue was not known to the District.
Meanwhile, Lanie asserts that the Court erred because she "never exceeded her lunch room
budget in any year" and that her employment evaluations were positive and she did not fail to

86

87

Woods Affidavit, at p. 3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.3.
Motion, at p.7.

MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 15 of 41

Page 89

RECEIVED

FEB/14/2018/WED 10:46 AM

02/14/2018 09:32AM

P.016/041

FAX No.

submit the state-required forms mentioned above. Each of these is discussed in greater detail
below.

a. Ryan's Job Responsibilities
In his Motion to Reconsider Ryan asserts that he was hired as a person on disability. The
issue of Ryan's disability was not before the Court at summary judgment. Because it was not
before the Court at summary judgment, it is immaterial to the Court's analysis of Plaintiffs'
Motion to Reconsider,
In addition to claiming he was hired as a person on disability, Ryan asserts, for the first

time in his Motion to Reconsider, he was not responsible for the propane, heating, or furnace
systems. However, based on the following analysis, the Court cannot reasonably infer that
Ryan's responsibilities as maintenance supervisor did not include the furnace and propane
systems; or that he was not tasked with resolving the propane issue.
The Court's conclusion is supported by various statements from Ryan's own affidavit.
First, Ryan writes, "I had been doing the best I could with my disability to maintain and fix
furnaces, water heaters, and plumbing issues by myself. " 88 Whether these were part of his job
duties upon hiring or whether he acquired these duties later by assignment or his own initiative,
it was asserted by Plaintiffs that Ryan undertook to fix these systems. 89
Ryan also described how he became of aware of the propane problem in his own
affidavit, indicating that in January 2012 he began "getting calls every other day about [sic]
strong odor of propane in the old gymnasium from [the District's] business manager (Gayle
Woods) ...."90 He also wrote that he "Had High Planes Propane come over to check for propane
smell [sic]," He told Dave Kerns, "[He] was going to have Sermon Service and Electric come out
88

Wessel Affidavit., at attachment p.311.
Wessel Affidavit, at attachmo.nt p.311.
90
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311.
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and [he] was going to lock the old gym up."91 Over a period of several months Ryan continued,
with the assistance of Sermon Electric, to work on solving the problem(s) with the propane .

system, Once Sermon Electric had prepared a price quote for the needed repairs, Ryan was the
person who received this quote and shared it with Dave Kerns. 92 Ryan also provided regular
reports on the work he was doing with the propane and heating systems in District meetings and
in letters written to the school board. 93 Later, Ryan also reported on the problem(s) with the

propane system at Board meeting in May. 94
All of these facts support the Court's conclusion because in the absence of some

responsibility for the furnace, heating, and propane systems, it is difficult for the Court to
understand why Ryan would have been involved in fixing the problem the way he was. There is
no evidence before the Court th.at Ryan ever disputed or objected to his responsibility for the
propane and heating systems prior to the objection in Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider.
Therefore, based on the prior reasoning and analysis, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan
was not the person responsible for maintaining and fixing the furnace and propane systems.

b. Affidavits
Ryan has argued that the Court erred in granting summary judgment for the District
because "[A]ll the affidavits state that until March, [sic] 2012, no one could find a leak in the
propane system. No one knew there was a leak in the propane system. They only knew of a
smell.'; Even drawing reasonable inferences in Ryan's favor, and assuming the actual source,
location, or cause of the propane leak was undiscovered until March 2012, the Court disagrees
with Ryan's assertions,

91

Wessel Affidavit. at attachment p.31 L
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.312.
93
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A.
94
Wessel Affidavit, at attachmentp.314.
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As mentioned above, Ryan began getting regular calls about a propane odor in the old
gymnasium as early as January 2012. The Court cannot reasonably infer that the odor of propane
in a room or building does not indicate the existence of a leak. Furthermore, when the Plaintiffs
filed their claims in state court, the District provided affidavits from Gayle Woods, Dave Kerns,
and Erin Haight-Mortensen. These affidavits each contain a similar statement which indicates the
District was "aware that the leak in the propane system was a building code violation."9:; As the
affidavits point out, the exact cause of the odor or the leak was unknown but it is evident
everyone involved knew it was a problem and they were actively working to solve it. Solving the
problem was difficult because the source or cause of the propane smell, or leak, could not be
isolated.
Plaintiffs dispute these affidavits by arguing they contradict the affidavits filed by the
District in the federal case. However, the Court cannot reasonably infer that the new affidavits
contradict the earlier affidavits that were filed in federal court. The new affidavits emphasize the '
difficulty in isolating the problem and indicate that Gayle Woods, Dave Kerns, and Erin HaightMortensen recognized the smell represented a building code violation that needed to be located
and corrected. Information that was not provided within the affidavits filed in the federal case.
Plaintiffs also rely upon deposition testimony in which Dave Kerns admits that he was
unaware that the propane leak was a safety issue or that the propane tanks were not in
compliance with building code or that he was unconcerned that the leak posed a safety threat.
Neither of these are material. As stated in the affidavits, the District was already aware that a
building code violation existed somewhere in the system and it was working to isolate it.
Because the District already knew about the violation and was working to isolate it, the mere fact

~ Woods Affidavit, at p.3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.3.
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that Ryan (with help from Sermon Electric) may have been the person who isolated the source of
the problem and reported it does not qualify him for protection under the Act.
As to the safety concerns regarding the propane leaks, which were pointed out by

Plaintiffs in their motion to reconsider, this claim is immaterial. The Idaho Whistleblower Act
affords protection to employees who "[communicate] in good faith the existence of any waste of
public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or
regulation adopted under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this state or the United
States."96 Although the Court recognizes that a "safety" issue may be a result or concern of the
reported ''violation of a law, rule or regulation", the statute's focus is on violations oflaw, rules,

or regulations. Protection under the act is triggered when an employee reports a violation of a
11

law, rule or regulation'' not a •'safety" issue. 97 Therefore, it is immaterial whether Mr. Kerns

recognized the propane problem as a safety concern for purposes of the Act.
c. May 2012 School Board Meeting

As the Court discussed above, Ryan was called upon to discuss the propane issue at the

May 2012 school board meeting. Ryan asserts that "According to school board member Sherri
Mead ... the school board terminated Kerns based upon [Ry8.l)'s] testimony,"98 Ryan points this
out his affidavit and has provided a note written his calendar (attached to his affidavit as Exhibit

B). However, as presented, this assertion is hearsay. It is an out-of-court statement that does not
fall within any of the recognized exceptions pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Mead's statement is not hearsay under Idaho Rule of Evidence
80I(d)(2) because it is an admission of a party opponent. This is incorrect. Idaho Rule of
Evidence 80l(d)(2) requires more than just a statement, the statement must be
96
97
98

Idaho Code§ 6-2103(1)(a).
Id,

Motion, at p. IO.
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[T]he party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity,
or (B) a statelll.ent of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by a party to make a statement
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by a party's agent or servant concerning
a matter within the scope of the agency or employment of the servant or agent,
made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co99
conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Plaintiffs have proffered nothing that indicates Sherri Mead was speaking as the District's
representative, that the District manifested agreeance or adopted her statement as truth; or that
Ms. Mead was authorized to make the statement, was acting within the scope of her agency or
employment, or was a co-conspirator. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that Ms. Mead's
statement regarding Dave Kern's tennination is anything but inadmissible hearsay.
The Court has previously stated that Plaintiffs must provide more than a mere scintilla of
evidence to make an issue of fact, on the issue of Mr. Kerns' departure or termination they have
not done so. 100 Even if the statement proffered by Plaintiffs was not hearsay, or Plaintiffs had
obtained an affidavit from Sherri Mead or taken her deposition these would have little bearing on
the issues presented in this case. Ryan has never asserted that he was fired because Mr. Kerns
was fired. In his complaint, Ryan did not assert that it was Mr. Kerns who fired him, wrongfully
or otherwise. Plaintiffs' complaint states, in relevant part:
On Jwie 30, 2012, [the District] terminated Plaintiffs' employment. The reason
which [the District] gave for plaintiffs' tennination was a pretext. The true reason
and a motivating reason for plaintiffs' tenninations was that Plaintiff Ronald
Ryan Berrett communicated to the District, in good faith, a violation of a law, rule
101
or regulation which had been adopted under the law of the state of Idaho.
Therefore, whether Sherri Mead told Ryan that Mt. Kerns was terminated based on something
Ryan stated at the Board meeting is immaterial to the Court's analysis.

99
Idaho
100
Van,
101

Rules of Evidence 80l(d)(2).
147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986.
Complaint, at Ex. C,
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d. Foul Language
In its Opinion and Order on the Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment the Court
found that Ryan Berrett referred to Dave Kerns as a "fucking asshole" when confronted
regarding the Facebook post Upon reconsideration, this finding was in error; however, it is
immaterial to the Court's analysis and does not change the outcome of the Court's decision at
summary judgment or upon reconsideration.

e. School Board's Knowledge of Ryan and Lanie's Termination
Plaintiffs have asserted that Dave Kerns terminated their employment without the school
board's knowledge. This is a conclusory assertion raised by the plaintiffs in their Motion to
Reconsider. Beyond the conclusory statements made in their Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiffs
have not pointed to any place in the record or their affidavits or anywhere else that supports their
conclusions. In other words, they have not provided a scintilla of evidence that makes this a
disputed fact. 102
Meanwhile, the District has supplied the affidavits of Dave Kerns and Erin HaightMortensen. Mr. Keros' affidavit states, in relevant part:
Mr. Berrett's termination had nothing to do with the propane issue. The Distict
decided to terminate Mr. Berrett following his insubordination and verbal abuse
directed toward me. In approximately late May or early June, 2012, I was
contacted by Erin Haight-Mortensen who had seen a derogatory Facebook post
about me. Ms. Haight-Mortensen provided me with a copy of the Facebook post
and I placed it in Mr. Berrett's personnel file. It is my understanding that students
and parents saw the post and that some students had commented on the post. The
Facebook post was inappropriate and a violation of District Policy.
At the next meeting with the School Board, I discussed the Facebook post with
board members and it was determined that because Mr. Berrett was an at-will
employee that termination was appropriate. rn:;

100

103

Van, 147 Idaho at S56, 212 P.3d at 986.
Kerns Affidavit. at p.5.

MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 21 of 41

Page 95

RECEIVED

FEB/14/2018/WED 10:49 AM

02/14/2018 09:32AM

P. 022/041

FAX No.

With regard to Lanie's termination, Mr. Kerns wrote, Because of the repeated inability to
104
efficiently run the kitchen, the District made the decision to terminate Ms. Berrett.''

Regarding the Berretts' termination, Ms. Haight-Mortensen stated, ''I was involved in the
decision to terminate Mr. Berrett's employment and can attest that his termination had nothing to
do with the propane issue. The District decided to terminate Mr. Berrett following Mr. Barrett's
105
insubordination and verbal abuse directed towards Mr. Kerns." Ms. HaightwMortensen also

wrote Lanie's employment was terminated because of her inability to manage the kitchen and
remain within her budget. 106
Even if Mr. Kerns had terminated Lanie and Ryan without the school board's approval,
he had the authority to do so. Ms. Haight-Mortensen indicated that, "Because Mr. Kerns was the
interim Superintendent, he had authority to terminate Mr. Berrett. He likewise had authority to
107
terminate Ms. Berrett. " The Court notes that being fired or terminated without the approval of

the school board is not the basis for the Berrens' claims. Nor have Plaintiffs cited a proposition
of law that would support such a position.
Instead, Plaintiffs claim they were fired in retaliation for Ryan ''blowing the whistle" on
the problems with the District's propane system, and that their terminations violated Idaho law
and public policy. However, based on the Court's reasoning and analysis in other sections of this
opinion. the Court cannot reasonably infer either of the Berretts qualify for protection under the
Act. Because the Berretts do not qualify for protection under the Act, the Court cannot
reasonably infer their terminations with, or without, the Board's approval were wrongful. Even if
the Board 1s approval was required, Ryan and Lanie have not provided any evidence to support

104

Kerns Affidavit, at p.6.
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5.
106
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6-7.
101
Haight-Monensen Affidavit, at p.6.
105
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an inference that the Board lacked knowledge of the tern:rinations. Therefore, the Court may not
reasonably infer that their terminations were done without the Board's knowledge. In the absence
of disputed facts, the Court concludes that its decision at summary judgment was appropriate.

f. Performance Reviews
Plaintiffs assert the Court's error by arguing "Ryan always received positive performance
reviews. The first time anyone complained about his performance was the statement in his
termination letter that he was doing a poor job in his maintenance duties.u 108 In his affidavit he
wrote, •nespite my experience and my always stellar performance evaluations, they denied me
requested reasonable accommodations and eventually fired me." 109 These statements are
conclusory and are insufficient to create an issue of material fact. Rather, this statement is
commentary on the evidence but it is not evidence. The court assumes the fact that he received
stellar performance reviews for purposes of summary judgment, notwithstanding the facts
presented by the record.
The Court notes the inspection reports provided by the District which mention the
discovery of numerous maintenance violations. At summary judgment the Court recognized
these stating, "Only a few months before [Ryan's] discharge, the School District's facilities were
inspected and numerous maintenance violations were discovered. In fact, some of these
violations had been noted in the previous two or three inspections and still remained
unresolved." 110 Plaintiffs did not dispute that these violations occurred at summary judgment and
has not done so in their Motion to Reconsider. They only assert a lack of complaints regarding
his job performance prior to his termination.

108
Motion,
109

at p.7.
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.315.
110
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A.
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Nonetheless, the Court sets aside the maintenance violations previously relied upon and
assumes, for purposes of summary judgment, that Ryan "always" received superb performance
reviews. In light of this assumption, the Court's conclusion remains unchanged. As stated in the
termination Iener provided to Ryan, his employment was terminated because he was
"insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration and ... ridiculed personnel
through social media on the internet. "

111

Ryan does not dispute that he did so and has provided a

copy of the message he posted as an exhibit to his affidavit.

112

This reasoning for his termination

is independent of the propane issue and independent of his job perfonnance. The Court
recognizes that even if Ryan always received stellar perfonnance reviews and had never posted
his grievances or frustrations on social media, this would not preclude his termination because he
was an at-will employee.

113

Ryan has not disputed this.

Idaho law is very clear regarding at-will employees: "Unless an employee is hired
pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment or limits the reasons why
an employee may be discharged, the employee is at-will and can be terminated for ariy reason or

no rea.son at all." 114 Absent the application of an exception to this general rule, the District did
not need to provide a reason for Ryan's termination. As the Court found at summary judgment,
and reiterates below, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan qualified for protection under
the Idaho Whistleblower Act. Therefore, as an at-will employee his tennination was not
wrongful.

111

Kerns Affidavit, 11,t Ex. A.
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.315, 323-24.
113
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5-6.
114 Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 179, 75 P.3d 733, 740 (2003) (emphasis added),

112
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&· Lanie's Lunchroom Budiet

Plaintiffs dispute that Lanie ever exceeded her budget; meanwhile, the District asserts
that Lanie exceeded her budget in multiple years. Plaintiffs point to Lanie's affidavit and
attached exhibits to support her assertion. In her affidavit Lanie wrote, "In 2009, when I took
over as lunchroom supervisor, I stayed within budget." 115 She also wrote, "[A]though we may
have overspent the budget in a given month, I did not overspend the Food Service budget in any
given year. " 116
Additionally, Lanie has provided to the "Child Nutrition Financial Report" as "Exhibit
A" to her affidavit. Although the Child Nutrition Financial Report shows a balanced food

services budget_ for the 2009 fiscal year, the data is inconclusive. First, Lanie did not become the
Food Service Supervisor until May 2009 and it is unclear what time period this report covers, 117
Second, she has not provided the reports for the remaining years of her tenure as Food Service
Supervisor. Lanie was the Food Service Supervisor from May 2009 until June 2012. 118 Despite
asserting that she never exceeded her allotted budget, she has failed to provide evidence for
2010, 2011, and 2012. 119
In direct contradiction of the assertions in her affidavit, Lanie admitted to overspending

her budget when Defendant's counsel asked about it during her deposition:
Q. In the second line it says that you have consistently overspent the food service
budget each year, with the amount increasing each time, That's a true statement?
A. Yes, sir, it is.
Q, You don't dispute that you overspent the food service budget each year,
correct?
115

Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.329.
Wessel Affidt1vit, at attachment p.330.
117
Wessel Affidavit, at Attachment p.330.
118
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.330.
119
The Court also notes that the District has failed to produce reports for these years, although overage figures were
provided in the Affidavit of Gayle Woods.
116
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A. No, I don't. 120

Plaintiffs have not attempted to reconcile the conflicting statements in Lanie's affidavit
with her deposition testimony. Nor have they done so in their Motion to Reconsider and
did not do so when asked by the Court at oral argument. However, this is immaterial to
the Court's analysis.
Even assuming Lanie never exceeded her budget, she was an atvwill employee. 121
Plaintiffs have not disputed this fact. As the Court recognized above, Unless an
14

employee is hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment

or limits the reasons why an employee may be discharged, the employee is at-will and
can be terminated for any reason or no reason at all." 12'). Because Lanie was an at~will
employee the District could fire Lanie for "any reason or no reason at all." Plaintiffs do
not assert that Lanie engaged in any activity that would protect her from termination or
limit the District's ability to terminate her employment. Instead, she asserts protection as
a matter of public policy because of her husband's activities. However, as the Court
found at summary judgment, and reiterates below, Ryan, did not qualify for protection
under the Idaho Whistleblower Act. Therefore, even if the Act, or Idaho public policy,
provided an exception for the spouse of a whistleblower, the Court cannot reasonably
infer that Lanie's termination was wrongful because she was an at~will employee and
because her husband did not engage in protected activity.

120

Affidavit of Blake G. Hall, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161,
Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31, 2017) (hereinafter "Hall Affidavit''), 11.t Ex, B, p.70:13 f;-71:20.
21
Kerns Affidavity, at Ex. B.
122
Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 179, 75 P.3d at 740 (emphasis added).
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h. Lanie's Performance Evaluations
Like Ryan, Lanie asserts that she "always received positive performance evaluations" and
only a few weeks before her termination ''had received a positive performance evaluation and an
offer of a raise!' 123 As discussed above, it is undisputed that Lanie was an at-will employee,
"Unless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the
. employment or limits the reasons why an employee may be discharged, the employee is at~will
and can be terminated for any reason or no reason at all." 124 Therefore, the District could fire

Lanie for ''any reason or no reason at all." Based on the Court's analysis at summary judgment
and in other sections of this opinion, Lanie does not qualify for protection from this rule.
Therefore, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Lanie's termination was wrongful.

i. Required Forms
At summary judgment the Court recognized that Lanie failed to submit several state~
required forms during her tenure as lunch room supervisor. The Court reasoned that this was part
the District's reasoning for firing her. Despite asserting her always positive perfonnance
evaluations, Lanie never directly disputes her failure to submit these forms. However, even if
Lanie did not properly submit the forms, it is inunaterial to the Court's additional analysis.
As stated, Lanie was an at-will employee. Under Idaho law, an at-will employee may ''be
terminated for any reason or no reason at all" absent some exception. 125 The Court has
previously determined that Lanie did not qualify for protected status. Therefore, as an at-will
employee, her termination was not wrongful.

113
114

125

Wessel Affidavit, a.t attachment p.330.
Edrrumdson, 139 Idaho at 179, 75 P.3d at 740 (emphasis added).

Id. (emphasis added).
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3. The Berretts are not entitled to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act, or
Idaho Public Policy,

In light of the Court's additional reasoning and analysis regarding the disputed and
undisputed facts in this case. the Court reevaluates the Berretts' claims for protection under the
Idaho Whistleblower Act and Idaho public policy. After additional analysis, the Court concludes
that its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the District was appropriate. The Court
will evaluate each plaintiff's claims for protection individually, beginning with Ryan's.
a. Ryan

Toe Act affords "a legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse
action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or
regulation." 126 Protection under the Act is afforded to any employee that "communicates in good
faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or
suspected violation of a law ... under the law of this state or the United States." 127 Therefore,
more narrowly stated, the issue is whether Ryan reported a violation or suspected violation of a
law, entitling him to protection under the Act.
Ryan elm.ms that he reported a violation of the law because he reported on the District's
problem(s) with the propane system. He claims he was discharged in retaliation for making these
reports. In response_ to Ryan's claims, the District argues the discharge was not retaliatory and
has motioned for summary judgment. In order to survive summary judgment, _the Berretts carry
"the burden of presenting evidence from which a rational inference of retaliatory discharge under

1211
127

Idaho Code§ 6-2101.
Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1).
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the whistleblower act [can) be drawn." 128 In other words, they must present "a prima facie case
of retaliatory discharge ...." 129
A prima facie case for retaliatory discharge consists of three elements. To survive

summary judgment the Berretts must establish: (1) Ryan was an employee of the District and
"engaged or intended

to engage in protected activity;" (2) the District "took adverse action

against" him; and (3) there is "a causal connection between the protected activity'' and the
adverse action taken by the District. 1lo These three elements will be discussed in sequence
below.
i. Ryan Berrett did not engage, or intend to engage, in protected
activity.

It is undisputed that Ryan was an employee of the District. Therefore, in order to satisfy
this first element, Ryan only needs to establish that he engaged in, or intended to engage in, a
protected activity. 1; 1 Based on the Court's analysis, it cannot reasonably infer that Ryan engaged
in any protected activity.

There is very little precedent that may be used to define the scope of "protected
activities" contemplated llllder Idaho law. However, as the Act states, it applies to good faith
communications of "the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a

violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation adopted under the law of this state, a
political subdivision of this state or the United States. " 132

In this case, Ryan claims that he reported a building code violation and that the_report(s)
he made became the catalyst for his termination. As the following analysis illustrates, the alleged

128

Curlee v. Kootenai Co'UJ'/,ty Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,396,224 P.3d 458,463 (Idaho 2008).

twld.
llO Id.
131 Id.
132
Idaho Code§ 6-2103(1)(a).
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reports Ryan made do not fall within the range of "protected activities" contemplated by the Act.
Ample evidence indicates the propane odor in the old gymnasium was well known to the District
in January 2012. It was reported to Ms. Woods, the District's business manager by several staff
members. 133 In tum, Ms. Woods called Ryan to inform him of the problem. 134 Ms. Woods also
reported the issue to Mr. Kerns, the District's superintendent. 135 Mr. Kerns reported the issue to
the chairwoman of the Board, Ms. Haight-Mortensen. 136
As the District's maintenance supervisor, responsibility fell to Ryan, or he was assigned,
to identify the problem and fix it. 137 The Court cannot reasonably infer otherwise. In February,
after becoming aware of the problem, Mr. Berrett made his first report in his monthly letter to the
Board. Here, the Court again points out it cannot reasonably infer the issue had not already been
reported to the Board by Mr. Kerns and was not already well known throughout the District and
the administration. 138
In his March letter, Ryan reported on the issue again. This time he described the work he

had done to identify and fix the problem. He also informed the Board, "I am waiting for a bid
from sennon [sic] to correct this problem, when I receive it I will give it to MR. KERNS [sicJ
and we will go from there." 139 Ryan claims he later received the bid from Sermon Electric$
showed it to Mr. Kerns, and was told to "keep quiet." Mr. Kerns disputes that he ever told Ryan
to "keep quiet."

133

Woods Affidavit, at p.3
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311.
m Kerns Affidavit, at p.2.
130
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.2.
137
In Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, Ryan disputed his responsibility for the propane system but as the Court's
earlier analysis shows: there is no genuine dispute of fact. It is clear that Ryan was tasked with solving the problem
the propane system.
138
Woods Affidavit, at p. 3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Haight~Morte.nsen Affidavit, at p.3.
139
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28.
134
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Although this allegation is suspicious, it is of little consequence. Even if Ryan was told to
''keep quiet," the Court cannot reasonably infer there was anything to keep quiet about. The
school board was already aware of the propane leak. Mr. Kerns had already informed the school
board's chairwoman, Erin Haight-Mortensen, and Ryan had already begun reporting the problem
in his letters to the Board. He had already told the Board that Sermon Electric was preparing a
price quote for the needed repairs. 140 Based on the affidavits and other evidence supplied, the
Court cannot reasonably infer that the propane issue was not already known to the District. Nor
can the Court reasonably infer that the leak was not known to be a building code violation before
this particular conversation between Ryan and Mr. Kerns occurred.
This is also supported by additional evidence. M. early as February; a technician from
Sermon Electric began making service calls to the school and was assisting Ryan in resolving the
propane leak. 141 Ryan reported this in his February letter to the Board. Ryan also enlisted the aid
of High Planes Propane. 142 It is apparent the School Board knew of this involvement because "it
approved payment for each of the service calls." 143
It is beyond believable that an employee could be charged with solving a problem (even a
building code or safety violation), provide regular progress reports to his employer, discuss the
viability of proposed solutions with superiors, and then, after being fired, use those same
activities to substantiate claim of retaliatory discharge. This is especially true when the employee
was charged with fixing a problem already known to the employer.
Certainly, the statute offers protection to employees who report "a violation or suspected

violarion of a law" and it is undisputed that the propane leak was a violation of law; however,

140

Woods Affidavit. at Ex. A, p.28
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311-12.
142
Wessel Affidavit. at attachment p.311.
143
Woods Affidavit, at p.3.

141
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there was nothing to report for purposes of the Act because the District already knew about the
problem and was working to fix it. Therefore, Ryan has failed to establish that any of the actions
described above constituted protected activity.
The Court now looks to Ryan's other actions to determine whether any of these
reasonably constituted pi:otected activity. First, Ryan claims he appeared at the May 17 school
board meeting to testify against Mr. Kerns. 144 The notes from the meeting shed a different light
on his participation. The notes indicate Ryan reported that "the propane issues are still a
problem." 14s From the District's perspective Ryan's participation appears to have been nothing
more than another progress report on the problem he had been tasked with resolving.
Ryan asserts that he and two others ''were called before the Board and asked one at a time
if [they] thought that the Superintendent knew that the propane problem could possibly cause
injury to human life." The court for Summary Judgment assumes this to be true. Regardless, this
statement supports the conclusion the District already knew about the propane problem and
acknowledged it, Why else would the school board have ''called" upon Ryan to discuss the issue
at all?

All things considered and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs (the
nonmoving party), the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan's participation in the school
board meeting was protected activity, The District already knew about of the propane leak, Mr.
Kerns had personally informed the Board of the issue four months before. Ryan had also been
providing the Board with monthly reports on the issue. The Board had also approved payments
for service calls made by Sermon Electric and High Plan.es Propane. Again, the Court is left to

ponder, what else was there to report that might have constituted a protected activity? Even if
144
145

Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314.
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A.

MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Page 32 of 41

Page 106

FEB/14/2018/WED 10:53 AM

RECEIVED

02/14/2018 09:32AM

FAX No.

P. 033/041

Ryan's assertions are true, even if he was called to testify about or against Mr. Kern at the school
board meeting, what could he have said to qualify him for protection? Ryan does not claim he
was terminated for testifying against Mr. Kerns. He claims he was fired for reporting on the
propane issue, which was a violation of law. 146
Lastly, the Court discusses the message Ryan posted to Facebook on or about June 18,
2012. 147 The posted message was critical of the District and its administration. 148 Although the
message may have contained a cryptic reference to the propane problem, it more closely
resembles an unfettered rant by a disgruntled employee. 149 It offers nothing th.at resembles a
good faith report of ''a violation or suspected violation of a law, , .." 150 Therefore, the Court
cannot reasonably infer that it constitutes protected activity.
Because the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan engaged in any protected activity,
summary judgment in favor of the District was appropriate. Nevertheless, for the sake of inquiry,
the Court continues its analysis of the two remaining elements: ( 1) adverse action against the
employee, and (2) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.

b. The District took an advel"se action against Ryan Berrett by terminating his
employment.
The second element of a retaliatory discharge claim requires the employee to establish
the employer took an adverse action against them. Based on the following analysis, the Court
may reasonably infer the District took adverse action against Ryan. The evidence before the
Court is that Mr. Berrett' s employment was terminated. This fact is undisputed.

146

Complaint, Ex. C, at p.7-9.
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.323-24.
148
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.323-24.
149
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.323-24.
150
Idaho Code§ 6~2104(1),
141
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After Ryan posted the aforem~tioned rant on Facebook, Ms. Haight-Mortensen notified

Mr. Kerns about the post and requested that he speak to Ryan about it. Mr. Kerns then discussed
the Facebook post at the Board's next meeting. During the meeting it was decided that Mr.
Berrett was an at-will employee and discharge was the appropriate sanction for his conduct. A
termination letter was then drafted and delivered to Ryan. The letter, signed by Mr. Keros, states
in relevant part:
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District adnlinistration
and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the internet. Your
performance in some duties has been declining as well with building maintenance
and keeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "at~
will", or non-contractual employee, the District administration has decided to
terminate your employment effective June 30th, 2012. 151
The District does not dispute that this letter was delivered, or that Ryan's employment was
terminated. Because it is undisputed his employment terminated, Ryan has established that the
District took adverse action against him.
The Court notes that, for the first time at oral argument, on Plaintiffs' Motion to
Reconsider, Plaintiffs asserted that the District took additional adverse action against them.
Plaintiffs asserted that the District raised their rent and eventually evicted them from their
District owned residence. The Court recognizes these as additional adverse actions and assumes
them to be true, but the Court has already recognized that, for purposes of summary judgment,
the District took adverse action against the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the prior related analysis and
conclusion of the Court is unchanged by these new assertions and swnmary judgment in favor of
the School District was still appropriate based on the Court's analysis of the two remaining
elements.

151

Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. B,
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c. There is no causal connection between Ryan Berrett's alleged, protected

activity and the adverse action taken by the District.
To survive summary judgment on a retaliatory discharge claim, Ryan must also establish
a causal connection between his alleged, protected activity and the adverse action taken by the
District. Because Ryan failed to establish that he engaged in a protected activity, there can be no
causal connection to the adverse action taken by the District. Nevertheless, the Court continues
its analysis of the final element for the sake of inquiry. Relevant to this inquiry is the "Proximity
in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment action ...." 152
As stated, several of the District's other employees and adn:tinistrators received reports of
a propane odor in the gymnasium as early as January 2012. Over a period of several months,
Ryan worked to resolve the issues and provided regular reports to Mr. Kerns and the Board,
Multiple affidavits and their corresponding exhibits support these facts. It was not until
approximately four or five months later, after multiple written and verbal reports were provided,
that Ryan's employment was terminated, This is a significant amount of time, and the Court
cannot reasonably infer that the adverse action taken against Ryan and the alleged protected
activity are causally connected.
Beyond this, Ryan asserts that he attended the May 17 Board meeting and testified
against Mr. Kerns. Then his employment was terminated roughly six weeks later. Although these
two events occurred close in time, the temporal relation is immaterial be.cause a claim that Ryan
was terminated for testifying against Mr. Kerns is not before the Court. Therefore, the Court
cannot reasonably infer that there a causal connection between the adverse action taken by the
District and the activities Ryan claims were protected. This is especially true because the District
152

See Curlee, 148 Idaho at 397, 224P.3d at 464 (quoting Heng v. RotechMed.Corp.. 688 N.W.2d 389,401. (N.D.

2004)).
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was already aware of the propane issue as early as January and Ryan had been providing regular
reports on the problem months before his termination.
The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit Court concluded that Ryan's termination was
sufficiently close in time to the alleged, protected activity to survive summary judgment.
However, the facts now before the Court are different from the facts in the case heard by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The affidavits filed in this case make it clear the District was
aware of the building code violation caused by the propane issue as early as January 2012. As the
Court discussed above, many IIlonths passed since Ryan began working on and reporting on the
propane issue and his termination. Based on this analysis, the Court cannot reasonably infer that
the two events were close in time or causally connected. Therefore, In other words, the Court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the District and Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider
should be denied as to the wrongful termination claim.

4. As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett does not qualify for protection under: the

Act as the spouse of a whistleblower.
As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett claims that she qualifies for protection from a
retaliatory discharge as the spouse of a whistleblower. However, based on the Court's prior
analysis, it cannot reasonably infer that Ryan Berrett failed to establish that he was a
whistleblower under the Act or was the subject of a retaliatory discharge. Because Ryan does not
qualify for protected status under the Act, Lanie cannot claim protection as his spouse. Even if
Ryan had established a case retaliatory discharge, Lanie would still not be entitled to protection
for two reasons. First, under established law, spouses of employees are unprotected by both the
Act and public policy. Second, the Court cannot reasonably infer that her termination is causally
connected to any protected activity.
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a. Spouses of Employees are Unprotected
Spouses of employees who engage in protected activity are not protected under the Act or
any related Idaho law or policy. The Idaho Whistleblower Act provides a "cause of action for
public employeu who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting
waste and violations of a law, rule or regulation."u 3 Lanie Berrett asserts that as a matter of
public policy,_ she is entitled to protection. However, the Court will not adopt this conclusion.
The language of the Act specifically allows relief for "employees." It makes no reference
to, or allowance for, spouses of employees. 154 The Court is unwilling to read words into the
statute that were not included by the legislature. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has not
previously extended protection to an employee's spouse as a matter of public policy and the
Court is unwilling to do so now. "Even if a cause of action for damages should exist as relief for
alleged retaliatory discharge in contravention of public policy based upon conduct of the
employee's spouse ... the dearth of evidence in this case fails ..." to support a reasonable
inference that Lanie's spouse was entitled to protection under the act, or that her termination was
causally connected to any of his allegedly protected activities. m
Plaintiffs have argued that this Court should extend whistleblower protection to spouses
of eligible employers. Plaintiffs have made valid arguments as to why this would be appropriate;
however, in considering these arguments the Court notes that the whistleblower statute's latest
version was enacted by the legislature in 1994, It is not a statute that is over fifty, or even one
hundred, years old with a changing and evolving population. The court also notes the specific
language of the statute says, "employee."

3

Idaho Code§ 6~2101 (emphasis added).
See id.
'" Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 179, 75 P.3d at 740 (emphasis added).

is

154
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This Court consistently applies statutes as written and it is not persuaded that this is a
situation where an exception or an addition to the statute is appropriate as a matter of public
policy. If the Idaho legislature desires to extend protection to spouses of employees under the
whistleblower statute it may do so. This court is not persuaded that it should enlarge the
protection already made available by the legislature. The Idaho legislature may do so if it
believes such protection is appropriate.

b, Lanie's Termination is not Causally Connected
Even if relief were available based upon the conduct of an employee's spouse as a matter
of public policy, summary judgment is still appropriate because Lanie has not established that
her termination is causally connected to any protected activity (even the activity asserted by her
husband). As discussed, the Berretts must establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge to
survive summary judgment. 156 Such a cl~im requires three elements: (1) the employee engaged
in a protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse action against the employee, and (3) the
adverse action was causally connected to the protected activity. 157
Lanie does not assert that she engaged in protected activity; rather, she relies on her
husband's claim that he engaged in protected activity. The Court previously decided that it could
not reasonably infer Ryan had engaged in protected activity. The Court emphasizes that even if
he had, neither the act nor Idaho public policy extends protection to spouses of employees who
engaged in protected activity.
The second element requires an adverse action against the employee. If the Act made
allowance for spouses of employees, Lanie could establish this element, Her rent was increased,
her employment was terminated, and she was evicted from her residence. Therefore, for purposes
156

Curlee, 148 Idaho at 397, 224 P.3d at 464.

1s1 Id.
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of summary judgment, the Court may reasonably infer that adverse action was taken against
Lanie.

However, the Court cannot reasonably infer Lanie qualifies for protection under the Act
because her termination is causally connected to any protected activity. Lanie has not asserted
that she engaged in any protected activity. Instead, she asserts that her termination is causally
connected to her husband's activities.
As stated, "Proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action ..." is relevant to determining whether the two are causally connected. 158 As discussed
above, months passed between Lanie's termination and Ryan's allegedly protected activity.
During this period, Ryan was constantly updating the school board on his progress. The Board
also called on Ryan to discuss the propane issue at the May 17 Board meeting. 159 Based on this
and the Court's analysis in other sections of this opinion, the Court cannot reasonably infer that

Lanie's termination was causally connected to any protected activity. As a result, the Court
cannot reasonably infer that Lanie's termination was in retaliation for any protected activity
(either her own or her spouses). As a result, the Court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of the District on Plaintiffs' claim for retaliatory discharge. Plaintiffs' Motion to
Reconsider should be denied.

5. Remaining Claims
As to the remaining federal law claims, listed in the complaint, which were not addressed

by the parties in the original Summary Judgment Motion and in the Courts prior Opinion and
Order on Parties' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' Motion

158

See id. (quoting Her,,g v. Rotech Med.Cory., 688 N.W.2d 389,401, (N.D. 2004)).
,s9 This provides additional evidence that the District knew about and acknowledged the propane problem.
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to Reconsider. As the Plaintiffs correctly point out, they should be allowed to address those
issues through pleading and argument.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1- Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the decision on Plaintiffs' Whistleblower/Retaliation

Claims is DENIED.
2- Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the decision on Plaintiffs' Disability Discrimination
claims is GRANTED,

3- Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the decision on Plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claims is
GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 40 of 41

Page 114

RECEIVED

FEB/14/2018/WED 10:57 AM

02/14/2018 09:32AM

FAX No.

P. 041/041

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Ji3....

day of February 2018 the MEMORDANDUM DECISION
I hereby certify that on this
ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER was entered and a true and correct copy was
served upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage thereon, or by causing
the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes.

Counsel for Plaintiffs:
Jacob S. Wessel
THOMSEN HOLMAN WHEILER. PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401

Counsel fo:r Defendant:
Blake G. Hall
Sam L. Angell
HAll ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, UP
1075 S. Utah Ave., Ste. 150

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

Clerk of the District Court
Jefferson County, Idaho

MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Page 41 of 41

Page 115

FILED
y-:·~~
.....---T-1,J..A_

-

2 2018

FILED IN CH.A.JIBElll
at Idaho Fall,

JE F~~:IU. MAGISTRATE
AND DISTRICT COURT
....___..;..._.~;;...;;..;...;.----1

1lontievil1e ~

8rooe
L. P;e,ll ejt
/J. il,

E: !~ :
HM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

RONALD RYAN BERRETT AND
LANIE BERRETT, husband and wife,
Case No. CV-2017-328
Plaintiffs,

v.

FINAL JUDGMENT

CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
NO. 161,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: The Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant
are hereby dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this

FINAL JUDGMENT

/¾or

August 2018.

Page I of2

Page 116

,_
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this~ day of August 2018 the FINAL JUDGMENT was entered and
a true and correct copy was served upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereo~ or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes.

Counsel for Plaintiffs:
Jacob S. Wessel

THOMSEN HOLMAN WHEILER PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Fax:208-522- 1277

Email: wessel@thwlaw.com

Counsel for Defendant/Respondent:
Blake G. Hall
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: 208-522-3003
Fax: 208-621-3008

Email: bgh@hasattomeys.com

Colleen Poole
Clerk of the District Court
Jefferson County, Idaho

FINAL JUDGMENT

Page2of2

Page 117

·~~_.~,~~

I

'fi.l1

! :)

...

JEFFi"i<:::;~

Jacob S. Wessel, ISB 7529
THOMSEN HOLMAN WHEILER, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 10404
Telephone (208) 522-1230
Fax (208) 522-1277
wessel@thwlaw.com

2018 SEP IO PM 5: 03

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
RONALD RYAN BERRETT AND LANIE )
)
BERRETT, husband and wife,
)
Plaitiffs/Appellant,
)
)
V.
)
CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT )
)
NO. 161,
)
Defendant/Respondent.

Case No. CV-17-0328

NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT, CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
161, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS BLAKE HALL AT HALL ANGELL &
ASSOCIATES, 1075 S UTAH, STE 150, 83402, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE
ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellants appeal against the above named respondent to the Idaho

Supreme Court from the Opinion and Order on Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
entered November 15, 2017, Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider entered
February 12, 2018, and Final Judgment entered August 1, 2018. Honorable Judge Bruce Pickett
1-

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Page 118

V

presiding. A copy of the judgment and orders being appealed is attached to this notice, as well as a
copy of the final judgment.
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That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments

or orders describe in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders pursuant to I.A.R. Rule ll(a)(l).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TBE
-STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

RONALD RYAN BERRETT AND
LANIE BERRETT. husband and wife,
Case No. CV-2017-328

Plaintiffs,

v.

OPINION AND ORDER ON PARTIES,
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
NO. 161,
Defendant.

This Opinion and Order is in response to the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment.

I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of summary judgment, the Court finds the following facts:
The plaintiffs. Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett (..Ryan" or'~. Berrett'', and
"Lanie.. or "Ms. Berrett''• -and collectively as ''the Berretts~'). were both employed by the Clark
County School District (the "School District"). Ryan was employed as the district's maintenanc e
supervisor, Lanie as the lunchroom supervisor. During the relevant time period, Erin Haight-

Mortensen ("Ms. Haight-Mortensen") was chairwoman of the Clark County School Board,
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David Kerns (''Mr. Kerns..) was the district superintendent, and Gayle Woods (''Ms. Woods")
was the district business manager.

1. Ryan
As the School District's-maintenance supervisor, Ryan's responsibilities included the

School District's heating and.:fur:nace systems. Including the propane tank and corresponding
system that supplied propane gas to heat the School District's various buildings. In January 2012,
Ms. Woods began receiving reports that the old gymnasium smelled of propane. She then

informed Mr. Kerns, and Mr. Kerns informed Ms. Haight-Mortensen there was a leak in the ·
propane system. Ms. Woods, Mr. Kerns, and Ms. Haight-Mortensen we.re all aware that the
propane system leak was a building code vi-Olation. 1
The task of :findjng and fucing the leak fell to Ryan. As a result, Ryan began reporting on
the problem in his monthly letters to 1he Clark County School Board (''the School Board") in
February 2012. He wrote, ~we do have a propane pressure issue that has been ongoing for

several years. I have been working with a Sermon technician and think a lot of the problems are
at the bulk tank. I will bet [sic] the problem resolved."2

In March. Ryan provided- another update t.o the -School Board. In his letter, he described
the work he had done over the past month and his diagnosis of the problem. He then concluded,
"I am waiting for a bid from sermon [sic] to couect this problem, when I receive it I will give it
to MR. KERNS [sic] and we will go from there. "3 There is a dispute about what happened after
Ryan received the quote from Seanon Electric. Ryan clauns that he showed it to Mr. Kerns and
was told to c'keep quiet" Mr. Kerns disputes that he never instructed Ryan to "'keep quiet"

1

Woods Aff. 3; Kerns Aff. 2; Haight~Mortensen Aff. 3.
Woods Aif. Ex. A. February 2, 2012 letter.
3
Woods Aff. Ex. A. Mm-ch 12, 2012 letter.
2

OPINION AND ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SU!v(MAllY JUDGMENT

Page 2 of22

Page 123

V

NOV/15/2017/WED 02:39 PM

P. 003/024

FAX No.

Also in March, the School District received an inspection report. In the report. the School
District was-eited for multiple maintenance violations. Some of the violations cited were repeat
offenses. for which the School District hBd been cited in prior inspections. As the maintenance

supe:rvisor, Ryan was responsible for these violations.
During the months of February, March, and April, Ryan worked with technicians from
both Sermon Electric and High Planes :Propane and their involvement is mentioned in his
monthly letters. Over the course of this three month period, both companies visited the school on
numerous occasions and attempted to identify and the leak in the propane system. The School
Board approved payment for these service call-s. 4 After several months of in.vestigation, it was
discovered that the propane system contained micro-leaks throughout and plans were made to
repair it after school let out for the smnmer.

In May 2012 the propane leak still remained unfixed. The School Board minutes indicate /

,_;J-i

<.rr··t

Ryan appeared and told the School Board that "the propane issues are still a problem.. »5 La:ter on,
near the end of May or first of June, Ryan posted.a derogatory message on Faceboo.k. The
tnessage was critical of the Clark County School Di.strict and Administration and violated the
established policies outlined in the employee manual. The message also appears to have

contained a cryptic reference to the School District's propane leak. After it was posted, several
members of the community saw and co:tnm.ented on the message. Ms. Haight-Mortensen was

among those who saw the message. After viewing the message, Ms. Haight-Mortensen provided
a copy ofit to Mr. Kems and requested that he speak Ryan about it.

At Ms. Haight-Mortensen's request. Mr. Kerns approached Ryan about the Facebook
, __.,. I

post and asked-that it be removed. 'When confrente~ Ryan became belligerent and called :Mr.

4
5

d O '/){

~

Woods A.ff: 3.
Woods AfE Ex. A.
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Kerns a ''fu.clcing asshole. »6 Mr. Kerns then explained why the post was inappropriate and
requested that Ryan remove it, a second time. Ryan agreed to remove it. -and did so.

Mr. Kerns discussed-th.en the Facebook post and his encounter with Ryan at the School
Board"s next meeting. During the rneeting it was decided that Mr. Berrett was-an at-will
employee and discharge was the appropriate-sanction for his conduct. A termination letter was
then drafted and delivered to Ryan. 1b.e letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states in relevant part:
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration
and have ridiculed personnel thmn2h sor.fal media on the intemet. Your
pezfonnance in some duties has been declining as well with building mmn.tenance
and koeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "atwill". or non-contractual employee) the District administration has decided to
t.en:oinate your employment effective June 30th, 2012. 7
As per the terms of the letter, Ryants employment was terminated on June 30, 2012.

2. Lanie
As the hmchroom supervisor, Ms. Berrett was responsible for proper management of the

kitchen. Among other things, this required that she prepare (and adhere to) an annual budget and
submit state-required paperwork. However, for at least three consecutive years, Lanie exceeded
her approved budget. Despite beiug admonished and informed of hardship placed on the School
District when she exceeded her budget, she continued to exceed it. In addition to exoeeding the
budget, it was also discovered. that Lanie repeatedly failed to submit several fonns required by ;

1 'i ~✓·-'\.
\J-

6

the State of!daho. These were grounds for her termination, as stated in the letter.
On June 30, 2012, Lanie 1 s employment was terminated. Her temrirurtion letter. 'Which
was signed by Mr. Kerns. states, ''You have consistently overspent the Food Service budget each

year, with the amount mcreasing each time. You also are not performing satisfactorily in your
supervisory duties and you have not followed the direction from your own supervisor when
6

7

I<ems Aff. 7.

Kerns A.ff. Ex. B.
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called upon to make sure District policies and procedures are followed_J,s Lanie's employment
was terminated per the terms of the letter.

After they were discharged. the Berretts filed their in the Federal District Court ofldaho.

The Federal court granted summary judgment in favor of1he School District on all claims and
the Ben-ens-appealed to Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. the Federal District Court's-ruling as to the federal law claims, but remanded the
decision back on to the state law claims. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the

Betretts had established a prime facie case lln.der the Act and were entitled. to a trial. Upon the
remand, the Federal District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case
with.out prejudice. The Berretts then filed their state law clanns in state district court.

II.

PLEADINGS
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Ryan Bettett claims that bis

employment was terminated because he reported on a leak in the Clarlc County School District's
propane system. He claims that this amounted to a retaliatory discharge because he engaged in
protected activity under the Idaho Whlstleblower Act. He further claims his termination violated
the Idaho Whistleblower Act

Lanie Berrett claims that she was terminated in retaliation for her husband's protected
activity. She claims that public policy entitles her to protection llll.der the Idaho Whistleblower
Act, as the spouse of a wbistleblower. Based on these assertiOllS, she claims that she was
wrongfully terminated.

8

Kerns Af£ Ex. D.
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Both of the Berretts -claim the "law of the case" applies to the Ninth Circuit Court
decisio~ binding this Court to act in accordance with that decision. They claim that by virtue of
that decision, they are entitled to survive. summary judgment and proceed to trial.

In opposition to the Berretts' claims, the Defendant claims that SUin.DlarJ judgment
should be granted in its favor-. The School Distrlct claims that the Ryan is not entitled to
protection under the Act, his termination was not the result of any protected activity, Lanie's
termination was um-elated to her husband's activities, and public policy does not protect Ms.
Berrett from tennination.

w.
APPUCABLE LAW
1. Standard of Review -Motion fo:r Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if. based upon "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that th.ere is no genuine issue as to any material
9
fact and that 1h.e moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." In evaluating a party's

Motion for Summary Judgment, "[The Court] liberally construes all disputed facts" and draws
"all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing
11
10
the moti.oJL" Where there is no '•issue of material fact. only a question oflaw :remains." When

only a question oflaw remains, the Court "exercises free review_,J

12

Additionally. the nonmoving party must provide more than a •~ere scintilla of
evidence." creating a genuine issue of .material fact. 13 In other words, "{T]he nonmoving party

'Ktebenv. Goss, 144 Idaho 225. 227, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (2007); l.R..C.P. 56(c).
10
11

Kieben. 144 Idaho at 227, 159 P.3d at 864.
Id

ll Id
IS

Van v. Portne,efMed.

err., 147 Idaho 552,556 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009).
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must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine

~-.:-

issue for trial." 14

2. Law of the Case
Tue law of the case is similar to stare decisiS. Like stare decisis, it seeks to eliminate
"relitigation of settled issues ....'' 15 Specifically, the Idaho Court ofAppeals has stated:
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case. that rule
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision on
tm issue of law made at one stage of a proce~ becomes precedent to be
followed. in successive stages of that same litigation. 1

However notwithstanding this precedent, established by the Idaho Court of Appeals. state
3

district courts are not required to treat Federal district or circuit court decisions or inteipretaiions

of Idaho Jaw as bind.ing. 17 This applies "even on issues of federal law." 18 Certainly> they may
treat Federal district and circuit court decisions as persuasive, but they ate not required to do
s0.19

3. The Idaho Whisdeblower Act - § 6.:2101 et seq.
The Idaho Whistleblower Act ("the Act'') affords "a legal cause of action for public

employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and
violations of a law, rule o:,; :regulati.on."20 Protection under the Act is afforded to employees who
communicate. "in good faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower,

1• Id.
15

SW1 Valley Ranches, Inc. \I. Pral'rte.Power Co-op., Inc., 124Idaho 125,129, 856P.2d 1292, 1297 (Idaho Ct App.

19.93).

16

Id. (quoting Frazier'V. Neilsen,

118 Idaho

104, 106, 794P.2d 1160, 1162 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990)) (internal

citations omitted).
17

See State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413,413,398 P.3d 146, 149 (Id8ho 2017) (findmg error where state district court
felt compelled t.o follow a directive or pronouncement of the N:intb. Circuit).
u Id. (quoting Dan W'rebold Ford, Inc. -v. Universal Computer Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235,240, 127 P.3d 138, 143
(2005)).
19
McN,uily, 162 Idaho at 413,398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho2017).
20
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2101 (1994).
OPINION AND ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMM.AltY JUDGMENT

Page7of22

Page 128

NOV/15/2017/WED 02:41 PM

P. 008/024

FAX No.

or a violation or suspected violation ofa law .. ." under the law of t:bis state ot the United
States. ,.ii However, a good faith communication must also "be made at a time and in a :r:mmner

which gives the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the waste or violation.',22

IV.
ANALYSIS
These are the issues before the Court on Summa.ry Judgment. (1) Does the "law of the
case" apply to the Nmth Circuit Court's decision. binding this Court and entitling the Berretts 10.

a trial on their claims for relief? (2) Is Ryan Berrett entitled to protection under the Idaho
Wbistleblower Act as outlined by Idaho Code section 6-2101 et seq.? (3) Is Lanie Benett entitled
to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act, as a matter of publ~c policy, because she is 1he

spouse of an asserted whistleblowcr? Each of these :issues will be addressed in tom.
1. The "law of the case'' doctrine does not apply and the Court may .niake an

independent evaluation of the facts before it
The Court must first decide whether the '"law of the case" applies to the Ninth Circuit

Court's decision. binding this Court and entitling the Berretts to trial on their claims- for relief.
Based on the Court's reasoning and analysis, the "law of the case" does not apply to the Ninth
Circuit Court's decision and the Court is not bound to follow it.
As the Comt has stated, the Berretts previously filed their claim in the Federal District

Court for the District ofidaho. In that case, the Berretts asserted both federal and state law
claims for relie£ The School District moved for summary judgment and the Federal District

Court granted '!he motion. Toe Berretts appeal-ed. the decision to the Nmth Circuit Court of
Appeals.

21
22

InAHO CODE ANN. § 6-2104(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 6-2104(1) (1994).
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The Ninth Circuit Comt affinned the district court's rulings on the Berretts' federal law

~

..

claims but remanded the remaining state law claims back to the Federal District Court. In doing
so, the Ninth Circuit stated:

Mr. Berrett established a prima facie case of retalia:tory conduct by presenting
evidence that: he engaged in protected activity by reporting "a violation or
suspected violation of a law" ....he suffered an "adverse action" "When he was
terminated . . . and the ••close relation in time" between th.em, among other
factors, suggests he may have been fired for reporting the propane issue. Tiris is
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary

judgment.23

Upon remaud, the Federal District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case and

dismissed it without prejudice. The Benetts then filed their claims in state district court. They
argue the Ninth Circuit's decision is binding upon the Court !:lild entitles them to a trial on the
merits of their claims. In this assertion,. the Berretts specifically rely on 1he "law of the case"

doctrine.
The "law of the case" doctrine is similar to stare decisis. Like stare decisis, it seeks to

eliminate "relitigation of settled issues .... "24 On the issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals has
stated:
[W]here an appellate court st.ates a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the Sal.ne. The decision on
an issue of law made at one stage of a. procee<llff becomes precedent to be
followed in successive stages of that same litigation.

However, notwithstanding the precedent established by the Idaho Court of Appeal, state district
courts are not required to treat Federal district or circuit comt decisioll.S as wntrolling. i 6 This r'Ule

Wessel Af£: E:ic. A, at 2.
Sun Valley Ranehes, Inc., 124 Idabo at 129, 856 P .2d at 1297.
25 Id. (quoting
Frazjer v. Neil.rem, 118 ldaho 104, 106, 794 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) (intemal citations
zi
24

omitted).

26 McNeely,

162 Idaho at 413,398 P.3d at 149 (finding error where state district court felt compelled to follow a
directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circllit).
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applies "even on issues of foderal law." 27 The Court notes that the issues in this case arise under
state, not federal, law.

In short. the "law of the case" does not apply here. Certainly, the Comt may still treat the
Federal district and circuit court decisions as persuasive. but it is not required to do so.:28 Because

the Court is not bound by the Nmth Circuit"s decision and the issues of the case arise under state
law. it will look at the facts presently before it and make an independent evaluation and decision.

2. Ryan. Berrett.is not entitled to protection onder the Idaho Whistleblower Act.

Next, the Court turns its attention. to the second issue before it on summary judgment: Is
Ryan Berrett entitled to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act as outlined by Idaho Code
section 6-2101 et seq.? Based on the following analysis. the Court concludes he is not.
The Act affords "a legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse

action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law. rule or
regulation. ,.29 Protection under the Act is afforded to any employee that "communicates in good
faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or

suspected violation of a law ... under the law of this state or the United States.,,3o Therefore,
more narrowly sta:ted., the issue is whether Ryatt reported a violation or suspected violation of a

law. entitling him to protection under the Act.

Ryan claims that he reported a violation of the law because he reported on the School
District's problem.(s) with the propane system. He claims he was discharged in retaliation for
making these reports. In response to Ryan's claims, the School District argues the discharge was
not retaliatory and has motioned for summary judgment. In order to survive sn:mroary judgment,
1:1

McNeely, 162 Idaho at413,398 P.3dat 149 (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc.. v. Universal CompuierSen>ices,

Inc., 142 Idaho 235, 240, 127 P 3d 138, 143 (2005)).
28
McNeely, 162 ldaho at 398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho 2017).
29

36

lDAHO CODBANN. § 6-2101 (1994).
IDAHO CODE.ANN.§ 6--2104(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
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the Berretts carry "the burden of presenting evidence from which a rational inference of

~

....,

retaliatory clischarge..underthe whistleblower act [can] be drawn."3 J In other words. they must
present "a prirna facie case of retaliatory discharge ...."32
A prima facie case for retaliatory discharge consists of three elements. To survive
summary judgment the Berretts must establish: (I) Ryan was an employee of the District and
"engaged.or intended to engage in protected activity;" (2) the School District ''took adverse
action against" him; and (3) there is "a causal connection between the protected activity" and the

adverse action taken by the District.33 These three elements will be discussed in sequence below.
a. :Ryan :Uen-ett did not engage, or intend

to engage, in protected activity.

It is not disputed that Ryan was an etnployee of the School District Therefore, in order to
satisfy this first element, llyan only needs to establish that he engaged in. or intended to engage
in, a protected activity. 34 Based on the Court's analysis. Ryan has not established that he engage.d

in a protected activity.

There is very little precedent that may be used to define the scope of "protected
activities.. contemplated under Idaho law. Howev~ one case, Black v. Idaho State Police, has
provided some guidance in the fotm of examples.35 The Black court stated:
Examples of protected activity include (I) reporting safety violations that
potentially violate federal regulations ... (2) documenting a waste of public :funds
and manpower ... and (3) communicating a mayor's pot.ential conflict of interest
with an employee health plan that could potentially waste public resources. 36
Of the three examples listed abo'\Te, the first is most :relevant here. Ryan claims the safety
violation he reported was the leak in the propane system, and that the reports he made became

n Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 ldaho 391,396,224 P.3d 458,463 (Idaho 2008).

llJd.

DJd
34 Id.
35
Black v. Idaho Stare Police, 155 ldaho 570, 573, 314 P 3d 625, 628 (Idaho 2013).
36 Id :fu.3.
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the catalyS1 for his discharge. How-ever, as the following analysis illustrates, tlie reports Ryan
made do not fall withln the range of '"'protected activities» contemplated by the Act.

Ample evidence indicates the propane odor in the old gynmasium was well known
-tbroqghout 1he School District in Ja:rmary 2012. It was reported-to Ms. Woods, the School
District's business manager, by several sta:ff members. 37 In turn, Ms. Woods reported the issue to
Mr. Kerns, the School Disttict' s superinte.odent.38 Mr. Kerns then reported the issu.e to the

School Board's chairwoman, Ms. Haight-Mortensen. 39

As the School District's maintenance supervisor, responsibility fell to Ryan to identify
the problem and fix it. After becoming aware of the problem, Mr. Berrett made his :first report on
the problem. in in February, in his monthly letter to the School Board. Here, the Court again
points out that the issue had .already been reported to the School Board by Mr. Kerns and was

well known throughout the School District and the Admmistrati.on.

In bis March letter. Ryan reported on the issue again.. This time he descn1>ed the work be
had done to identify the problem and fix it He also informed. the School Distric\ ..I am waiting
for a bid from sermon [sic] to correct this problem, when I receive it I will give it to .MR.

KERNS [sic] and we will go :from there. "40 Ryan claims he later received the bid from Serm.on

Electric, showed it to Mr. Kerns~ and was told to "keep quiet." Mr. Kerns disputes that he ever
told Ryan to ".keep quiet."

Although this allegation is suspicious. it is of little consequence. Even if Ryan was told to
•'k,o~

qui.et,., the Court wonders: What was the.re to keep quiet about? The School Board was

already aware of the propane leak. Mr. Kerns, himself, informed the School Board, s

37

Woods A:ff. 3
Aff. 2.
Haight-Mortensen Aff. 2.
40
Woods A.ff. Ex. A. March 12, 2012 letter.

31 Kerns
39
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chairwoman, Erin Haight-Mortensen. and Ryan began reporting the problem a mon1h later in his

letters to the School Board. The School Board was already aware of the problem and already
knew itwas a building code violation, mon-ths before this particular conversation between Ryan
and Mr. Kerns occurred.
Additionally. there is other evidence that suggests the propane leak was already known to
the School Board, even before Ryan was allegedly told to "keep quiet" by Mr. Kerns. As early as
February. a teclnrician from Serro.on Electric began making service calls to the school and was
assisting Ryan in resolving the propane leak. Ryan reported this in his F e ~ letter to the
School Board. Eventually, Ryan also enlisted the aid of High Planes Propane. It is apparent the
School Board knew ofthis involvement because "it approved payment for each of the service
calls.',41 This is important because it evidences tha:t the School Board had separate knowledge of
the propane problem; apart from Ryan's, Ms. Woods'. or Mr. K.ems' reports of the issue.

It is beyond believable that an employee could be charged with solving a problem (even a
building code or safety violation), provide regular progress reports to his employer, discuss the
viability of proposed solutions with superiors. and th~ after being fired, use 'those same
activities to substantiate claun of retaliatoiy discharge. This is especially true when the employee
was charged with fixing a problem already known to the employer. Certamly, the stalllte offers

protection to employees who report "a violation or suspected violation ofa law." And it is
undisputed that the propane leak was a violation of law; however, there was nothing to report for
purposes of the Act because the School District already knew abeut the problem and was trying
to :fix it. Therefore, Ryan has failed to establish that these discussed actions constituted protected
activity.

41

Woods Aff. 3.
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The Court now looks to Ryan's other actions to determine whether any of these
reasonably constituted protected activity~ F ~ Ryan claims he appeared-at the May 17 school
board meeting to testify against Mr. Kerns. 42 The meeting notes shed a different light on his

L.:

participation in that meeting; instead, these merely indicate Ryan reported "the propane issues
are still a problem.""3 As with his other reports. this was nothing more than a progress report on
the problem Ryan had already been tas1ced with solving.
Just as before. the Court finds it difficult to conclude this partitipation in the School
Board meeting constitutes protected activity, even after drawing reasonable inferences in bis
favor. The School Board already knew of the propane leak, Mr. Kems bad personally infonned
the School Board of the issue approximately four months prior, Ryan had been providing the
School Board with monthly reports on the issue, and the School Board had approved payments

for service calls made by Sermon Electric and High Planes Propane lOI1g before this meeting
occurred. Again, the Court is left to ponder, what else was there to report that might have
constituted a protected activity?

Finally, the Court addresses the message Ryan posted to Facebook near the end of May
or beginning of June. The posted was message was critical of the Clark County School District

and Administration. Although. the message may have contained a cryptic reference to the
propane probl~ it more closely resembles an unfettered rant by a disgruntled employee. It
offers nothing that resembles a good faith report of "a violation or suspected violation of a

law ...." 44 Therefore, the Court cannot deem it protected activity.
Because Mr. Berrett has not established that he engaged in any protected activity,
summary judgment in favor of the School District is appropriate. Nevertheless, for the sake of
Berrett Aff. 5,
Woods Aff. Ex. A.
-44 lDAllO CODE ANN. § 6-2104(1) (1994) ( emphasis added).
Q

43

OPINION AND ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 14 of22

Page 135

NOV/15/2017/WED 02:44 PM

P. 015/024

EAX No.

inquiry, the Court continues its analysis of the two remaining elements: (1) adverse action.
against the employee. and (2) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

action.

b. The District took an adverse action against Ryan Berrett by terminating his
employment.

The second element oi a retaliatory discharge clw.m. reqwres the employee to establish
the employer took an adverse action against them. Based on the following analysis. the Court

concludes that the Cl.ark County School District took adverse action against Ryan. The evidence
before the Court is that Mr. Be~tt• s employment was renninatetl. This is undisputed..

After Ryan aired his discontent via social media, Ms. Haight-Mortensen notified Mr.

Kerns about the post and requested that he speak to Ryan about it Mr. Kerns approached Ryan

about the Facebook post and asked th.at it be removed. Ryan became belligerent and called Mr.

Kerns a ":fucking asshole/.4:S Mr. K.ems then explained why the past was inappropriate and
requested that Ryan remove it, for the second time. Ryan agreed to remove it, and did so.

Mr. Kerns discussed th.en the Facebook post and his encounter with Ryan at the School
Board's next meeting. Dw.ing the meeting it was decided that Mr. Benett was an at-will

employee and discharge was the appropriate sanction for his conduct. A termination letter was
then drafted and delivered to Ryan.. The letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states in relevant part:
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration
and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the mtemet. Your
performance in some duties has been declming as well witb. building maintenance
and keeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "atwill", or non-contractual employee, the District administration has decided to

terminate your employment effective June 30th, 2012.46

4$

46

K.ru:ns Aff. 7.
Kerns Aff. Ex.. B.
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The School District does not dispute that this letter was delivered. nor that Ryan's emplo)llllent

i··

was ten:ninated.Because itis undisputedhis employmentter.mina:ted. Ryan has established that
the School District took adverse action against him. However S'llinlnm:"y judgmen t in favor of the
School District .is still appropriate based on the Court's analysis ofth.e other two elements.
c.

There is no cam-al com1ection betwee. Ryan Berretts alleged. protected.
activity ana the advene action taken by the District.

To survive summ.ary judgment on a retaliatory discharge claim, Ryan must also establish
a causal connection between his alleged, protected activity and the adverse action taken by the
School District. Because Ryan failed to establish 1hat he engaged in a protected activity, there
can be no causal connection to the adverse action taken by the District. Nevertheless, the Court
continues its analysis of the final element for the sake of inquity, Relevant to this inquiry is the
''Proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment action_ ..

_,'4

7

As stated, several the School District's other employees and administrators received

reports of a propane odor in the gymnasium as early as January 2012. Over a period of several
months, Ryao. worked to resolve the issues and provided regular reports to Mt. Kerns and the
School Board. Multiple affidavits and their corresponding exhibits suppott these facts. It was

not

until approximately five months later. after multiple written and verbal reports were provided
that Ryan's employment was terminated. This is a significant amount oftime, and the Court

concl'Odes that the adverse action taken agamst Ryan and the alleged protected activity are not
causally connected.
In.stead, another cause for Ryan's discharge is more likely. As the Court discussed above.

Ryan posted a derogatory message on Facebook in late May or early June. The posted message
47

See Curlee, 148 ldaho at 397, 224P3d at464 (quotingHengv. RotechMed.Corp., 688 N.W.2d38
9, 401, (N.D.
2004)).
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was critical of the School District and the Administration and violated the School District~s

~.-•.

established policies. Ryan further compounded. this behavior when he was confronted by Mr.
Kerns. When he was confronted Ryan was belligeren~ ca::lling Mr. Kerns a ''fucking asshole." As
a result of this conduct, Ryan was deemed "insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District
administration and have ridiculed. personnel through. social media on the :internet', and his
employment was tenninated. 48

In addition to this belligerent conduct, the letter provided another reason for Ryan's
discharge: he had been doing a poor job in his maintenance duties.49 The evidence before the
Court supports this. Only a few months before his discharge, the School District's facilities were
inspected and numerous maintenance violations were discovered. In fact. some of these
violations had been noted in the previous two or three inspections and still remained
unresolved. 50
Based upon the undisputed. evidence and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Ryan•s "ter.n:rination had nothing to do with the propane issue" or any other
protected activity. si Therefore, the Court concludes there is no causal comiection between the
adverse action taken by th.e School District (i.e. Ryan's discharge) and any activity Ryan claims.
Because Ryan has failed to establish that he engaged in any protected activity or that the adverse
action taken against him was related to such activity was causally related, summary judgment in
favor of the School District is appropriate.
3. As a lna.tter of public policy, Lanie Berrett does not qualify for protection under the
act as the sponse of a whistleblow et.

Keras Aff: Ex. A..
Kens Aff. Ex. A..
so Woods Aft Ex. A.
.si Haight-Mortens&o Aff. 5.
4&
4ll
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As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett claims that she qualifies for protection under
the Act as the spouse of a whistleblower.

~.:

However. based on the Court's prior analysis, Ryan

Berrett failed to establish that he was a whistleblower under the Act or was the subject of a
retaliat.ory discharge. Because Ryan does not qualify for protected status under the Act, Lanie
cannot claim it as his spouse either.
However, even if Ryan had established a prim.a facie case retaliatory discharge, Lanie
would still not be entitled to protection for two reasons. First. under established law, spouses
of

employees are unprotected by the Act. Second. her tennination is not causally connected to any
protected activity.

a. Sponses of Employees are Unprotected

Spouses of employees who engage in protected activity are not protected under 1he Act or
any related Idaho law. The Idaho Whistleblower Act provides a "cause of action for public
employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste

and

violation s of a law, rule or regulati.on."52 Lanie Berrett asserts that as a m.a.tter of public
policy.

she is entitled to protection. However, the Court cannot adopt this conclusion.\
The .language of the Act specifically allows relief for "employees." It makes no reference
to, or allowance, for spouses of employees. 53 The Comt is unwilling to read words into the

statute that were not included by the legislatme, nor is the Court willing to extend protection that
is not expressly provided by the Act Therefore, the Court C8D110t conclude that spouses of
employees engaging in protected activity are entitled to protection under the Aci Because Lanie
Berrett is not entitled to protection as the spouse of an employee claiming protection under the
Act, summary judgment in favor ofthe School District should be granted.
52

lDAJIOCOOE.ANN. § 6-2101 (1994) (8lllphasis added).
IDAHO CODB.ANN, § 6-2101 (1994).

13 See
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b. Lanie>s Tenrdnation is not Causally Connected

~--

Even if Lanie were entitled to protection as the spouse of an employee engaging in
protected activity, summary judgmen t is still appropriate because she- has not established th.at her
termination was causally coDnected to any (even the activity asserted by her husband ). As
discussed above, the Berretts must a establish a prim.a facie case of retaliatory discharge to
survive summary judgment. 54 Such a claim requires three elements: (I) the employee .engaged

in

a protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse action against the employee, and (3) the
adverse action was causally co.nnected to the protected acti'Vity. 55
Lanie does not assert that she engaged in protected activity; rather, she relies on her
husband's claim that he engaged in protected activity. As the Court previously concluded, Ryan
did not engage in protected activity. Even if he had, the Act does not extend protection to
spouses of employees engaging in protected activity.

The second element requires an adverse action against the employee. If the Act made
allowance for spouses· of employees, Lanie could establish this element. Her employenient was
terminated and this is not disputed by the School District Therefore, adverse action was

taken

against her.
However, Lanie would not qualify for protection under the Act because her temuna!ion. is
not causally connected to any protected activity. In the te::ouioation letter. signed by David Kerns,

and delivered. to Lanie, the reasoning for her termination is stated. The letter.states, "You have
consistently overspent the Food Service budget each year. with the amount increasing each time.
You also are not performing satisfactorily in your supervisory duties and you have not followed
the direction from your own supervisor when called upon to make sure District policies and
54

Curlee, 14& Idaho at 397,224 P.3dat 464.
ss Id.
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procedures are followed. ,.56 This reasoning for her termination is further supported. by the

affidavits.
The multiple affidavits submitted to the Court indicate that Ms. Berrett consistently
overspent the food service budget. Notwithstanding, Lanie continued to exceed her budget. Th.en.
after all this> it was discovered that Lanie bad failed. repeatedly, to submit paperwork required by
the State ofldaho.

These are the offenses cited in her termination letter. They are entirely separate and apart

from her husband's activities and the propane leak. The termination letter does not mention or

even. allude that her termination is in any way related to her husband or his actions. As a result,
the Court cannot conclude that the termination of Lanie' .s employment was in retaliation for any
protected activity and sun:unaxy judgment in favor of the School District is appropriate.

V.
CONCLUSION

Therefore. the Court concludes. based on its prior analysis, that it is not botmd by the
Nfoth. Circuit Court of Appeals decision on the Berretts' claims and may conduct an independent

evaluation of the facts before it. Additionally. having conducted an independent evaluation of the
facts befoxe it, the Court cannot conclude that either of the Be:ttetts' engaged in a protected

activity or that their terminations are causally connected to any protected activity. Because the
Berretts have failed to establish tliese two elements, even drawing reasonable inferences in their

favor, the Court camiot conclude th.ere is a genuine issue of material fa.ct left to be resolved at
trial Lastly, based Court's prior analysis, the School District's Fourteenth Defense should be

denied. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the School District is appropriate.

56

Kems Aff. Ex.D.
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Based on the foregoing, the Comt orders as follows:

~·-

1-- . Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
.'.!.•

2- Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
,,,.J,,e.....

Dated this

/5

dayofNovember 2017.

District Judge
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cERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~-:

-!5-

I hereby certify that on this
day of November 2017 the OPINION AND ORDER ON.
PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was entered and a true
and
correct copy was served upon the parties listed below by mailing. with the correct postage
thereon. or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes.

Counsel for Plaintiffs:
Jacob S. Wessel

THOMSEN HOLMAN WHEILER.. PLLC

2635 Channi ng Way

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Fax:208-522-1277
Email: wessel@th.wlaw.com

COllll.Sel for Defendant/Respondent:
Blake G. Hall
HALL ANGELL & ASSOCIATES, LLP
1075 S Utah Avenue, Ste. 150
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone: 208-522-3003
Fax: 208-621-3008

Email: bgh@hasattorneys.com

Colleen Poole
Clerk of the District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

RONALD RYAN BERRETT AND
LANIE BERRETI, husband and wife,
Case No. CV-2017-0328
Plaintiffs,

v.
CLAR~ COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
N0.161,

MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

Defendant

This Memorandum Decision is in response to the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider.

I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this Motion to Reconsider the Court adopts the following facts,
acknowledging there were inadvertent facts in the Court's prior opinion at summary judgment:
The plaintiffs, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett ("Ryan" or "Mr. Berrett", and
"Lanie" or "Ms. Berrett", and collectively as "the Berretts"), were both employed by the Clark
County School District (the "District"). Ryan was employed as the District's maintenance
supervisor and Lanie as the lunchroom supervisor. During the relevant time period, Erin HaightMortensen ("Ms. Haight-Mortensen") was chairwoman of the Clark County School Board,
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David Kerns ("Mr. Kerns") was the district superinten dent, and Gayle Woods ("Ms. Woods")
was the district business manager.

1. Ryan
As the District's maintenance supervisor, Ryan Berrett maintained and fixed the
District's furnace system. 1 As discussed below, this also included the propane tank and
correspon ding system that supplied propane gas to the furnaces. In January 2012, Ms. Woods
began receiving reports that the old gymnasiu m smelled of propane. 2 Ms. Woods informed Ryan
of the reported odor. 3 Ms. Woods also informed Mr. Kerns, and Mr. Kerns informed Ms. HaightMortensen.4 Ms. Woods, Mr. Kerns, and Ms. Haight-M ortensen were all aware that the propane
system leak was a building code violation. 5
Ryan began working to solve the problem and enlisted the help of Sermon Electric. 6
Ryan also began reporting on the problem in his monthly letters to the District's school board
("the Board").7 In February, he wrote, 'We do have a propane pressure issue that has been
ongoing for several years. I have been working with a Sermon technician and think a lot of the
problems are at the bulk tank. I will bet [sic] the problem resolved." 8 Although Ryan does not
mention this letter ( or any of the others he sent) in his affidavit, he has not disputed the
authentici ty of the letters provided by the District.
1

Affidavit of Jacob S. Wessel in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ronald Ryan Berrett
and
La.nie Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161, Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed September
15,
2017) (hereinafter "Wessel Affidavit}, at attachment p.311.
2
Affidavit of Gayle Woods, Ronald RY.(lll-Berrett and Lanie Berrett v. Clarie County School District No. 161,
Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31, 2017) (hereinafter "Woods Affidavit), at p.3
3
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311.
4
Woods Affidavit, at p.3; Affidavit of David Kerns, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett v. Clarie County School
District No. 161, Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31, 2017) (hereinafter "Kerns Affidavit),
at

p-2.

Woods Affidavit, at p.3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Affidavit of ;Erin Haight-Mortensen, Ronald Ryan Berrett and
La.nie Berrett v. Clarie County School District No. 161, Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31,
2017) (hereinafter "Haight-Mortensen Affidavit), at p.3.
6
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311-12.
7
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.27-29.
8
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.27.
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In March, he provided another update to the Board.9 This time he described the work he
had done on the propane system over the past month and his diagnosis of the problem. 10 He
concluded by writing, "I am waiting for a bid from sermon [sic] to correct this problem, when I
receive it I will give it to MR. KERNS [sic] and we will go from there." 11 Later, Ryan received
the bid and showed it to Mr. Kerns and Ms. Haight-Mortensen. 12 There is a dispute about what
happened after Ryan received the quote from Sermon Electric and showed it to Mr. Kerns. Ryan
claims that Mr. Kerns told him to "keep quiet." 13 Mr. Kerns disputes that he instructed Ryan to
"keep quiet." 14
During the months of February, March, and April, Ryan worked with technicians from
both Sermon Electric and High Planes Propane. 15 Ryan mentioned the involvement of Sermon
Electric and High Planes Propane in his monthly letters to the school board. 16 Over the course of
this three month period, both companies visited the school on numerous occasions and attempted
to help Ryan isolate and repair the leak in the propane system. 17 During this time frame, the

Board was aware of these visits and approved payment for the service calls. 18 After several
months of work, it was discovered that the propane system contained micro-leaks throughout and
plans were made to repair it 19

9

Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28.
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28.
11
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28.
12
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.3 I 2-13.
13
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.313.
14
Kerns Affidavit, at p.2.
15
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.31 I-13.
16
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.27-29.
17
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311-13.
18
Woods Affidavit, at p.3.
19
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.312-13; Woods Affidavit, at p.4; Kerns Affidavit, at p.3-4; Haight-Mortensen
Affidavit, at p.3-4.
10
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In May 2012 the propane issue was still unresolved. 20 Ryan attended the Board meeting
to discuss the ongoing propane issue that month.2 1 The Board minutes indicate Ryan appeared
and told the School Board that "the propane issues are still a problem."22 Ryan characterizes his
participation in this meeting, by stating that he ''testified against Mr. Kerns ... :•23
In June, Ryan posted a derogatory message on Facebook.24 The following is an image of

the message Ryan posted, as included in his affidavit: 25
lh.,,m

··,-·
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After it was posted, several members of the community saw and commented on the message. 26
Ms. Haight-Mortensen was among those who it message. 27 After viewing the message, Ms.
Haight-Mortensen provided a copy of it to Mr. Kems. 28
Mr. Kerns discussed Ryan's Facebook post Ryan at the Board's next meeting. 29 Mr.

Kerns and Ms. Haight Mortensen were both present and involved in the meeting. 30 During the
20

Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.34.
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.4.
22
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.34.
23
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314.
24
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.315, 323-24.
25
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.324.
26
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5, Ex.A.
27
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5.
28
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5.
21
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meeting, the District determined that because Mr. Berrett was an at-will employee, termination
was the appropriate sanction for his conduct. 31 A termination letter was then drafted and
delivered to Ryan. 32 The letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states in relevant part:
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration
and have ridiculed personnel tbmugh social media on the internet. Your
performance in some duties has been declining as well with building maintenance
and keeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "atwill", or non-contractual employee, the District administration has decided to
terminate your employment effective June 30th , 2012. 33
Accordingly, Ryan's employment was terminated on June 30, 2012. 34 Ryan disputes that the
Board was aware of, or approved, his termination but has not provided any evidence to support
this conclusion.

2. Lanie
Lanie Berrett was the District's lunchroom supervisor from spring 2009 through June
2012. 35 As the lunchroom supervisor, Ms. Berrett was responsible for proper management of the
kitchen. 36 This required that she prepare (and adhere to) an annual budget and submit staterequired paperwork. 37 The District asserts that Lanie failed to remain within her allotted budget
for at least three consecutive years and submit the state-required paperwork. 38 Furthermore, the
District asserts that Lanie's job performance was unsatisfactory. 39
Her termination letter, which was signed by Mr. Kerns, states, "You have consistently
overspent the Food Service budget each year, with the amount increasing each time. You also are
29

Kerns Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at

p5-6
°Kerns Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5.

3

31

Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5-6.
Kerns Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.5-6.
33
Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. B.
34
Wessel Affidavit, at attachmentp.315.
35
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.329; Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6.
36
Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6;
37
Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6;
38
Woods Affidavit, at p.5; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6;
39
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6;
32
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not performing satisfactorily in your supervisory duties and you have not followed the direction
from your own supervisor when called upon to make sure District policies and procedures are
followed." 40 Accordingly, Lanie's employmen t was terrninated. 41 Lanie disputes the reasons for
her termination. 42 Therefore, for pmposes of summary judgment, the Court assumes Lanie
performed satisfactorily, did not exceed the budget, and submitted the state-required paperwork.
After they were discharged, the Berretts filed an action in the Federal District Court of
Idaho. The Federal court granted summary judgment in favor of the District on all claims and the
Berretts appealed to Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the Federal District Court's ruling as to the federal law claims, but remanded the
decision back to the Federal District Court on the-state law claims. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that the Berretts had established a prime facie case under the Idaho
Whlstleblow er Act and were entitled to a trial. Upon the remand, the Federal District Court
declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case without prejudice. The Berretts then filed
their claims in state district court.

II.
APPLICABLE LAW
1. Standard - Motion to Reconsider
"On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible evidence
or authority bearing-on the correctness of an interlocutor y order." 43 However, it is not required
that the motion "be supported by new evidence or authority." 44 "When deciding [al motion for
reconsidera tion, the district court must apply the same standard of review that the court applied

°Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. D.

4

41

Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.330.
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.329-30.
43
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).
42

44

Id.
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when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. "45 Therefore, when deciding a
motion to reconsider a grant of summary judgment. the Court must apply the summary judgment
standard.46

2. Standard - Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper if, based upon "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuihe issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is ·entitled to judgment as a matter of law."47 In evaluating a
party's Motion for Summary Judgment, "[The Court] liberally construes all disputed facts" and
draws "all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party
opposing the motion."48 Where there is no "issue of material fact, only a question of law
remains."49 When only a question of law remains, the Court "exercises free review."50
Additionally, the nonmovin.g party must provide more than a "mere scintilla of
evidence," creating a genuine issue of material fact. 51 In other words, "[T]he nonmoving party
must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine
issue for trial."52 "Bare assertions that an issue of fact exists, in the face of particular facts
alleged by the movant, are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact." 53

45

46
41

48

Id.
Id.

Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 227, 159 P.3d 862,864 (2007); I.RC.P. 56(c),
Kiebert, 144 Idaho at 227, 159 P.3d at 864.

Id.
so Id.
51
Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,556 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009).
s2 ld.
53
Cates v. Albertson's Inc., 126 ldaho 1030, 1033, 895 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1994).

49
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3. Law of the Case
The law of the case is.similar to stare decisis. Like stare decisis, it seeks to eliminate
"relitigation of settled issues ...." 54 Specifically, the Idaho Court of Appeals has stated:
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision on
an issue of law made at one stage of a proceedinf becomes precedent to be
followed in successive stages of that same litigation. 5
However, notwithstanding this precedent, established by the Idaho Court of Appeals, state
district courts are not required to treat Federal district or circuit court decisions or interpretations
of Idaho law as binding. 56 This applies "even on issues of federal law." 57 Certainly, they may
treat Federal district and circuit court decisions as persuasive, but they are not required to do
so.ss
4. Idaho Whistleblower Act ~ § 6-2101 et seq.
The Idaho Whistleblower Act ("the Act") affords "a legal cause of action for public
employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and
violations of a law, rule or regulation." 59 Protection under the Act is afforded to employees who
communicate, "in good faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower,
or a violation or suspected violation of a law ... under the law of this state or the United

54

Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie Power Co-op., Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 129, 856 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Idaho Ct. App.
1993).
55
Id. (quoting Frazier v. Neilsen, 118 Idaho 104, 106, 794 P.2d ll60, 1162 (Idaho Ct App. 1990))(internal
citations omitted).
56
See State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413,413,398 P.3d 146, 149 (Idaho 2017) (finding error where state district court
felt compelled to follow a directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit).
51
Id. (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235,240, 127 P.3d 138, 143
(2005)).
58
McNeely, 162 Idaho at 413, 398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho 2017).
59
Idaho Code§ 6-2101 (1994).
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States.',6° However, a good faith communication must also "be made at a time and in a manner
which gives the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the waste or violation."61

m.
ANALYSIS
These are the issues before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. (1) Does the
"law of the case" apply to the Ninth Circuit Court's decision, thereby binding this Court and
entitling the Berretts' to a trial their claims? (2) Did the Court properly construe the facts in favor
of the plaintiffs in its decision at summary judgment? (3) Did the Court properly grant summary
judgment in favor of the Defendant, thereby dismissing Ryan Berrett' s whistleblower claim? (4)
Did the Court properly grant summary judgment in favor of the Defendant on Lanie's public
policy claim? (5) Was summary judgment properly granted on Plaintiffs remaining federal law
claims?
1. The Law of the Case

The law of the case does not apply and the Court may make an independent evaluation of
the facts and evidence before it (i.e. it is not bound by the prior decision of the Ninth Circuit
Court's decision). As stated in the Court's earlier decision, the Berretts previously filed their
claims in federal court. The District moved for summary judgment and the Federal District Court
granted summary judgment for the District. This decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on the Berretts' federal
law claims but remanded the case back on the remaining state law claims. In doing so, the Ninth
Circuit stated:

60

Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1) (emphasis added).

61

/d.
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Mr. Berrett established a prima facie case of retaliatory conduct by presenting
evidence that: he engaged in protected activity by reporting "a violation .or
suspected violation of a law" ... he suffered an "adverse action" when he- was
tem1inated . . . and the "close relation in time" between them, among other
factors, suggests he may have been fired for reporting the propane issue. This is
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary
judgment.62
Upon remand the Federa1 District Court declined jurisdiction because there were no more federal
law claims and the case was dismissed without_prejudice. Subsequently, the Berretts refiled their
claims in state district court The Defendants then moved for summary judgment. At summary
judgment the Berretts argued that the Ninth Circuit's decision on appeal constitutes the law of
the case, entitling them to proceed to trial on the merits of their claims.
After careful analysis, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
The Berretts have filed a motion requesting the Court reconsider its prior decision. After the
following analysis, the Court remains convinced that its prior decision, granting summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants, was proper.
Like stare decisis, the "law of the case" seeks to eliminate "relitigation of settled issues ..
. •"

63

The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated:
[W]here an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule
becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same. The decision
on an issue of law made at one stage of a proceeding becomes precedent to be
followed in successive stages of that same Htigation. 64

In Swanson v. Swanson, the Idaho Supreme Court described the law of the case as follows:
[U]pon appeal, the Supreme Court in deciding a case presented states in its
opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement

62

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Ronal.d Ryan and Lanie Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161,
Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed May 9, 2017) (hereinafter"Complaint"), at Ex. A.
63
Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 124 Idaho at 129, 856 P.2d at 1297.
64
Id. (quoting Frazier v. Neilsen, 118 Idaho I 04, 106, 794 P.2d 1160, 1162 (Idaho Ct App. 1990) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
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becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal .... 65
The Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out other language in Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire

Ass 'n. of Seattle, Wash. which describes the law of the case doctrine this way:
Where a judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court -''for a
new trial," the case comes on for the same, in all respects, as if it had never been
tried, subject to this condition, however, that it must be tried in light of and in
consonance with the rules of law as announced by the appellate court in that

particular case. 66
This case is substantially different from the one filed in federal court and does not meet
the standards relied upon by the Idaho Supreme Court in Swanson or Creem. The original
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial was filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho in December 2012 and assigned case number 4: 12-CV-0626-EJL. The Federal
District Court then granted summary judgment for the Defendants on all claims. Plaintiffs
appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court in part
but remanded the case back on Ryan's "whistleblower claim" and on Lanie's "public policy
claim." Upon remand, the Federal District Court granted the Defendant's Motion for the Court to
Decline Jurisdiction and dismissed Plaintiffs' state law claims without prejudice.

67

Plaintiffs' then filed their claims anew, incorporating their same federal Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial when they filed their case in Jefferson County. This new case was filed in

a separate jurisdiction from Plaintiffs' earlier case, and was assigned a new case number
(Jefferson County case no. CV-2017-0328). Although Plaintiffs assert that the case filed in
Jefferson County is the same case, it is not As quoted above, the Idaho Supreme Court has

65

134ldaho 512, 515,5 P.3d 973,976 (2000) (quotingSuitts v. First Sec. Bankofldalw, llOidaho 15, 21,713 P.2d
1374, 1380 (1985)).
66
Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n of Seattle, Wash .. 58 Idaho 349, _, 74 P.2d 702, 703 (1937).
61

Complaint, at Ex. B.
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previously announced that the law of the case only applies "in that particular case."

Based on

the Court's reasoning and analysis the two cases are different and separate. Therefore, the law of
the case does not apply.
Despite Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, there are additional reasons why the
law of the case does not apply. First, state district courts are not required to treat federal dis-trict
or federal circuit court decisions or interpretations of Idaho law as binding.

69

Second, the facts in

the case before the Court are not the same as those in the federal case.
As stated, state district courts are not required to treat federal district or federal circuit
court decisions or interpretations of Idaho law as binding.

70

This even applies to "issues of

. federal law." 71 Certainly, Idaho courts may treat Federal district and circuit court decisions as
persuasive, but they are not required to do so.

72

In its Order and Opinion on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment the Court relied on
this holding as announced by State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413,398 P.3d 146 (2017). In
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiffs attacked the Court's reliance on McNeely by arguing
that the question before this Court, in this case, is entirely different from the question presented
in McNeely (i.e. "must this Court follow decisions by the Ninth Circuit in this exact case").

73

The fatal flaw in Plaintiffs argument is, as reasoned above, the case now pending is not the exact
case that was before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Even if this were the exact same case,
the Court still believes the holding in McNeely is relevant and disposifive.

68

Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n of Seattle, Wash., 58 Idaho 349, _, 74 P.2d 702, 703 (1937).
See State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho at_, 398 P.3d at 149 (finding error where state district court felt compelled to
follow a directive or pronouncement of the Ninth Circuit).
70
Id.
71
Id. (quoting Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer Services, Inc., 142 Idaho 235,240, 127 P.3d 138, 143
{2005)).
72
McNeely, 162 Idaho at_, 398 P.3d at 149 (Idaho 2017).
73
Motion to Reconsider, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lanie Berrett v. Clark Cowity School District No. 161, Jefferson
County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed November 28, 2017) (Hereinafter "Motion"), at p.4.

69
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Notwithstanding, the Court wishes to supplements it prior reasoning and- analysis by
relying on the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in English v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 737, 742, 378
P.3d 1036, 1041 (2016). fu English, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Bonneville County
74
district court. The case was then removed to federal court based diversity of citizenship.

75

Later, the Englishes "filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint ... " on
December 10, 2013, and sought to add two new defendants, Eastern Idaho Regional Medical
Center and Dr. James Taylor.

76

The Englishes did not serve copies of their motion or the second

amended complaint on either of the new defendants at that time.

77

The motion was granted and

the Second Amended Complaint was filed on January 16, 2014.

78

"[T]he filing of the Second

Amended Complaint destroyed diversity and deprived the federal district court of subject matter
jurisdiction."

79

After the Englishes filed their Second Amended Complaint in federal court, the

parties stipulated to remand the case back to state district court.

80

On January 24, 2014, after the case was remanded back to the state district court, the
plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint in the Bonneville County district court, and
served the two new defendants.

81

On March 4, 2014, the Englishes filed an ex parte Rule 60 Motion to Clarify
Docket entry order with the federal district court, seeking clarification that the
order granting their motion to file the second amended complaint related back to
the date on which the Englishes filed their motion for leave to file the Second
Amended Complaint. The motion stated that the purpose would be to clarify "that
2
the Complaint was filed on December 10, 2013, instead of some other date.'.s

74

English v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 737,739,378 P.3d 1036, 1038 (2016).

~M

-

Id.
11
Id.
18 Id. .
19 Id.
so Id.
16

s1 ld.
&2

ld.
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The federal district court entered a clarifying order on the Englishes motion to amend, stating,
"The Court hereby clarifies that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint was effectively filed on
83
December 10, 2013 .... "

Subsequently, the new defendants filed motions for "summary judgment on grounds that
the statute of limitations had expired" and the district court granted the motions, concluding "the
Englishes did not commence the actions against Respondents until after the statute of limitations
had expired."

84

The Englishes appealed. On appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court the

Englishes argued that the federal district court's clarifying order (i.e. the second amended
complaint was effectively filed December 10, 2013) was dispositive. The Idaho Supreme Court
noted that this argument had waived on appeal but addressed the claim anyways by stating,
"Even if the Englishes had not waived the argument, it is well established that 'the decisions of
lower federal courts are not binding on state courts, even on issues of federal law.' Therefore, the
85

federal district court's order of clarification is not binding on this Court."

As stated, the Court also recognizes that the facts in the federal case and the state case are
not substantially the same. Although Plaintiffs' filed the exact same affidavits that were filed in
federal court, along with copies of the Defendant's affidavits from federal court, the Defendant
has filed new affidavits. These affidavits offer facts not before the federal district court or the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Specifically, these affidavits state that the District was aware of
the propane leak in January and recognized it was a building code violation; even though it was

Id.
Id.
85
Id. (internal citations omitted). Although it was a decision made by the federal district court and not the Ninth
Circuit that was at issue in English, this was not the case in McNeely. At issue in McNeely was a pronouncement by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals may be treated as persuasive but are not binding on Idaho's state courts. McNeely, 162 Idaho at_, 398
P .3d at 148-49.

in

84
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86
unable to isolate the cause or source of the leak. Therefore, based on the prior reasoning and

analysis, the Ninth Circuit's decision in the Berrett's former case is not binding on this court, in
this new case.

2. Disputed and Undisputed Facts
Plaintiffs have asserted multiple errors in the Court's findings of fact in its Opinion and
Order on the Parties' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment Specifically, Plaintiffs' assert the
Court failed to recognize facts that support their position and that the Court did not liberally

construe the facts in the light most favorable to them. Examples of the asserted errors are
provided below:
First, Ryan's [sic] was hired as a person on disability. When he was hired, he told
Kerns that he could not do the physical work required, but that he would call
professionals to do the work. He was not responsible for the propane, heating and
furn.ace system. Due to the smell, he called propane companies to check the
system. Second, all of the affidavits state that until March, [sic] 2012, no one
could find a leak in the propane system. No one knew there was a leak in the
propane system. They only knew of a smell. Third, at the May, [sic] 2012 meeting
Ryan testified against Kerns along with two propane professionals, and Kerns was
a [sic] fired as a result. Fourth, Ryan never swore at Kerns and never called him a
''fucking asshole", [sic] but Kerns used foul language towards Ryan and Lanie on
multiple occasions. Fifth, Kerns fired the Berretts without the school board's
knowledge. Only after they were fired, did the Berretts and Kerns go before the
school board to discuss the termination. Sixth, Ryan Berrett always received
positive performance reviews. The first time anyone complained about his
performance was the statement in his termination letter that he was a doing a poor
87
job in his maintenance duties.
Further, Ryan asserts that he engaged in a protected activity under the Idaho
Whistleblower Act and the.evidence shows the propane issue was not known to-the District
Meanwhile, Lanie asserts that the Court erred because she "never exceeded her lunch room
budget in any year" and that her employment evaluations were positive and she did not fail to

86
81

Woods Affidavit, at p. 3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.3.
Motion, at p.7.
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submit the state-required forms mentioned above. Each of these is discussed in greater detail
below.
a.

Ryan's Job Responsibilities

In his Motion to Reconsider Ryan asserts that he was hired as a person on disability. The
issue of Ryan's disability was not~before the Court at summary judgment. Because it was not
before the Court at summary judgment, it is immaterial to the Court's analysis of Plaintiffs'
Motion to Reconsider.

In addition to claiming he was hired as a person on disability, Ryan asserts, for the first
time in his Motion to Reconsider, he was not responsible for the propane, heating, or furnace
systems. However, based on the following analysis, the Court cannot reasonably infer that
Ryan's responsibilities as maintenance supervisor did not include the furnace and propane
systems; or that he was not tasked with resolving the propane issue.
The Court's conclusion is supported by various statements from Ryan's own affidavit.
First, Ryan writes, "I had been doing the best I could with my disability to maintain and fix
88

furnaces, water heaters, and plumbing issues by myself." Whether these were part of his job
duties upon hiring or whether he acquired these duties later by assignment or his own initiative,
it was asserted by Plaintiffs that Ryan undertook to fix these systems.

89

Ryan also described how he became of aware of the propane problem in his own
affidavit, indicating that in January 2012 he began "getting calls every other day about [sic]
strong odor of propane in the old gymnasium from [the District's} business manager (Gayle
Woods) .... " 90 He also wrote that he "Had High Planes Propane come over to check for propane
smell [sic]." He told Dave Kerns, "[He] was going to have Sermon Service and Electric come out
88

Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.31 I.
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311.
90
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311.

89
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91

and [he] was going to lock the old gym up." Over a period of several months Ryan continued,
with the assistance of Sermon Electric, to work on solving the problem(s) with the propane .
system. Once Sermon Electric had prepared a price quote for the needed repairs, Ryan was the
person who received this quote and shared it with Dave Kerns.

92

Ryan also provided regular

reports on the work he was doing with the propane and heating systems in District meetings and
in letters written to the school board.

93

Later, Ryan also reported on the problem(s) with the

propane system at Board meeting in May.

94

All of these facts support the Court's conclusion because in the absence of some
responsibility for the furnace, heating, and propane systems, it is difficult for the Court to
understand why Ryan would have been involved in fixing the problem the way he was. There is
no evidence before the Court that Ryan ever disputed or objected to his responsibility for the
propane and heating systems prior to the objection in Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider.
Therefore, based on the prior reasoning and analysis, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan
was not the person responsible for maintaining and fixing the furnace and propane systems.

b. Affidavits
Ryan has argued that the Court erred in granting summary judgment for the District
because "[A)ll the affidavits state that until March, [sic] 2012, no one could find a leak in the
propane system. No one knew there was a leak in the propane system. They only knew of a
smell." Even drawing reasonable inferences in Ryan's favor, and assuming the actual source,
location, or cause of the propane leak was undiscovered until March 2012, the Court disagrees
with Ryan's assertions.

91

Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311.
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.312.
93
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A.
94
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314.
92
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As mentioned above, Ryan began getting regular calls about a propane odor in the old
gymnasium as early as January 2012. The Court cannot reasonably infer that the odor of propane
in a room or building does not indicate the existence of a leak. Furthermore, when the Plaintiffs
filed their claims in state court, the District provided affidavits from Gayle Woods, Dave Kerns,
and Erin Haight-Mortensen. These affidavits each contain a similar statement which indicates the
District was "aware that the leak in the propane system was a building code violation."

95

As the

affidavits point out, the exact cause of the odor or the leak was unknown but it is evident
everyone involved knew it was a problem and they were actively working to solve it Solving the
problem was difficult because the source or cause of the propane smell, or leak, could not be
isolated.
Plaintiffs dispute these affidavits by arguing they contradict the affidavits filed by the
District in the federal case. However, the Court cannot reasonably infer that the new affidavits
contradict the earlier affidavits that were filed in federal court. Toe new affidavits emphasize the
difficulty in isolating the problem and indicate that Gayle Woods, Dave Kerns, and Erin HaightMortensen recognized the smell represented a building code violation that needed to be located
and corrected. Information that was not provided within the affidavits filed in the federal case.
Plaintiffs also rely upon deposition testimony in which Dave Kerns admits that he was
unaware that the propane leak was a safety issue or that the propane tanks were not in
compliance with building code or that he was unconcerned that the leak posed a safety threat
Neither of these are material. As stated in the affidavits, the District was already aware that a
building code violation existed somewhere in the system and it was working to _isolate it.
Because the District already knew about the violation and was working to isolate it, the mere fact

95

Woods Affidavit, at p.3; Keros Affidavit, at p.2; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.3.

MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Page 18 of 41

Page 161

V

that Ryan (with help from Sermon Electric) may have been the person who isolated the source of
the problem-and reported it does not qualify him for protection under the Act.
As_-to the safety concerns regarding the propane leaks, which were pointed out by
Plaintiffs in their motion to reconsider, this daim is immaterial. The Idaho Whistleblower Act
affords protection to employees who "[communicate] in good faith the existence of any waste of
public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or
regulation adopted under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this state or the United
96
States." Although the Court recognizes that a "safety" issue may be a result or concern of the

reported ''violation of a law, rule or regulation", the statute's focus is on violations of law, rules,
or regulations. Protection under the act is triggered when an employee reports a "violation of a
law, rule or regulation" not a "safety" issue.

97

Therefore, it is immaterial whether Mr. Kerns

recognized the propane problem as a safety concern for purposes of the Act.

c. May 2012 School Board Meeting
As- the Court discussed above,_Ryan was called upon to discuss the propane issue at the
May 2012 school board meeting. Ryan asserts that "According to school board member Sherri
Mead ... the school board terminated Kerns based upon [Ryan's] testimony."

98

Ryan points this

out his affidavit and has provided a note written his calendar (attached to his affidavit as Exhibit
B). However, as presented, this assertion is hearsay. It is an out-of-court statement that does not
fall within any of the recognized exceptions pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
Plaintiffs argue that Ms. Mead's statement is not hearsay under Idaho Rule of Evidence
80I(d)(2) because it is an admission of a party opponent. This is incorrect. Idaho Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2) requires more than just a statement, the statement must be
96

Idaho Code§ 6-2103(1)(a).

<n Id.
98

Motion, at p.10.
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[TJhe party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity,
or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by a party to make a statement
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by a party's agent or servant concerning
a matter within the -scope of the agency or employment of the servant or agent,
made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co9
conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy:9
Plaintiffs have proffered nothing-that indicates Sherri Mead was speaking as the District's
representative, that the District manifested agreeance or adopted her statement as truth; or that
Ms. Mead was authorized to make the statement, was acting within the scope of her agency or
employment, or was a co-conspirator. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that Ms. Mead's
statement regarding Dave Kern's termination is anything but inadmissible hearsay.
The Court has previously stated that Plaintiffs must provide more than a mere scintilla of
evidence to make an issue of fact, on the issue of Mr. Kerns' departure or termination they have
not done so.

100

Even if the statement proffered by Plaintiffs was not hearsay, or Plaintiffs had

obtained an affidavit from Sherri Mead or taken her deposition these would have little bearing on
the issues presented in this case. Ryan has never asserted that he was fired because Mr. Kerns
was fired. In his complaint, Ryan did not assert that it was Mr. Kerns who fired him, wrongfully
or otherwise. Plaintiffs' complaint states, in relevant part:
On June 30, 2012, [the District] terminated Plaintiffs' employment. The reason
which [the District] gave for plaintiffs' termination was a pretext The true reason
and a motivating reason for plaintiffs' terminations was that Plaintiff Ronald
law, rule
Ryan Berrett communicated to the District, in good faith, a violation of a 101
Idaho.
of
state
the
of
law
the
under
adopted
been
or regulation which had
Therefore, whether Sherri Mead told Ryan that Mr. Kerns was terminated based on something
Ryan stated at the Board meeting is immaterial to the Court's analysis.

99

Idaho Rules of Evidence 80l(d)(2).
Van, L47 Idaho at 556,212 P.3d at 986.
101
Complaint, at Ex. ·C.

100
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d. Foul Language
In its Opinion and Order on the Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment the Court

. found that Ryan Berrett referred to Dave Kerns as a "fucking asshole" when confronted
regarding the Facebook post Upon reconsideration, this finding was in error~ however, it is
immaterial to the Court's analysis ·and does not change the outcome of the Court's decision at
summary judgment or upon reconsideration.

e. School Board's Knowledge of Ryan and Lanie's Termination
Plaintiffs have asserted that Dave Kerns terminated their employment without the school
board's knowledge. This is a conclusory assertion raised by the plaintiffs in their Motion to
Reconsider. Beyond the conclusory statements made in their Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiffs
have not pointed to any place in the record or their affidavits or anywhere else that supports their
conclusions. In other words, they have not provided a scintilla of evidence that makes this a
disputed fact.

102

Meanwhile, the District has supplied the affidavits of Dave Kerns and Erin HaightMortensen. Mr. Kerns' affidavit states, in relevant part:
Mr. Berrett's termination had nothing to do with the propane issue. The Distict
decided to terminate Mr. Berrett following his insubordination and verbal abuse
directed toward me. In approximately late May or early June, 2012, I was
contacted by Erin Haight-Mortensen who had seen a derogatory Facebook post
about me. Ms. Haight-Mortensen provided me with a copy of the Facebook post
and I placed it in Mr. Berrett's personnel file. It is my understanding that.students
and parents saw the post and that some students had commented on the post The
Facebook post was inappropriate and a violation of District Policy.
At the next meeting with the School Board, I discussed the Facebook post with
board members and it was determined that because Mr. Berrett was an at-will
103
employee that termination was appropriate.

102

JOJ

Van, 147 Idaho at 556, 212 P.3d at 986.
Kerns Affidavit, at p.5.
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With regard to Lanie's termination, Mr. Kerns wrote, Because of the repeated inability to
efficiently run the kitchen, the District made the decision to terminate Ms. Berrett."

104

Regarding the Berretts' termination, Ms. Haight-M ortensen stated, "I was involved in the
decision to terminate Mr. Berrett's employme nt and can attest that his terminatio n had nothing to
do with the propane issue. The District decided to terminate Mr. Berrett following Mr. Barrett's
insubordi nation and verbal abuse directed towards Mr. Kems."

105

Ms. Haight-Mortensen also

wrote Lanie's employm ent was terminated because of her inability to manage the kitchen and
remain within her budget.

106

Even if Mr. Kerns had terminated Lanie and Ryan without the school board's approval,
he had the authority to do so. Ms. Haight-M ortensen indicated that, "Because Mr. Kerns was the
interim Superintendent, he had authority to terminate Mr. Berrett. He likewise had authority to
terminate Ms. Berrett."

107

The Court notes that bemg fired or terminate d without the approval of

the school board is not the basis for the Berretts' claims. Nor have Plaintiffs cited a propositio n
of law that would support such a position.
Instead, Plaintiffs claim they were fired in retaliation for Ryan "blowing the whistle" on
the problems with the District's propane system, and that their terminations violated Idaho law
and public policy. However, based on the Court's reasoning and analysis in other sections of this
opinion, the Court cannot reasonably infer either of the Berretts qualify for protection under the
Act. Because the Berretts do not qualify for protection under the Act, the Court cannot
reasonabl y infer their terminations with, or without, the Board's approval were wrongful. Even if
the Board's approval was required, Ryan and Lanie have not provided any evidence to support

104

Kerns Affidavit, at p.6.
,os Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.S.
106
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6-7.
107
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.6.
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an inference that the Board lacked- knowledge of the terminations. Therefore, the Court may not
reasonably infer that their terminations were done without the Board's knowledge. In the absence
of disputed facts, the Court concludes that its decision at summary judgment was appropriate.

f. Performance Reviews
Plaintiffs assert the Court's error by arguing "Ryan always received positive performance
reviews. The first time anyone complained about his performance was the statement in his
termination letter that he was doing

apoor job in his maintenance duties."!0

8

In his affidavit he

wrote, "Despite my experience and my always stellar performance evaluations. they denied me
requested reasonable accommodations and eventually fired me."

109

These statements are

conclusory and are insufficient to create an issue of material fact. Rather, this statement is
commentary on the evidence but it is not evidence. The court assumes the fact that he received
stellar performance reviews for purposes of summary judgment, notwithstanding the facts
presented by the record.
The Court notes the inspection reports provided by the District which mention the
discovery of numerous maintenance violations. At summary judgment the Court recognized
these stating, "Only a few months before [Ryan's] discharge, the School District's facilities-were
inspected and numerous maintenance violations were discovered. In fact, some of these
violations had been noted in the previous two or three inspections and still remained
unresolved."

110

Plaintiffs did not dispute that these violations occurred at summary judgment and

has not done so in t.lieir Motion to Reconsider. They only assert a lack of complaints regarding
his job performance prior to his termination.

108

Motion, at p.7.
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.315.
110
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A.

109
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Nonetheless., the Court sets aside the maintenance violations previously relied upon and
assumes, for purposes of summary judgment, that Ryan "always" received superb performance
reviews. In light of this assumption, the Court's conclusion remains unchanged. As stated in the
termination letter provided to Ryan, his employment was terminated because he was
"insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration and ... ridiculed personnel
through social media on the internet."

111

Ryan does not dispute that he did so and has provided a

copy of the message he posted as an exhibit to his affidavit.

112

This reasoning for his termination

is independent of the propane issue and independent of :ll.is job performance. The Court
recognizes that even if Ryan always received stellar performance reviews and had never posted
his grievances or frustrations on social media, this would not preclude his termination because he
was an at-will employee.

113

Ryan has not disputed this.

Idaho law is very clear regarding at-will employees: ''Unless an employee is hired
pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment or limits the reasons why
an employee may be discharged, the employee is at-will and can be terminated for any reason or

no reason at all."

114

Absent the application of an exception to this general rule, the District did

not need to provide a reason for Ryan's termination. As-the Court found at summary judgment,
and reiterates below, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan qualified for protection under
the Idaho Whistleblower Act. Therefore, as an at-will employee his termination was not
wrongful.

Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. A.
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.315, 323-24.
113
Haight-Morte nsen Affidavit, at pS6.
4
(emphasis added).
!! Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 179, 75 P.3d 733, 740 (2003}

Ill

112
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g. Lanie's Lunchroom Budget

Plaintiffs dispute that Lanie ever exceeded her budget; meanwhile, the District asserts
that Lanie exceeded her budget in multiple years. Plaintiffs point to Lanie's affidavit and
attached exhibits to support her assertion. In her affidavit Lanie wrote, "In 2009, when I took
over as lunchroom supervisor, I stayed within budget."

115

She also wrote, "[A]though we may

have overspent the budget in a given month, I did- not overspend the Food Service budget in any
given year."

116

Additionally, Lanie has provided to the "Child Nutrition Financial Report" as ''Exhibit
A" to her affidavit. Although the Child Nutrition Financial Report shows a ~alanced food
services budget for the 2009 fiscal year, the data is inconclusive. First, Lanie did not become the
117
Food Service Supervisor until May 2009 and it is unclear what time period this report covers.

Second, she has not provided the reports for the remaining years of her tenure as Food Service
Supervisor. Lanie was the Food Service Supervisor from May 2009 until June 2012.

118

Despite

asserting that she never exceeded her allotted budget, she has failed to provide evidence for
119
2010, 2011, and 2012.

In direct contradiction of the assertions in her affidavit, Lanie admitted to overspending

her budget when Defendant's counsel asked about it during her deposition:
Q. In the second line it says that you have consistently overspent the food service

budget each year, with the amount increasing each time. That's a true statement?
A.. Yes, sir, it is.
Q. You don't dispute that you overspent the food service budget each year,

correct?
115

Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.329.
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.330.
117
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.330.
118
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.330.
were
119
Toe Court also notes that the District has failed to produce reports for these years, although overage figures
provided in the Affidavit of Gayle Woods.

116
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A. No, I don't.

120

Plaintiffs have not attempted to reconcile the conflicting statements in Lanie's affidavit
with her deposition testimony. Nor have they done so in their Motion to Reconsider and
did not do so when asked by the Court at oral argument. However, this is immaterial to
the Court's analysis.
Even assuming Lanie never exceeded her budget, she was an at-will employee.

121

Plaintiffs have not disputed this fact. As the Court recognized above, "Unless an
employee is hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment
or limits the reasons why an employee may be discharged, the employee is at-will and

can be terminated for any reason or no reason at all."

122

Because Lanie was an at-will

employee the District could fire Lanie for "any reason or no reason at all." Plaintiffs do
not assert that Lanie engaged in any activity that would protect her from termination or
limit the District's ability to terminate her employment. Instead, she asserts protection as
a matter of public policy because of her husband's activities. However, as the Court
found at summary judgment, and reiterates below, Ryan, did not qualify for protection
under the Idaho Whistleblower Act. Therefore, even if the Act, or ldalw public policy,
provided an exception for the spouse of a whistleblower, the Court cannot reasonably
infer that Lanie's termination was wrongful because she was an at-will employee and
because her husband did not engage in protected activity.

i1.0

Affidavit of Blake G. Hall, Ronald Ryan Berrett and Lani.e Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161,

Jefferson County case no. CV-17-0328 (filed August 31, 2017) (hereinafter "Hall Affidavit"), at Ex. B, p. 70: 13 P:-71:20.
21
Kerns Affidavity, at Ex. B.
122

Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 179, 75 P.3d at 740 (emphasis added).
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h. Lanie's Performance Eva1uations
Like Ryan, Lanie asserts that she "always received positive performance evaluations" and
only a few weeks before her termination ''had received a positive performance evaluation and an
offer of a raise."

123

As discussed above, it is undisputed that Lanie was an at-will employee.

''Unless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the
employment or limits the reasons why an employee may be discharged, the employee is at-will
and can be terminated for any reason or no reason at all."

124

Therefore, the District could fire

Lanie for "any reason or no reason at all." Based on the Court's analysis at summary judgment
and in other sections of this opinion, Lanie does not qualify for protection from this rule.
Therefore, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Lanie's termination was wrongful.

i. Required Forms
At summary judgment the Court recognized that Lanie failed to submit several staterequired forms during her tenure as lunch room supervisor. The Court reasoned that this was part
the District's reasoning for firing her. Despite asserting her always positive performance
evaluations, Lanie never directly disputes her failure to submit these forms. However, even if
Lanie did not properly submit the forms, it is innnaterial to the Court's additional analysis.

As stated, Lanie was an at-will employee. Under Idaho law, an at-will employee may •<lJe
terminated for any reason or no reason at all" absent some exception.

125

The Court has

previously determined that Lanie did not qualify for protected status. Therefore, as an at-will
employee, henerminat ion was not wrongful.

123

Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.330.
Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 179, 75 P.3d at 740 (emphasis added).
125
Id. (emphasis added).
124
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3. The Berretts are not entitled to protection under the Idaho Whistleblower Act, or
Idaho Public Policy.
In light of the Court's additional reasoning and analysis regarding the disputed and
undisputed facts in th.is case, the Court reeval~ates the Berretts' claims for protection under the
Idaho Whistleblower Act and Idaho public policy. After additional analysis, the Court concludes
that its decision to grant summary judgment in favor-of the District was appropriate. The Court
will evaluate each plaintiff's claims for protection individually, beginning with Ryan's.
a. Ryan

The Act affords "a legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse
action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or
regulation."

126

Protection under the Act is afforded to any employee that "communicates in good

faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or
127

suspected violation of a law ... under the law of this state or the United States."

Therefore,

more narrowly stated, the issue is whether Ryan reported a violation or suspected violation of a
law, entitling him to protection under the Act
Ryan claims that he reported a violation of the law because he reported on the District's
problem(s) with the propane system. He claims he was discharged in retaliation for making these
reports. In response to Ryan's claims, the District argues the discharge was not retaliatory and
has motioned for summary judgment In order to survive summary judgment, the Berretts carry
"the burden of presenting evidence from which a rational inference of retaliatory discharge under

126

127

Idaho Code§ 6-2101.
Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1).
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the whistleblower act [can] be drawn.''

128

In other words, they must present "a prima facie case

129
-ofretaliatory discharge ... .''

A prirna facie case for retaliatory discharge consists of three elements. To survive
summary judgment the Berretts must establish: (1) Ryan was an employee of the District and
"engaged or intended to engage in protected activity;" (2) the District "took adverse action:
against" him; and (3) there is "a causal connection between the protected -activity" and the
adverse action taken by the District.

130

These three elements will be discussed in sequence

below.

i. Ryan Berrett did not engage, or intend to engage, in protected
activity.

It is undisputed that Ryan was an employee of the District. Therefore, in order to satisfy
this first element, Ryan only needs to establish that he engaged in, or intended to engage in, a
protected activity.

131

Based on the Court's analysis, it cannot reasonably infer that Ryan engaged

in any protected activity.
There is very little precedent that may be used to define the scope of "protected
activities" contemplated under Idaho law. However, as the Act states, it applies to good faith
communicatio ns of "the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a

violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation adopted under the law of this state, a
political subdivision ofthi.s state or the United States."

132

In this case, Ryan claims that he reported a building code violation and that the report(s) .
he made became the catalyst for his termination. As the following analysis illustrates, the alleged

m Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 396, 224 P .3d 458, 463 (Idaho 2008).
Id.
no Id.
131
Id.
132
Idaho Code§ 6-2103(l)(a).

129
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reports Ryan made do not fall within the range of "protected activities" contemplated by the Act.
Ample evidence indicates the propane odor in the old gymnasium was well known to the District
in January 2012. It was reported to Ms. Woods, the District's business manager by several staff
members.133 In tum, Ms. Woods called Ryan to inform him of the problem.

134

Ms. Woods also

135
reported the isst1e to Mr. Kerns, the District's superintendent. Mr. Kerns reported the issue to

the chairwoman of the Board, Ms. Haight-Mortensen.

136

As the District's maintenance supervisor, responsibility fell to Ryan, or he was assigned,
137
to identify the problem and fix it. The Court cannot reasonably infer otherwise. fu February,

after becoming aware of the problem, Mr. Berrett made his first report in his monthly letter to the
Board. Here, the Court again points out it cannot reasonably infer the issue had not already been
reported to the Board by Mr. Kerns and was not already well known throughout the District and
the administration. 138
fu his March letter, Ryan reported on the issue again. This time he described the work he

had done to identify and fix the problem. He also informed the Board, "I am waiting for a bid
from sermon [sic] to correct this problem, when I receive it I will give it to MR. KERNS [sic]
and we will go from there.'' 139 Ryan claims he later received the bid from Sermon Electric,
showed it to Mr. Kerns, and was told to "keep quiet" Mr. Kerns disputes that he ever told Ryan
to "keep quiet."

133

Woods Affidavit, at p.3
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311.
135
Kerns Affidavit, at p.2.
136
Haight-Mortensen Affidavit. at p.2.
137
In Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, Ryan disputed his responsibility for the propane system but as the Court's
earlier analysis shows: there is no genuine dispute of fact. It is clear that Ryan was tasked with solving the problem
the propane system.
138
Woods Affidavit, at p. 3; Kerns Affidavit, at p.2; Haight-Mortensen Affidavit, at p.3.
139
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28.
134
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Although this allegation is suspicious, it is of little -consequence. Even if Ryan was told to
"keep quiet," the Court cannot reasonably infer there was anything to keep quiet about. The
school board was already aware of the propane leak. Mr. Kerns had already informed the school
board's chairwoman, Erin Haight-Mortensen, and Ryan had already begun reporting the problem
in his letters to tbe Board. He hacf already told the Board that Sermon Electric was preparing a
price quote for the needed repairs.

140

Based on the affidavits and other evidence supplied, the

Court cannot reasonably infer that the propane issue was not already known to the District. Nor
can the Court reasonably infer that the leak was not known to be a building code violation before
this particular conversation between Ryan and Mr. Kerns occurred.
This is also supported by additional evidence. As early as February, a technician from
Sermon Electric began making service calls to the school and was assisting Ryan in resolving the
propane leak. 141 Ryan reported this in his February letter to the Board. Ryan also enlisted the aid
of High Planes Propane.

142

It is apparent the School Board knew of this involvement because "it

approved payment for each of the service calls. "

143

It is beyond believable that an employee could be charged with solving a problem (even a
building code or safety violation), provide regular progress reports to his employer, discuss the
viability of proposed solutions with superiors, and then, after being fired, use those same
activities to substantiate claim of retaliatory discharge. This is especially true when the employee
was charged with fixing a problem already known to the employer.
Certainly, the statute offers protectfon to employees who report "a violation or suspected
violation of a law" and it is undisputed that the propane leak was a violation of law; however,

Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A, p.28
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311-12.
142
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.311.
143
Woods Affidavit, at p.3.

IM>
141
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there was nothing to report for purposes of the Act because the District already knew about the
problem and was working to fix it. Therefore, Ryan has failed to establish that any of the actions
described above constituted protected activity.
The Court now looks to Ryan's other actions to determine whether any of these
reasonably constituted protected activity. First, Ryan claims he appeared at the May 17 school
board meeting to testify against Mr. Kerns.

144

The notes from the meeting shed a different light

on his participation. The notes indicate Ryan reported that "the propane issues are still a

problem."

145

From the District's perspective Ryan's participation appears to have been nothing

more than another progress report on the problem he had been tasked with resolving.
Ryan asserts that he and two others "were called before the Board and asked one at a time

if [they] thought that the Superintendent knew that the propane problem could possibly cause
injury to human life." The court for Summary Judgment assumes this to be true. Regardless, this
statement supports the conclusion the District already knew about the propane problem and
acknowledged it Why else would the school board have "called" upon Ryan to discuss the issue
at all?
All things considered and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs (the
nonmoving party), the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan's participation in the school
board meeting was protected activity. The District already knew about of the propane leak, Mr.
Kerns had personally informed the Board of the issue four months before. Ryan had also been
providing the Board with monthly reports on the is.sue. The Board had also approved payments
for service calls made by Sermon Electric and High Planes Propane. Again, the Court is left to
ponder, what else was there to report that might have constituted a protected activity? Even if

144
145

Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.314.
Woods Affidavit, at Ex. A.
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Ryan'·s assertions are true, even if he was called to testify about or against Mr. Kem at the school
board meeting, what could he have said to qualify him for-protection?· Ryan does not claim he
was terminated for testifying against Mr. Kerns. He claims he was fired for reporting on the
propane issue, which was a violation of law.

146

Lastly, the Court discusses the message Ryan posted t-0 Facebook on or about June 18,
2012.

147

148
Although the
The posted message was critical of the District and its administration.

message may have contained a cryptic reference to the propane problem, it more closely
resembles ~ unfettered rant by a disgruntled employee.

149

It offers nothing that resembles a

good faith report of "a violation or suspected violation of a law ... :•

150

Therefore, the Court

cannot reasonably infer that it constitutes protected activity.
Because the Court cannot reasonably infer that Ryan engaged in any protected activity,
summary judgment in favor of the District was appropriate. Nevertheless, for the sake of inquiry,
the Court continues its analysis of the two remaining elements: (1) adverse action against the
employee, and (2) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.

b. The District took an adverse- action against Ryan Berrett by terminating his
employment.
The second element of a retaliatory discharge claim requires the employee to establish
the employer took an adverse action against them. Based on the following analysis, the Court
may reasonably infer the District took adverse action against Ryan. The evidence before the
Court is that Mr. Berrett's employment was terminated. This fact is,undisputed.

146

Complaint, Ex. C, at p.7-9.
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.323-24.
148
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.323-24.
149
Wessel Affidavit, at attachment p.323-24.
ISO Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1).

147
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After Ryan posted the aforementioned rant on Facebook, Ms. Haight-Mortensen notified

Mr. Kerns about the post and requested that he speak to Ryan about it Mr. Kerns then discussed
tlie Facebook post at the Board's next meeting. During the meeting it was decided that Mr.
Berrett was an at-will employee and discharge was the appropriate sanction for his conduct. A
termination letter was then drafted and delivered to-Ryan. The letter, signed by Mr. Kerns, states
in relevant part:
You have been insubordinate and verbally abusive to the District administration
and have ridiculed personnel through social media on the internet. Your
performance in some duties has been declining as well with building maintenance
and keeping lights replaced and in working order. Due to your status as an "atwill", or non-contractual employee, the District administration has decided to
151
th
terminate your employment effective June 30 , 2012.
The District does not dispute that this letter was delivered, or that Ryan's employment was
terminated. Because it is undisputed his employment terminated, Ryan has established that the
District took adverse action against him.
The Court notes that, for the first time at oral argument, on Plaintiffs' Motion to
Reconsider, Plaintiffs asserted that the District took additional adverse action against them.
Plaintiffs asserted that the District raised their rent and eventually evicted them from their
District owned residence. The Court recognizes these as additional adverse actions and assumes
them to be true, but the Court has already recognized that, for purposes of summary judgment,
the District took adverse action against the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the prior related analysis and
conclusion of the Court is unchanged by these new assertions and summary judgment in favor of
the School District was still appropriate based on the Court's analysis of the two remaining
elements.

151

Kerns Affidavit, at Ex. B.

MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Page 34 of 41

Page 177

c. There is no causal connection between Ryan Berrett's alleged, protected
activity and the adverse action taken by the District
To survive summary judgment on a retaliatory discharge claim, Ryan must also establish
a causal connection between his alleged, protected activity and the adverse action taken by the
District. Because Ryan failed to establish that he engaged in a protected activity, there can be no
causal connection to the adverse action taken by the District. Nevertheless, the Court continues
its analysis of the final element for the sake of inquiry. Relevant to this inquiry is the "Proximity
in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment action .... "

152

As stated, several of the District's other employees and administrators received reports of
a propane odor in the gymnasium as early as January 2012. Over a period of several months,
Ryan worked to resolve the issues and provided regular reports to Mr. Kerns and the Board.
Multiple affidavits and their corresponding exhibits support these facts. It was not until
approximately four or five months later, after multiple written and verbal reports were provided,
that Ryan's employment was terminated. This is a significant amount of time, and the Court
cannot reasonably infer that the adverse action taken against Ryan and the alleged protected
activity are causally connected.
Beyond this, Ryan asserts that he attended the May 17 Board meeting and testified
against Mr. Kerns. Then his employment was terminated roughly six weeks later. Although these
two events occurred close in time, the temporal relation is immaterial because a claim that Ryan
w.as terminated for testifying_against Mr. Kerns is not before the Court. Therefore, the Court
cannot reasonably infer that there a causal connection between the adverse action taken by the
District and the activities Ryan claims were protected. This is especially true because the District

See Curlee, 148 Idaho at 397,224 P.3d at464 (quoting Heng v. RotechMed.Corp., 688 N.W.2d 389,401, (N.D.
2004)).
152
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was already aware of the propane issue as early as January and Ryan had been providing regular
reports on the problem months before his termination.
The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit Court concluded that Ryan's termination was
sufficiently close in time to the alleged, protected activity to survive summary judgment
However, the facts now before the Court are different from the facts in the case heard by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The affidavits filed in this case make it clear the District was
aware of the building code violation caused by the propane issue as early as January 2012. As the
Court discussed above, many months passed since Ryan began working on and reporting on the
propane issue and his termination. Based on this analysis, the Court cannot reasonably infer that
the two events were close in time or causally connected. Therefore, In other words, the Comt
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the District and Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider
should be denied as to the wrongful termination claim.

4. As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett does not qualify for protection under the
Act as the spouse of a whistleblower.
As a matter of public policy, Lanie Berrett claims that she qualifies for protection from a
retaliatory discharge as the spouse of a whistleblower. However, based on the Court's prior
analysis, it cannot reasonably infer that Ryan Berrett failed to establish that he was a
whistleblower under the Act or was the subject of a retaliatory discharge. Because Ryan does not
qualify for protected status under the Act, Lanie cannot claim protection as his spouse. Even if
Ryan had established a case retaliatory discharge, Lanie would still not be entitled to protection
for two reasons. First, under established law, spouses of employees are unprotected by both the
Act and public policy. Second, the Court cannot reasonably infer that her termination is causally
connected to any protected activity.

MEMORDANDUM DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 36 of 41
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a. Spouses of Employees are Unprotected
Spouses of employees who engage in protected activity are not protected under the Act or
any related Idaho law or policy. The Idaho Whistleblower Act provides a "cause of action for
public employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting
waste and violations of a law, rule or regulation." 153 Lanie Berrett asserts that as a matter of
public policy, she is entitled to protection. However, the Court will not adopt this conclusion.

The language of the Act specifically allows relief for "employees." It makes n0 reference
to, or allowance for, spouses of employees. 154 The Court is unwilling to read words into the
statute that were not included by the legislature. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has not
previously extended protection to an employee's spouse as a matter of public policy and the
Court is unwilling to do so now. ''Even if a cause of action for damages should exist as relief for
alleged retaliatory discharge in contravention of public policy based upon conduct of the
employee's spouse ... the dearth of evidence in this case fails ..." to support a reasonable
inference that Lanie's spouse was entitled to protection under the act, or that her termination was
causally connected to any of his allegedly protected activities. 155
Plaintiffs have argued that this Court should extend whistleblower protection to spouses
of eligible employers. Plaintiffs have made valid arguments as to why this would be appropriate;
however, in considering these arguments the Court notes that the whistleblower statute's latest
version was enacted by the legislature in 1994. It is not a statute that is over fifty, or even one
hundred, years old with a chariging and evolving population. The court also notes the specific
language of the statute says, "employee."

153

Idaho Code§ 6-2101 (emphasis added).
See id.
155
Edmondson, l 39 Idaho at 179, 75 P.3d at 740 (emphasis added).
154
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This Court consistently applies statutes as written and it is not persuaded that this is a
situation where an exception or an addition to the statute is appropriate as a matter of public
policy. If the Idaho legislature desires to extend protection to spouses of employees under the
whistleblower statute it may do so. This court is not persuaded that it should enlarge the
protection already made available by the legislature. The Idaho legislature may do so if it
believes such protection is appropriate.

b. Lanie's Termination is not Causally Connected
Even if relief were available based upon the conduct of an employee's spouse as a matter
of public policy, summary judgment is still appropriate because Lanie has not established that
her termination is causally connected to any protected activity (even the activity asserted by her
husband). As discussed, the Berretts must establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge to
survive summary judgment. 156 Such a claim requires three elements: (1) the employee engaged
in a protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse action against the employee, and (3) the
adverse action was causally connected to the protected activity.

157

Lanie does not assert that she engaged in protected activity; rather, she relies on her
husband's claim that he engaged in protected activity. The Court previously decided that it could
not reasonably infer Ryan had engaged in protected activity. The Court emphasizes that even if
he had, neither the act nor Idaho public policy extends protection to spouses of employees who
engaged in protected activity.
The second element requires an adverse action against the employee. If the Act made
allowance for spouses of employees, Lanie could establish this element. Her rent was increased,
her employment was terminated, and she was evicted from her residence. Therefore, for purposes

156
1s1

Curlee, 148 Idaho at 397, 224 P.3d at 464.
Id.
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V

of summary judgment, the Court may reasonably infer that adverse action was taken against
Lanie.
However, the Court cannot reasonably infer Lanie qualifies for protection under the Act
because her termination is causally connected to .any protected activity. Lanie has not asserted
that she engaged in any protected activity. Instead, she asserts that her termination is causally
connected to her husband's activities.
As stated, ''Proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action ... '' is relevant to determining whether the two are causally connected. 158 As discussed
above, months passed between Lanie's termination and Ryan's allegedly protected activity.
During this period, Ryan was constantly updating the school board on his progress. The Board
also called on Ryan to discuss the propane issue at the May 17 Board meeting. 159 Based on this
and the Court's analysis in other sections of this opinion, the Court cannot reasonably infer that
Lanie's termination was causally connected to any protected activity. As a result, the Court
cannot reasonably infer that Lanie's termination was in retaliation for any protected activity
(either her own or her spouses). As a result, the Court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of the District on Plaintiffs' claim for retaliatory discharge. Plaintiffs' Motion to
Reconsider should be denied.

5. Remaining Claims
As to the remaining federal law claims, listed in the complaint, which were not addressed
by the parties in the original Summary Judgment Motion and in the Courts prior Opinion and
Order on Parties' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' Motion
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See id. (quoting Heng v. Rotech Med.Corp., 688 N.W.2d 389,401, (N.D. 2004)).
This provides additional evidence that the District knew about and acknowledged the propane problem.
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to Reconsider. As the Plaintiffs correctly point out, they should be allowed to address those
issues through pleading and argument

IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:
1- Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the decision on Plaintiffs' Whistleblower/Retaliation

Claims is DENIED.
2- Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the decision on Plaintiffs' Disability Discrimination

claims is GRANTED.
3- Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the decision on Plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claims is

GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this ~ r u a r y 2018.

~
District Judge
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